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ELEMENTARY 


PRINCIPLES  OF  INTERPRETATION, 


TRANSLATED   FROBI   THE   LATIN   OF 


J.  A.  ERNESTI, 


ACCOMPANIED  BY  NOTES,  WITH  AN   APPENDIX    CONTAINING   EX- 
TRACTS FROM  MORUS,  BECK,  KEIL,  AND  HENDERSON. 


BY  MOSES  STUART, 

Associate  Prof,  of  Sac.  Lit.  in  Theol.  Seminary,  Andover. 


jFouvtl)  33tiitton 


ANDOVER: 

PUBLISHED  BY  ALLEN,  MORRILL,  AND  WAEDWELL, 
NEW  YORK : 

DAYTON    AND     SAXTON. 

1842. 


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'Sl^^D 


/U^L^ 


PREFACE 


TO   THE    FOURTH    EDITION. 


The  public,  although  indulgent  in  respect  to  this  work,  are 
not  prepared  to  receive  another  apology  for  the  want  of  some 
emendation.  The  simple  truth  is,  that  the  intelligence  re- 
specting the  exhausted  state  of  the  last  edition  came  upon  me 
altogether  unexpectedly;  and  came  upon  me,  also,  when  so 
connected  with  other  engagements  (if  not  more  important  at 
least  more  imperious),  as  to  render  it  absolutely  impossible 
for  me  to  undertake  a  remodelling  of  this  treatise.  All  I 
could  do,  or  have  done,  was  simply  to  correct  the  press  while 
a  reprint  was  made. 

I  might  justify  myself,  perhaps,  in  the  view  of  the  public, 
were  I  to  state  what  my  engagements  are.  But  I  must  mere- 
ly cast  myself  on  their  indulgence,  not  deeming  it  proper  to 
bring  my  private  pursuits  before  them,  in  the  preface  to  this 
little  work. 

Some  account  of  the  manner  in  which  this  book  is  made 
up,  will  be  proper  for  the  sake  of  those  who  may  desire  to 
read  it.     Such  an  one  I  shall  now  subjoin.  ^' 

The  edition  of  Ernesti  from  which  I  have  made  the  present 
translation,  is  that  published  by  Dr.  Ammon  at  Leipsic,  in 
1809.  Of  his  notes  I  have  made  but  little  use.  Some  of 
them  are  so  thoroughly  neological,  that  I  could  not  in  con-  ( 
science  adopt  them.  My  principal  reason  however  for  omit-  ' 
ting  his  notes,  is,  that  I  found  a  much  better  commentator  on 
Ernesti,  to  whom  I  profess  myself  to  be  greatly  indebted.  I 
refer  to  Morus  ;  whose  Hermeneutica  is  a  system  of  lectures^ 


IV  PREFACE. 

on  interpretation,  of  which  Ernesti's  Institutio  is  the  basis  or 
text-book.  The  work  of  Morus  I  prize  so  highly,  that  I  have, 
at  the  close  of  almost  every  section  of  Ernesti,  referred  to' 
the  corresponding  part  in  his  commentator.  The  notes  which 
I  have  added  to  the  work,  contain,  for  the  most  part,  a  sum- 
mary of  lohat  Morus  has  said.  For  the  fidelity  of  this  sum- 
mary, and  for  the  matter  of  some  of  the  notes,  specially  of 
the  longer  ones,  I  am  responsible.  The  notes  are  distin- 
guished from  the  text,  by  being  printed  in  smaller  type.  Any 
more  distinction  was  thought  unnecessary. 

Morus  is  an  author  too  copious  for  republication  in  our 
country,  but  may  easily  be  imported.  The  student  cannot 
fail  to  read  him  with  great  profit.  The  Latin  is  uncommonly 
easy ;  and,  if  I  may  judge  from  my  own  feelings,  very  pure 
and  classical.  I  would  earnestly  recommend  it  to  every  stu- 
dent, to  compare  Morus  with  Ernesti,  in  all  the  places  where 
reference  in  the  following  work  is  made  to  him. 

The  works  of  Keil,  Beck,  and  Seller,  to  which  reference  is 
made  at  the  head  of  most  of  the  chapters,  are  useful  ?jianuals 
of  the  science  of  interpretation,  and  can  be  procured  at  a 
very  moderate  expense.  In  point  of  arrangement,  and  in  the 
exclusion  of  matter  which  does  not  belong  to  the  proper 
province  of  Hermeneutics,  they  have  some  advantage  over 
Ernesti.  I  believe,  however,  that  Ernesti  has  exhibited  the 
essential  part  of  the  science  in  question  more  fundamentally, 
and  in  a  more  convincing  and  instructive  way,  than  either  of 
these  authors.  Still,  as  they  are  more  recent,  and  have  been 
much  used  by  those  who  study  interpretation,  I  thought  it 
might  be  acceptable  to  refer  to  them. 

Other  books  are  occasionally  referred  to,  but  not  often, 
with  the  exception  of  Morus.  It  would  have  been  easy  to 
add  a  multhude  of  references  to  books,  on  every  subject,  and 
every  ramification  of  each  subject,  throughout  the  work.  But 
I  am  not  persuaded  of  the  utility  of  this  method  for  beginners. 


PREFACE.  V 

The  mind  is  overwhelmed  with  the  endless  task,  which  the 
reading  of  so  many  writers  would  occasion.  There  may  be 
a  show  of  learning  in  a  writer,  who  makes  his  references  so 
copious ;  but  the  real  profit  to  the  student  is  comparatively 
small.  A  reference  to  a  few  of  the  best  books,  is  of  more 
importance  than  to  accumulate  an  undistinguished  mass, 
which  presents  a  mere  catalogue  of  what  has  been  published. 
Beck  is  not  free  from  this  fault ;  and  even  Keil  has  not  made 
his  "  select  literature  "  sufficiently  select. 

To  the  third  division  of  this  work,  which  treats  of  translat- 
ing from  one  language  into  another,  I  have  added  the  greater 
part  of  an  excellent  dissertation  of  Morus,  which  comprises 
this  topic.  In  order  to  do  this,  [  have  omitted  a  part  of  the 
chapter  in  Ernesti,  pertaining  to  this  subject ;  as  I  thought  it 
far  less  useful  than  what  is  inserted  from  Morus. 

Part  fourth  contains  a  summary  of  the  laws  of  criticism, 
which  are  to  regulate  the  judgment  of  those  who  form  opin- 
ions about  the  genuine  text  of  the  Scriptures.  Exceptions 
might  be  made  to  some  of  these  laws ;  but  I  have  not  thought 
them  of  sufficient  importance  to  be  urged  here,  where  every 
thing  is  designed  to  be  a  mere  summary  of  general  maxims. 
Beck  has  given  a  more  brief  \\ew  of  the  subject  of  criticism, 
than  I  have  been  able  elsewhere  to  find  ;  and  the  biblical 
student  should  not  be  altogether  ignorant  of  it,  as  cases  of 
controversy  may  arise  about  the  text,  where  ignorance  of  this 
nature  would  subject  him  to  serious  disadvantages. 

Part  fifth  consists  of  a  chapter  from  Keil,  on  the  Qualifica- 
tions of  an  Interpreter.  It  is  so  much  more  brief  and  com- 
prehensive than  the  corresponding  chapter  in  Ernesti,  that  1 
could  not  hesitate  to  prefer  it.  A  list  of  some  of  the  best 
books,  on  the  topics  to  which  the  chapter  adverts,  will  be 
found  at  the  close  of  the  respective  sections. 

Part  sixth  contains  an  extract  from  the  London  edition  ot 
this  work,  which  extract  exhibits  the  sentiments  of  Dr.  Hen- 
1* 


VI  PREFACE. 

derson,  the  editor  of  that  edition,  respecting  the  moral  quali- 
fications of  young  men  who  enter  on  studies  appropriate  to 
the  sacred  office.  The  readers  of  this  httle  volume  will  prize 
it  the  more  in  consequence  of  its  exhibiting  the  views  of  one 
who  is  justly  regarded  with  great  respect  and  much  esteem, 
by  those  who  have  the  privilege  of  any  acquaintance  with  him. 

The  Index  or  table  of  Contents  to  the  present  edition,  is, 
after  the  example  of  Dr.  Henderson,  made  much  fuller  and 
more  particular  than  in  the  first  and  second  American  editions. 
Indeed  it  is  throughout  almost  an  exact  copy  of  his. 

In  regard  to  the  translation  itself  I  have  only  to  remark, 
that  I  have  made  what  may  be  called  a  free  translation.  I 
have  supplied  some  links  necessary  for  easy  transition,  and 
also  for  the  sake  of  perspicuity.  I  have  frequently  broken  up 
sections,  and  even  sentences,  for  the  same  purpose.  I  have 
also  numbered  the  sections  continuously^  for  the  sake  of  easy 
reference.  But  I  have  not,  in  any  case,  designedly  changed 
the  sentiment  of  Ernesti.  My  great  object  has  been,  so  to 
present  his  treatise  in  English  as  to  make  it  most  perspicuous 
and  useful  to  the  English  reader. 

At  the  commencement  of  each  section  of  the  text  I  have 
placed  a  very  brief  notice  of  the  contents ;  which,  for  con- 
venience to  the  reader  in  finding  easily  any  subject  after 
which  he  is  seeking,  has  been  printed  in  Italics.  These  sum- 
maries belong  not  to  the  original  work ;  1  am  responsible  for 
them. 

If  the  manual  shall  prove  to  be  intelligible  and  useful  to 

the  student,  who  is  entering  upon  the  regular  study  of  the 

Sacred  Records,  my  wishes  and  highest  expectations  will  be 

gratified. 

^  M.  STUART. 

Andover.,  Theol.  Seminary,  Nov.  1841. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 


OF    INTERPRETATION    IN    GENERAL. 

Necessity  and  utility  of  interpretation 

Difficulties  attending  it  

Definitions        ........ 

Requisites  of  a  good  interpreter         .... 

Means  by  which  difficulties  and  their  causes  are  detected 

Means  of  removing  these  difficulties 

Exercise  and  Habits  adapted  to  overcome  them 

Skill  in  explanation 

Definition  of  Hermeneutics 

Division  of  the  same 


Page. 
13 
13 
14 
14 
15 
16 
17 
17 
17 
18 


PART  I. 
CHAPTER  I. 

OF    THE    MEANING    OF    WORDS. 

Every  word  must  have  some  meaning  .... 
Meaning  of  words  conventional  ..... 
Connection  between  words  and  ideas  now  rendered  necessary 

by  usage  

Signification  of  words  multiplied  in  process  of  time 
How  to  find  the  meaning  in  each  case      .... 

Ambiguity  of  words  arises  from  various  causes 

Error  of  those  who  assign  many  meanings  to  a  word  at  the 

same  time  and  in  the  same  place 
Error  of  those  who  affirm  that  the  words  of  Scripture  mean  all 
that  they  poossibly  can  mean  .... 

The  sense  of  words,  properly  considered,  is  not  allegorical 
Properly  speaking,  there  is  no  typical  sense  of  words 
Danger  resulting  from  the  spirit  of  multiplying  allegories  and 
types       ......... 

The  sense  of  words  depends  on  the  usus  loquendi,  which  is  de 
termined  in  a  variety  of  ways         .... 

Grammatical  and  historical  sense        ..... 

Grammatical  sense  the  only  true  one        .... 

The   principles  of  interpretation  are  common  to  sacred  and 
profane  writings       ....... 

Language  can  be  properly  interpreted  only  in  a  philological  way 
Any  method  of  interpretation  not  philological,  is  fallacious 
The  analogy  of  faith  or  doctrine  as  applied  to  interpretation 


VJ 
20 

20 
21 
21 
21 

22 

23 
23 
24 

24 

25 
26 
26 

27 
27 

28 
28 


Vlll 


CONTENTS. 


29 
30 
31 
31 

31 


The  sense  of  Scripture  not  arbitrary 

No  sentiment  of  the  Scriptures  to  be  hastily  deemed  unreasonable 
Interpretation  should  rather  be  grammatical  than  doctrinal 

No  real  contradictions  in  Scripture 

Every  interpretation  should  harmonize  with  the  design  of  the 
writer,  and  with  the  context  .         .         . 

CHAPTER  II. 

OF  THE  KINDS  OF   WORDS  AND   THEIR  VARIOUS  USES. 

Words  proper  and  tropical         .... 

Words  as  first  used 

Mode  of  forming  tropical  words 

Tropical  words  sometimes  become  proper  ones 

Usage  sometimes  effects  this  change 

Tropical  words  become  proper  by  transfer 

used  for  the  sake  of  variety  in  expression 

used  for  ornament     ..... 

The  frequency  of  tropes  depend  much  on  the  genius  of  the  writer 

Tropes  used  from  necessity  differ  from  those  employed  for  va- 
riety or  ornament     . 

Sense  of  tropical  words  grammatical 

Origin  of  synonymous  words 

Definition  of  emphasis 

No  word  of  itself  emphatic 

Kinds  of  emphasis     . 

How  emphasis  is  known     . 

No  ground  for  dividing  emphasis  into  real  and  verbal 

Tropical  words  not  of  course  and  from  their  nature  emphatic 

Words  in  one  language  do  not  always  correspond  exactly  to 
those  in  another      ........ 

Antithesis 

Mstract  and  concrete  icords. 

The  use  of  abstracts  for  concretes  arose  from  necessity     . 

Fopular  and  learned  use  of  words       ...... 

PART  II. 

RULES  OF  INTERPRETATION. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Introductory  remarks 

CHAPTER  U. 

OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI  GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD 
LANGUAGES. 

Usus  loquendi  known  by  testimony 45 

How  to  obtain  direct  testimony         ......  45 

Definitions  of  words  ,        . 46 

Examples 46 

Parallel  passages 46 

Parallelism  is  verbal  and  real 47 

Parallel  passages  to  be  read  continuously  and  frequently         .  49 


43 


CONTENTS. 


IX 


The  exercise  of  comparison  should  be  often  repeated  .        .    50 

Many  parallel  passages  should  be  compared         .         .         .         .51 
Testimony  of  Scholiasts  respecting  the  usus  loquendi  ,         .    52 

Glossaries     .         .         , 52 

Versions 53 

Other  similar  testimonies 54 

Knowledge  of  the  peculiar  style  and  all  the  circumstances  of  an 

author  necessary 54 

The  nature  of  composition  specially  to  be  regarded     .         .         .55 

CHAPTER  III. 

OTHER  MEANS  TO  ASSIST  IN  FINDING  THE  SENSE   OF  WORDS 
BESIDES  THE  USDS  L0(^UENOI. 

Necessity  of  indirect  testimony 5G 

Scope  of  a  writer  the  first  and  best  means 50 

Cautions  in  judging  of  the  scope n  •  ^' 

Use  of  the  context 59 

Various  comparisons  useful 59 

Analogy  of  languages  of  use 60 

Grammatical  analogy 61 

Analogy  of  kindred  languages 01 

Etymology  an  uncertain  guide     i 62 

Similar  expressions  to  be  compared 62 

Foundation  of  analogy  in  all  languages        .  .         ,         .  63 

Use  of  this  general  principle 63 

Interpretation  by  appeal  to  the  nature  of  things,  etc.  .         .  64 

The  error  of  pressing  etymologies  too  far  not  unfrequent    .         .  65 

CHAPTER    IV. 

ON  FINDlIfC  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI  OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT, 

Knowledge  of  the  New  Testament  dialect  important  .         .     GO 

The  question  stated  and  limited ^ 

What  it  excludes ,         .     67 

The  kind  of  Greek  with  which  the  N  .Testament  is  to  be  compared    68 

New  Testament  Greek  not  pure 68 

Some  phrases  common  to  Greek  and  Hebrew      .  .         .69 

Arguments  to  prove  that  the  New  Testament  Greek  is  not  pure     69 
Objections  answered    .........     70 

Hebrew-Greek  idiom  does  not  necessarily  make  the  style  of  the 

New  Testament  obscure    .......     71 

Language  of  the  New  Testament  is  Hebrew-Greek    .         .         .71 

It  also  comprises  Latinisms,  etc. 72 

Method  of  finding  the  usus  loquendi  of  the  New  Testament  not 

difficult 72 

Rules  for  finding  it 72 

Much  caution  necessary  to  decide  what  is  classic  and  what  is 

Hebrew  Greek 73 

Sepluagint  and  Hebrew  to  be  compared      .         .         .         .         .73 

Aquila  and  Symmachus  to  be  studied 74 

When  the  Hebrew  idiom  is  to  be  preferred  .         .         .         .74 
in  the  doctrines  of  religion  especially        .         .         .         .75 


%  CONTENTS. 

in  respect  to  the  forms,  tenses,  and  number  of  words        ,     75 

Other  idioms  to  be  consulted  in  certain  cases  .  .  .  .75 
Direct  testimony  not  alwaj'^s  sufficient  .  .  .  .  .76 
New  words  to  be  explained  by  testimony  direct  and  indirect       .     77 

Greek  fathers  to  be  consulted 77 

Glossaries 78 

Glosses         ...........     78 

Context        . 79 

Analogy  of  faith 79 

Difficult  idioms  to  be  specially  studied 80 

Difficult  forms  in  profane  writers  to  be  studied  .         .         .81 

CHAPTER  V. 

RULES  IN  RESPECT  TO  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE. 

Duty  of  an  Interpreter  in  respect  to  tropical  language  .  .  82 
Certain  rules  respecting  tropical  diction  examined  .  .  .82 
How  to  examine  whether  language  is  tropical     .         .         .         .83 

Certain  words  not  tropical 85 

Words  tropical  where  the  subject  and  predicate  disagree     .         .     86 
Laws,  history,  didactic  works,  seldom  admit  tropes     .         .         .86 
[Jsus  loquendi  in  regard  to  things  which  cannot  be  examined  by 

our  feelings  and  conceptions      ......     87 

Adjuncts  useful  in  determining  when  words  are  tropical     .         .     88 

Context  to  be  consulted .         .88 

Sources  of  tropical  interpretation  .         .         .         .         .        .     88 

Caution  to  be  used  in  judging  from  etymology    .         .         .         .89 

Method  of  determining  whether  a  trope  is  adequately  understood     89 
Allecrories,  how  interpreted  .......     90 

Parables 92 

CHAPTER  VI. 

RULES  RESPECTING  EiMPHASI.S. 

Errors  respecting  emphasis  very  frequent 93 

Ground  of  these  errors 93 

Need  of  rules  to  direct  us  in  judging  of  emphasis         .         .         .94 

Insufficient  rules 94 

Kinds  of  writing  where  emphasis  is  rare 94 

No  word  of  itself  emphatical 95 

Emphasis  not  to  be  taught  by  etymology,  or  recurring  to  the 

original  sense  of  words      .......     95 

Prepositions  in  composition  do  not  always  increase  the  meaning 

of  a  word   ..........     95 

Whether  emphasis  is  to  be  deduced  from  the  plural  number        .     96 
Abstract  words  not  emphatic  when  used  for  concretes         .         .     96 
Emphasis  not  to  be  deduced  merely  from  oriental  idioms    .         .     97 
How  to  discover  emphasis  in  doubtful  cases         .         .         .         .98 

Emphasis  must  not  contradict  the  usns  loquendi  .         .         .99 


CONTENTS.  XI 


CHAPTER  VII. 


MEANS  OF  HARMONIZING  APPARENT  DISCREPANCIES. 

If  two  passages  contradict  each  other,  the  text  of  one  must  be 

faulty 100 

If  both  be  genuine,  conciliation  is  to  be  sought  where  apparent 
discrepancies  exist 

Discrepancies,  doctrinal  and  historical     .... 

Causes  of  apparent  discrepancies  in  doctrinal  passages    . 

Method  of  harmonizing  them 

Origin  of  apparent  historical  discrepancies 

We  should  be  conversant  with  the  mode  of  reconciling  passages 
in  the  best  classic  authors 

Historical  facts  not  to  be  confounded  because  of  a  slight  simili 
tude,  nor  represented  as  different  on  account  of  some 
slight  discrepancy  ...... 

Doubtful  passages  to  be  interpreted  by  plain  ones    . 

A  perfect  harmony  not  to  be  expected     .... 


100 
100 
101 
101 
103 

104 


104 
106 
106 


PART  m. 

ON  TRANSLATING  THE  SCRIPTURES. 

An  interpreter  should  not  only  understand  the  Scriptures,  but 
be  able  to  explain  them  well,  so  as  to  give  an  exact  de- 
lineation of  the  original  107 

The  words  of  a  version  ought  to  correspond  as  exactly  as  possi- 
ble with  the  original 107 

When  we  cannot  translate  ad  verbum  we  must  translate  ad  sensum  108 
A  knowledge  of  Hebrew  as  well  as  Greek  necessary  to  trans- 
late the  New  Testament         .         .        .         .         •         .108 
Cases  where  we  must  adhere  to  the  mode  of  translating  ad  verbum  109 
In  translating,  we  ought  to  lean  towards  our  own  idiom  .       110 

Morus  on  translation 110 

PART  IV. 

GENERAL  ROLES  OF  CRITICISM  IN  RESPECT  TO   THE    NEW 
TESTAMENT. 

Common  laws  of  lower  criticism  in  general      ....       121 
Laws  of  higher  criticism  for  establishing  a  purer  text       .         •       124 
Laws  proper  to  guide  our  judgment  in  regard  to  the  true  read- 
ing of  the  New  Testament      .         .         ,         .         .         .120 


Xll 


COxNTENTS. 


PART  V. 


ON  THE  LITERARY  QUALIFICATIONS  OF  AN  INTERPRETER 

Knowledge  of  Biblical  Criticism       ..... 

the  language  in  which  the  books  are  written 

the  historical  matter  of  the  books 

(1)  Geography     . 

(2)  Chronology    , 

(3)  History,  civil  and  political 

(4)  Manners  and  customs    . 
doctrinal  contents 

(1)  Jewish  opinions     . 

(2)  Christian  precepts 

(3)  Doctrines  of  heretical  sects 
Grammar,  Rhetoric  and  Philosophy 


131 
131 
132 
132 
132 
133 
133 
134 
134 
134 
135 
135 


PART  VL 


CHAPTER  I. 


ON   THE  MORAL 


QUALIFICATIONS  OF  AN  INTERPRETER    OF 
SCRIPTURE. 


Vital  and  practical  godliness 138 

Unreserved  submission  to  the  authority  of  divine  revelation  .  138 
An  humble  and  teachable  disposition  .....  139 
A  decided  attachment  to  the  divine  truth  ....  139 
Persevering  diligence  in  the  use  of  proper  means  .  .  .139 
Incessant  and  earnest  prayer 140 


INTRODUCTION. 


OF  INTERPRETATION  IN  GENERAL. 

[With  this  introductory  chapter,  may  be  compared  Keil,  Herme- 
neutica,  pp.  1 — 14.  Beck,  Monogramm.  Herm.  pp.  1—22.  Seller, 
Hermeneutik,  §§  9 — II.] 

§  1.  Necessity  and  utility  of  it.  The  interpretation  of  the 
sacred  books  is  the  highest  and  most  difficult  task  of  the  theo- 
logian. This  may  be  shown  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
from  experience,  and  also  from  the  consent  of  all  enlightened 
periods.  All  solid  knowledge  and  judicious  defence  of  divine 
truth,  must  originate  from  a  right  understanding  and  accurate 
interpretation  of  the  Scriptures.  The  purity  of  the  Christian 
religion  has  shone  brighter  or  been  obscured,  in  proportion 
as  the  study  of  sacred  interpretation  has  flourished  or  de- 
cayed. 

Finally,  those  have  always  been  reckoned  as  the  most  dis- 
tinguished theologians,  who  have  excelled  in  this  kind  of 
learning.     (Compare  Morus,  Hermeneutica,  p.  3.  I.) 

As  Christian  doctrine  is  preserved  only  in  written  records,  the  in- 
terpretation of  these  is  absolutely  essential  to  a  knowledge  of  it ;  and 
unless  we  know  what  Christianity  is,  we  can  neither  maintain  its 
purity  nor  defend  its  principles  to  the  best  advantage. 

§  2.  Difficulties  attending  interpretation.  The  science  of 
interpretation  in  general  is  difficult ;  because  it  requires  much 
learning,  judgment,  and  diligence.  Not  unfrequently  a  pecu- 
liar adaptedness  of  talent,  or  a  more  than  usual  degree  of  un- 
derstanding, is  requisite  to  manage  an  exegetical  inquiry  with 
success.  But  the  interpretation  of  the  sacred  books  is,  from 
various  causes  (a),  still  more  difficult ;  as  the  general  consent 
2 


14  ,  INTRODUCTION. 

of  the  learned  and  the  wonderful  paucity  (h)  of  good  inter- 
preters fully  evince.     (Morus,  p.  4. 11.) 

(a)  These  causes  are,  their  antiquity  ;  the  peculiar  dialect  of  the 
Scriptures,  which  greatly  differs  from  that  of  the  western  languages ; 
the  manners,  customs,  education,  style,  modes  of  thinking  and  ex- 
pression, situation,  government,  climate,  etc.,  of  the  authors,  in  ma- 
ny respects  so  very  dissimilar  to  ours  ;  the  fewness  of  the  books 
written  in  the  Scriptural  dialect ;  and  the  want  of  commentators  and 
lexicographers  to  whom  the  language  was  vernacular.  To  these 
causes  may  be  added,  the  authority  and  influence  which  many  erro- 
neous commentaries  of  distinguished  men  have  had  over  the  Chris- 
tian world. 

(b)  The  paucity  of  good  interpreters,  who,  unbiassed  by  party  sen- 
timents, have  pursued  the  interpretation  of  the  Scriptures  in  a  sim- 
ple philological  manner,  and  been  consistent  throughout  in  the  ap- 
plication of  principles  purely  exegeticalj  is  much  greater  than  any 
one  will  be  disposed  to  believe,  until  experience  acquired  by  consult- 
ing commentaries  shall  have  convinced  him. 

§  3.  Definitions.  The  art  of  interpretation,  is  the  art  of 
teaching  what  is  the  meaning  of  another's  language  ;  or  that 
skill,  which  enables  us  to  attach  to  another's  language  the 
same  meaning  that  the  author  himself  attached  to  it.  (Mo- 
rus, p.  6.  III.) 

It  is  better  to  define  interpretation  as  an  act  than  as  an  art.  To  in- 
terpret a  passage,  is  to  shew  or  declare  the  sense  of  it,  or  simply  to 
explain  the  meaning,  i.  e.  the  meaning  which  the  author  himself  of 
the  passage  attached  to  it.  Any  other  meaning  than  this  can  never 
be  called,  with  propriety,  the  meaning  of  the  author. 

Interpretation,  strictly  speaking,  may  be  called  grammatical,  when 
the  meaning  of  words,  phrases,  and  sentences,  is  made  out  from  the 
7J.SUS  loquendi  and  context;  historical,  when  the  meaning  is  illustra- 
ted and  confirmed  by  historical  arguments,  which  serve  to  evince 
that  no  other  sense  can  be  put  upon  the  passage,  whether  you  regard 
the  nature  of  the  subject,  or  the  genius,  manner,  and  circumstances 
of  the  writer. 

§  4.  Requisites  of  a  good  interpreter.  The  act  of  inter- 
pretation implies  two  things  ;  viz.,  (1)  A  right  perception  of 
the  meaning  of  words.  (2)  A  proper  explanation  of  that 
meaning.  Hence  a  good  interpreter  must  possess  a  sound 
understanding.,  and  be  skilful  in  explanation  (a).  (Morus^ 
p,  a  IV.) 

(a)  The  words  of  Ernesti  are  suhtilitas  intelligcndl  et  explicandi,  a 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

phrase  which  would  convey  a  meaning  quite  foreign  to  his  intention? 
if  literally  translated  into  English,  or  at  most  convey  his  idea  very 
imperfectly.  His  meaning  is,  that  the  interpreter,  who  exercises  an 
acute  understanding  or  possesses  suhtilitus  intelligendi,  must  demand 
satisfactory  reasons  for  believing  in  any  particular  exegesis,  and  build 
his  opinion  respecting  the  sense  of  any  passage  on  such  reasons. 
These  reasons  must  be  founded  on  the  usvs  loqucndi,  the  context,  the 
nature  of  the  subject,  the  design  of  the  writer,  etc.  An  interpreta- 
tion supported  by  none  of  these,  cannot  be  admitted  by  a  sound  un- 
derstanding. 

The  subtilitas  explicandi,  which  I  have  translated  skilf  in  explana- 
tion, consists  generally  in  the  accuracy  of  explanation.  To  constitute 
such  accuracy  in  its  proper  sense,  a  right  use  must  be  made  of  all  the 
means  of  interpretation,  so  as  to  gain  precise  and  definite  views  of  the 
author's  meaning ;  then  every  thing  should  be  so  defined  and  expres- 
sed by  the  interpreter  as  to  exclude  all  ambiguity  and  uncertainty  ; 
and  lastly,  the  whole  should  be  exhibited  in  the  proper  order  which 
the  nature  of  language  and  of  logic  demands^ 

§  5.  Suhtilitas  intelligendi.  An  acute  understanding  is 
exhibited  in  two  ways ;  first,  in  discerning  whether  we  really 
understand  a  passage  or  not,  and  provided  we  do  not,  in  dis- 
covering the  difficulties  that  lie  in  the  way  of  rightly  under- 
standing it  and  the  grounds  of  those  difficulties ;  secondly, 
in  finding  out  and  employing  a  proper  method  of  investigating 
the  sense  of  those  passages  which  are  difficult.  (Morus,  p. 
10.  V.) 

§  6.  Means  ly  which  difficulties  and  their  causes  are  de- 
tected. A  good  degree  of  talent  or  capacity  is  requisite  for 
this ;  for  men  of  small  capacity  frequently  assent  to  things 
which  seem  to  be  taught,  without  any  good  reasons  for  so 
doing,  and  often  believe  themselves  to  understand  what  they 
do  not  understand.  To  a  good  degree  of  talent  must  be 
joined  a  careful  habit  of  distinguishing  ideas  of  things  from 
mere  words  or  sounds  (a) ;  for  we  ought  always  to  inquire, 
with  respect  to  any  word,  whether  we  have  a  distinct  percep- 
tion of  the  thing  or  idea  which  it  is  meant  to  designate,  and 
not  to  regard  merely  the  sound  of  the  word.  (Morus,  p.  10. 
VI.) 

(a)  Specially  should  this  be  done  where  language  is  employed  to  de- 


16  INTRODUCTION. 

signate  any  thing  which  is  not  the  object  of  our  senses,  but  is  of  an 
intellectual  or  metaphysical  nature.  Habit  as  well  as  care  will  do 
much   in   these  cases.     Translating    from    onk    language    into 

ANOTHER,  IS  AN  EXCELLENT  EXERCISE  TO  FORM  A  HABIT  OF  NICE  DIS- 
TINCTION ;  for  when  we  come  to  express  the  ideas  of  an  author  in  an- 
other language,  we  often  find  that  we  had  only  an  indefinite  percep- 
tion of  them.  The  employment  of  teaching,  also,  is  well  adapted  to 
promote  the  same  purpose ;  as  is  the  study  of  logic,  or  any  science 
which  leads  to  nice  discrimination. 


§  7.  Means  of  removing  these  difficulties.  The  first 
means  is,  a  just  and  accurate  knowledge  of  languages  {a). 
The  next,  an  acquaintance  with  the  principles  of  interpreta- 
tion. Not  that  no  one  can  interpret  at  all  without  a  scientific 
knowledge  of  these  principles  ;  but  because  they  assist  men 
of  moderate  talents,  and  guide  them  as  it  were  in  the  right  way, 
so  that  they  are  not  left  to  depend  on  chance  rather  than  rea- 
son. Besides,  they  are,  in  this  way,  supplied  with  a  common 
rule  forjudging  in  controverted  cases  (5).  Finally,  as  in  de- 
tecting difficulties  exercise  and  habit  are  important,  so  here 
they  are  of  so  much  consequence  that  all  other  advantages 
will  be  of  little  use  without  them.  (Morus,  p.  12 — 19.  Nos. 
I.  II.  III.) 

(a)  An  accurate  knowledge  of  grammaticcd  principles  and  of  the 
risus  loquendi  is  here  intended ;  for  what  authority  can  an  interpreta- 
tion have,  which  violates  rules  of  grammar  and  the  usages  of  speech  ? 

(b)  Precepts  for  interpretation,  well  grounded,  clearly  understood, 
and  judiciously  applied,  very  much  facilitate  the  task  of  the  interpreter, 
and  render  the  result  of  his  labors  more  worthy  of  confidence.  He  who 
acts  by  well  established  rules  is  more  certain  that  he  acts  riglit,  than 
if  he  followed  his  own  opinion  merely,  in  all  cases  of  difficult}''  and 
doubt.  And  in  controversies  of  an  exegetical  or  doctrinal  nature,  to 
what  can  the  appeal  be  made,  in  the  ultimate  resort,  but  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  interpretation,  i.  e.  the  precepts  or  rules  which  it  prescribes  ? 
Nor  are  these  principles  useful  only  to  men  of  moderate  talents,  (as 
Ernesti  would  seem  to  intimate),  but  to  men  of  the  highest  talents 
and  best  acquisitions.  Men  may,  indeed,  learn  them  by  usage  in  the 
interpretation  of  authors,  without  the  scientific  study  of  them  :  but 
the  latter  is  the  most  easy  method,  and  guards  most  effectually 
against  mistakes. 

In  addition  to  these  helps  for  removing  difficulties,  a  knowledge 
of  history,  geography,  chronology,  antiquities,  etc.,  is  of  high  and  even 
of  indispensable  importance. 


INTRODUCTION.  I'V 

§  8.  Exercises  and  habits  adapted  to  overcome  the  difficul- 
ties of  interpretation.  First,  we  should  attend  the  instruc- 
tions of  a  good  interpreter ;  next,  we  should  read  those  works 
where  exegetical  knowledge  is  displayed  in  the  best  manner, 
and  reflect  much  upon  them,  for  in  this  way  we  may  be  led 
to  the  imitation  of  them  ;  and  lastly,  those  books  which  we 
desire  to  interpret  must  be  assiduously  and  constantly  perused. 
(Morus,  p.  19.  IV.) 

In  the  two  first  exercises,  example  serves  both  to  excite  and  to 
guide  our  efforts.  The  habit  of  reading,  often  and  assiduously,  the 
book  which  we  desire  to  interpret,  is  of  more  importance  than  any, 
or  perhaps  than  all,  other  means  within  our  power.  Every  new 
perusal  will  suggest  to  an  intelligent  and  inquisitive  mind  many 
ideas,  frequently  very  important  ones,  which  were  not  before  enter- 
tained. This  practice  cannot,  therefore,  be  too  strongly  recommend- 
ed to  the  student. 

§  9.  Snhtilitas  explicandi,  i.  e.  acuteness  or  skill  in  expla- 
nation. This  is  exhibited  by  expressing  the  sense  of  an  au- 
thor, either  in  words  of  the  same  language  which  are  more 
perspicuous  than  his,  or  by  translating  into  another  language, 
and  explaining  by  argument  and  illustration  (a).  In  addition 
to  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  language  which  we  translate, 
skill  in  explaining  requires  that  we  should  exhibit  purity  of 
diction  ;  still  preserving,  so  far  as  may  be,  the  features  of  the 
original,  lest  the  mode  of  reasoning  should  be  obscured,  which 
sometimes  depends  on  ihe  form  of  the  words.  (Morus,  p.  20. 
VIII.) 

(a)  We  explain  by  argument,  when  we  exhibit  reasons  drawn  from 
the  grammar  and  idiom  of  the  language,  the  context,  and  the  design 
of  the  writer.  We  illustrate,  when  we  cast  light  upon  the  meaning 
of  an  author,  which  is  borrowed  from  history,  chronology,  antiquities, 
etc.  Purity  and  brevity  of  style  should  characterize  both  these  modes 
of  explanation. 

§  10.  Definition  of  Hermeneuiics  (a).  Hermeneutics  is 
the  science  which  teaches  to  find,  in  an  accurate  and  judicious 
manner,  the  meaning  of  an  author,  and  appropriately  to  ex- 
plain it  to  others.     (Morus,  p.  21.  IX.) 

2* 


18  INTRODUCTION. 

(a)  Modern  usage  distinguishes  between  Hermeneutics  and  Exege- 
y^  ,-^13.  Hermeneutics  is  the  tltcory  or  science  of  interpretatjon  5  it  com- 
prises Imd  ex  hibils  the  principles  and  rules  of  this  art.  Exegesis  is 
(fthe  practical  apjjiication  of  these  rules  ;  the  act  of  carrying  them  into 
/"^execution.  The  etymology  of  these  two  words  would  lead  to  the  con- 
^clusion,  that  both  are  of  the  same  meaning  ;  but  usage  has  assigned 
^  a  different  signification  to  them. 

§  11.  Division  of  Hermeneutics.    Hermeneutics,  consider- 
ed as  the  art  of  finding  the  sense  of  words,  (so  far  as  it  is  an 
art,  and  is  the  proper  subject  of  precepts),  consists  of  two 
parts,  viz.  the  theoretical  and  preceptive  (a).     The  first  com- 
prises general  principles,  in  respect  to  the  meaning  of  words 
and  the  various  kinds  of  them.     On  these  principles,  the 
rules  of  interpretation  and  the  reasons  of  them  are  grounded. 
The  second  consists  of  rules,  which  are  to  guide  us  in  inves- 
tigating the  sense  of  an  author's  words.     Both  of  these  parts 
are  essential ;    for  on  the  one  hand,  principles  without  any 
\  rules  deduced  from  them  would  be  inadequate  to  guide  our 
,  philological  inquiries  ;  and  on  the  other,  rules  can  neither  be 
\  perspicuous  nor  well  grounded  which  are  not  established  upon 
principles.     (Morus,  p.  22.  X.) 

(a)  Exegesis  differs  from  the  preceptive  part  of  Hermeneutics,  in- 
asmuch as  it  is  the  act  of  carrying  the  precepts  into  execution,  and 
not  the  precepts  themselves. 

§  12.  Division  of  the  work.  It  may  be  divided  into  three 
parts  ;  the  first  contains  the  principles  and  precepts  of  Her- 
meneutics ;  the  second  has  respect  to  the  making  of  transla- 
tions and  commentaries ;  and  the  third  treats  of  the  various 
kinds  of  hermeneutical  apparatus,  and  of  its  proper  use  in  the 
interpretation  of  the  New  Testament. 

Of  these  three  parts,  the  first  is  translated  throughout,  and  so  much 

of  the  second  as  seemed  to  be  particularly  useful.     The  third  part  is 

essentially  comprised  in  the  first,  so  far  as  it  properly  belongs  to  the 

province  of  Hermeneutics;  and  therefore  may  well  be  dispensed  with, 

in  an  elementary  treatise  like  this.     So  far  as  the  third  part  contains 

-•any  thing  not  substantially  comprised  in  the  first,  it  properly  belongs 

-  to  the  province  of  sacred  literature,  and  specially  to  literarj^  history 

^  or  introductions  (as  they  are  called),  which  are  designed  to  give  the 

student  a  view  in  detail  of  the  various  authors,  books,  versions,  etc., 

of  the  Scriptures. 


MEANING  OF  WORDS.  19 


I.  luiITI 


PART 
CHAPTER  I 

[Compare  with  this  chapter,  Keil,  §§  5 — 8.    Seller,  §§  41— 4().] 
OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

§  13.  Design  of  this  chapter.  The  design  of  the  follow- 
ing remarks  upon  the  meaning  of  words,  is  to  exhibit  the 
ground  or  principles  whence  all  certainty  in  the  interpretation 
of  language  arises.  If  from  the  nature  and  use  of  language 
certain  principles  may  be  clearly  deduced,  which  will  serve 
as  a  guide  to  explain  it,  then,  it  is  evident,  the  essential  part 
of  the  theory  of  Hermeneutics  consists  of  these  principles. 
(Morus,  p.27.I.) 

<J  14.  Every  toord  must  have  some  meaning.  To  every 
word  there  ought  to  be  assigned,  and  in  the  Scriptures  there 
is  unquestionably  assigned,  some  idea  or  notion.  This  we 
call  the  meaning  or  sense  of  the  word  (a).    (Morus,  p.  28.  II.) 

(a)  Otherwise  words  are  useless,  and  have  no  more  signification 
than  the  inarticulate  sounds  of  animals. 

§  15.  Definitions.  The  literal  sense  of  words,  is  the  sense 
which  is  so  connected  with  them,  that  it  is  first  in  order,  and 
is  spontaneously  presented  to  the  mind,  as  soon  as  the  sound 
of  the  word  is  heard  {a).  The  literal  sense  does  not  differ, 
among  the  older  and  valuable  writers,  from  the  se?ise  of  the 
letter  ,•  although  some  ignorant  persons,  in  later  times,  have 
very  erroneously  made  a  distinction.  Erasmus  and  his  co- 
temporaries  use  both  phrases  promiscuously.  Literal  means 
the  same  as  the  Greek  to  ysygufifiivov,  or  tlie  Latin  scriptum  : 
whence  the  phrases  scriptum  sequi,  and  scriptum  interpretari. 


20  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

(a)  The  literal  sense  is  the  same  as  the  primitive  or  original  sense  ; 
or,  at  least,  it  is  equivalent  to  that  sense  which  has  usurped  the  place 
of  the  original  one  ;  e.  g.  the  original  sense  of  the  word  tragedy  has 
long  ceased  to  be  current,  and  the  literal  sense  of  this  word,  now,  is 
that  which  has  taken  the  place  of  the  original  one. 

§  16.  The  meaning  of  words  conventional.  Words  con- 
sidered simply  as  sounds  have  no  meaning  ;  for  they  are  not 
natural  and  necessary  signs  of  things,but  conventional  ones  (a). 
Usage  or  custom  has  constituted  a  connection  between  words 
and  ideas.     (Morus,  p.  28.  III.) 

(a)  Interjections  or  exclamations  may,  perhaps,  be  considered  as  a 
kind  of  exception  to  this  remark.  Words  also  which  the  Greeks  call 
<]vouaTOTcsnon;uira,  i.  e.  words  the  sounds  of  which  imitate  the  sense, 
are  also  considered  by  many  as  an  exception.  But  there  is  so  much 
of  fancy  in  the  construction  of  these  words,  and  they  are  so  differ- 
ently formed  in  different  languages,  that  no  solid  proof  of  their  being 
an  exception  can  fairly  be  made  out.  Great  efforts  have  been  made, 
in  former  times,  to  shew  that  every  syllable  and  even  letter  of  a  word, 
in  the  Hebrew  language,  had  a  special  significancy  attached  to  it. 
F.  M.  Helmont  published  a  work  entitled  Alyhahetum  Jfaturale,  the 
object  of  which  was  to  shew,  that  every  difierent  opening  of  the  mouth 
in  order  to  pronounce  different  letters,  was  significant  of  some  idea. 
To  illustrate  this,  he  caused  a  great  number  of  plates  to  be  engraved, 
which  he  inserted  in  the  work ;  so  that  his  book,  as  Morus  says,  is 
mira  capitum  humanorum  coUectio,  quae  admodum  distorta  ora  osten- 
dat.  Caspar  Neumann,  in  his  Exodus  Linguae  Sanctae,  followed 
much  the  same  path,  but  with  more  moderation  ;  and  V.  E.  Loescher, 
in  his  De  caussis  Ling.  Heb.  exhibits  the  same  principles.  E.  g.  in 
the  word  y^nji ,  t<  indicates  motion,  he  says,  -i  eruption,  i:  violence. 
The  whole  word  ynn  then,  signifies  something  inwhich  motion  bursts 
forth  icith  violence.  The  student  may  smile  at  this  egregious  tri- 
fling ;  but  the  time  has  been,  when  the  word  of  God  was  explained 
by  leading  men  in  the  churches,  in  connection  with  such  wretched 
puerilities.     (Morus,  p.  31.  IV.) 

§  17.  The  connection  between  words  and  ideas  now  render- 
ed necessary  ly  usage.  Such  is  the  fact,  whatever  may  have 
been  the  case  at  first.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  a 
word  is  susceptible  of  only  one  meaning  ;  for  usage  contra- 
dicts this.  But  from  this  principle  we  learn,  (1)  That  nei- 
ther in  using  or  interpreting  a  word  are  we  at  liberty  to  affix 
to  it  an  arbitrary  sense  (a).  (2)  That  the  sense  of  a  word 
cannot  be  diverse  or  multifarious,  at  the  same  time  and  in  the 


MEANING  OF  WORDS.  21 

same  passage  or  expression  (b).  (Morus,  p.  33.  V.  VI.  VII.) 
(a)  The  fact  that  usage  has  attached  any  particular  meaning  to  a 
word,  like  any  other  historical  fact,  is  to  be  proved  by  adequate  tes- 
timony. This  testimony  may  be  drawn  from  books  in  which  the 
word  is  employed,  or  from  daily  use  in  conversation.  But  the  fact 
of  a  particular  meaning  being  attached  to  a  word,  when  once  estab- 
lished, can  no  more  be  changed  or  denied,  than  any  historical  event 
whatever.  Of  course,  an  arbitrary  sense  can  never,  with  propriety, 
be  substituted  for  a  real  one. 

(6)  All  men,  in  their  daily  conversation  and  writings,  attach  but 
one  sense  to  a  word,  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  passage ;  un- 
less they  design  to  speak  in  enigmas.  Of  course,  it  would  be  in  op- 
position to  the  universal  custom  of  language,  if  more  than  one  mean- 
ing should  be  attached  to  any  word  of  Scripture  in  such  a  case.  Yet 
many  have  often  done  this.     See  §  §  21 ,  22. 

§  18.  Signification  oftcords  mulliplied  in  process  of  time. 
Although  a  word  can  have  but  one  meaning  at  the  same  time 
and  in  the  same  place,  usage  has  gradually  assigned  many 
meanings  to  the  same  word  (a),  lest  words  should  be  indefi- 
nitely multiplied,  and  the  difficulty  of  learning  a  language  be- 
come too  great.     (Morus,  p.  39.  VIII.) 

(a)  The  question  then  for  an  interpreter  is  simply  this  :  Which  one 
of  the  significations  that  a  word  has,  is  connected  with  its  use  in  any 
particular  instance  ? 

§  19.  How  can  the  meaning  in  each  case  he  found  7  (1) 
From  the  general  manner  of  speaking,  i.  e.  from  the  common 
usage.  (2)  From  the  proximate  words  or  context.  (Morus, 
p.  41.  I.  II.) 

That  is,  the  usual  and  obvious  meaning  is  attached  to  the  word,  or 
else  one  which  the  context  renders  necessary.  In  addition  to  the  aid 
drawn  from  these  sources,  an  interpreter  may  sometimes  obtain  as- 
sistance from  the  scope  or  design  of  the  writer,  or  from  history,  anti- 
quities, the  nature  of  the  subject,  etc.     (Morus,  p.  42.  III.  IV.) 

<5>  20.  Ambiguity  ofioords  arises  from  various  causes.  (1) 
From  the  fault  of  writers  (a).  (2)  From  neglect  in  the  con- 
struction and  necessary  connections  of  words  and  sentences  ; 
proper  care  not  having  been  taken  to  guard  the  reader  against 
uncertainty,  and  to  afford  him  the  best  means  for  finding  the 
true  sense  {b).     (3)  From  the  manner  in  which  common 


22  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

usage  often  forms  language ;  which,  not  being  guided  by  phi- 
losophy.or  refined  knowledge,  is  frequently  deficient  in  re- 
spect to  accuracy  (c).     (Morus,  p.  44.  X.  I — V.) 

{a)  When  they  are  ignorant  of  the  rules  of  writing  with  accuracy 
and  perspicuity,  {b)  E.  g.  the  answer  of  the  Delphic  oracle, /iio  te 
Romanos  vincere  posse,  which  may  be  rendered,  with  equal  probabili- 
ty, that  the  Romans  would  conquer  Pyrrhus,  or  Fyrrhus  the  Romans, 
(c)  No  other  proof  of  this  is  needed,  than  what  the  perusal  of  a  com- 
position by  an  illiterate  person  will  afford. 

Besides  the  causes  of  ambiguity  above  enumerated,  we  may  reckon 
ignorance  of  the  usus  loquendi.  If  the  interpreter  is  not  acquainted 
with  this,  (and  in  respect  to  words  which  are  uttw;  Xiyo^uru  he  must 
of  course  be  ignorant  of  it  in  many  cases),  he  is  left  in  doubt,  unless 
the  context  decides  for  him.  As  this  is  not  always  the  case,  there  is 
room  here  for  ambiguity. 

§21.  Conclusions  fromwhat  has  heen  said.  From  what 
has  already  been  said,  in  this  chapter,  about  the  use  of  words, 
we  may  discover  the  ground  of  all  the  certainty  which  attends 
the  interpretation  of  language  {a).  For  there  can  be  no  cer- 
tainty at  all  in  respect  to  the  interpretation  of  any  passage, 
unless  a  kind  of  necessity  compels  us  to  affix  a  particular  sense 
to  a  word  ;  which  sense,  as  I  have  said  before,  must  be  one  ; 
and,  unless  there  are  special  reasons  for  a  tropical  meaning, 
it  must  be  the  literal  sense  {b).     (Morus,  p.  47.  XL  ) 

(a)  If  any  one  should  deny  that  the  above  principles  lead  to  cer- 
tainty, when  strictly  observed,  he  would  deny  the  possibility  of  find- 
ing the  meaning  of  language  with  certainty,  {b)  The  secondary  or 
figurative  sense  of  words  is  as  often  necessary  as  the  literal  sense. 
Many  words  have  even  ceased  to  convey  a  literal  meaning.  The  ob- 
vious sense  of  a  word,  therefore,  in  any  particular  connection,  is  the 
necessary  one  ;  and  a  conviction  that  the  sense  in  any  case  is  neces- 
sary, will  be  in  exact  proportion  to  the  degree  in  which  it  is  felt  to  be 
obvious.  By  obvious  here,  is  not  meant  what  is  obvious  to  an  illite-. 
rate  or  hasty  interpreter  ;  but  to  one  who  has  learning  and  good  judg- 
ment, and  makes  use  of  all  the  proper  means  of  interpretation. 

§  22.  Error  of  those  who  assign  many  meanings  to  a  word, 
at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  place.  Such  an  opinion  is 
to  be  rejected  ;  although  the  practice  is  very  old,  as  Augus- 
tine testifies.  Confess.  XII.  30,  31.  The  opinion  probably 
originated  from  the  variety  of  interpretations  given  to  ambig-. 


MEANING  OF  WORDS.  23 

uous  passages  ;  several  of  which  appeared  probable,  and  were 
recommended  by  a  sentiment  of  reverence  towards  the  au- 
thors of  them.  A  principle  of  this  nature,  however,  must  in- 
troduce very  great  uncertainty  into  exegesis  ;  than  which 
nothing  can  be  more  pernicious.  (Morus,  p.  35.  VII.) 

§  23.  Error  of  those  who  affirm  that  the  words  of  Scripture 
mean  all  that  they  possibly  can  mean.  This  sprung  from  the 
Rabbinical  schools,  and  passed  from  them,  in  early  times,  to 
Christians.  The  transition  is  very  easy  from  this  error  to  ev- 
ery kind  of  license  in  the  introduction  of  allegory,  prophecy, 
and  mystery,  into  every  part  of  the  Bible  ;  as  the  experience 
of  the  Jews,  the  ancient  Fathers,  the  scholastic  divines,  and 
the  followers  of  Cocceius,  demonstrates. 

The  Rabbinic  maxim  is :  '  On  every  point  of  the  Scripture  hang 
suspended  mountains  of  sense.'  The  Tahnud  says;  *  God  so  gave 
the  Law  to  Moses,  that  a  thing  can  be  shewn  to  be  clean  and  unclean 
in  forty-nine  difierent  ways.'  Most  of  the  fathers,  and  a  multitude 
of  "commentators  in  later  times,  were  infected  with  these  principles. 
Little  more  than  a  century  ago,  the  celebrated  Cocceius  of  Leyden 
maintained  the  sentiment,  that  all  the  possible  meanings  of  a  word  in 
the  Scripture  are  to  be  united.  By  his  learning  and  influence  a  pow- 
erful party  was  raised  up,  in  the  protestanl  church,  in  favor  of  such 
a  principle.  The  mischiefs  resulting  from  it  have  not  yet  ceased  to 
operate. 

§  24.  The  sense  of  words  properly  considered  is  not  alle- 
gorical. Allegory  is  rather  an  accommodation  of  the  sense 
of  words^  or  an  accommodation  of  things^  to  the  illustration 
of  some  doctrine.  Moderately  used,  and  well  adapted,  it 
may  be  of  some  profit  which  is  entitled  to  regard.  But  when 
resorted  to  by  the  unlearned  and  those  of  an  uncultivated 
taste,  it  commonly  degenerates  into  empty  and  ridiculous 
trifling.     (Comp.  Morus,  Dissertt.  Tom.  I.  p.  370,  etc.) 

It  is  impossible  adequately  to  describe  the  excesses  and  absurdities 
which  have  been  committed  in  consequence  of  the  allegorizing 
spirit.  From  the  time  of  Origen,  who  converted  into  allegory  the 
account  of  the  creation  of  the  world,  the  creation  and  fall  of  man, 
and  multitudes  of  other  simple  facts  related  in  the  Bible,  down  to 
the  Jesuit,  who  makes  the  account  of  the  creation  of  the  greater 
light  to  rule  the  day  to  mean  the  Pope,  and  the  creation  of  the  lesser 


24  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

light  and  the  stars  to  m6an  the  subjection  of  kings  and  princes  to  the 
Pope,  there  have  been  multitudes  in  and  out  of  the  Catholic  church 
who  have  pursued  the  same  path.  The  most  sacred  d6ctrines  of  re- 
ligion have  often  been  defended  and  assailed,  by  arguments  of  equal 
validity  and  of  the  same  nature  as  the  exposition  of  the  Jesuit  just 
mentioned.  The  spirit  which  prompts  to  this  may,  in  some  cases, 
be  commendable;  but  as  it  is  a  mere  business  of  fancy,  connected 
with  no  principles  of  philology,  and  supported  by  no  reasons  drawn 
from  the  nature  of  language,  so  it  is,  for  the  most  part,  not  only 
worthless  but  dangerous.  And  of  what  possible  use,  in  the  end,  can 
»  a  principle  be,  which  can  prove  the  most  important  doctrine,  either 
of  Judaism  or  Christianity,  as  well  from  the  first  verse  of  the  first 
chapter  of  Chronicles,  as  from  any  part  of  the  Bible  ?  Or  rather, 
of  what  use  can  the  Bible  be,  if  it  may  be  interpreted  by  such 
principles  ? 

§  25.  Properly  speakings  there  is  no  typical  sense  of  words. 
Types  are  not  words  but  tilings^  which  God  has  designated 
as  signs  of  future  events.  Nor  is  any  special  pains  necessary 
for  the  interpretation  of  theni.  The  explanation  of  them, 
which  the  Holy  Spirit  himself  has  given,  renders  them  intelli- 
gible. Beyond  his  instructions  on  this  subject,  we  should  be 
very  careful  never  to  proceed.  As  for  those  who  maintain  a 
typical  design  in  all  parts  of  the  Scripture,  they  certainly  dis- 
play very  little  judgment  or  consideration  ;  for  they  lay  open 
the  way  for  the  mere  arbitrary  introduction  of  types  into  ev- 
ery part  of  the  Bible.  The  design  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  the 
mention  of  this  or  that  thing  in  the  Scriptures,  can  be  under- 
stood only  so  far  as  he  himself  has  explained  it,  or  afforded 
obvious  grounds  of  explanation. 

If  it  be,  asked :  How  far  are  we  to  consider  the  Old  Testament  as 
typical?  I  should  answer  without  any  hesitation:  Just  so  much  of  it 
is  to  be  regarded  as  typical,  as  the  New  Testament  affirms  to  be  so  ; 
and  NO  MORE.  The  fact,  that  any  thing  or  event  under  the  Old  Tes- 
tament dispensation  was  designed  to  prefigure  something  under  the 
^ew,  can  be  known  to  us  only  by  revelation  ;  and,  of  course,  all  that 
,;''  is  not  designated  by  divine  authority  as  typical,  can  never  be  made 
so  by  any  authority  less  than  that  which  guided  the  writers  of  the 
Scriptures. 

§  26.  Danger  resulting  from  the  spirit  of  multiplying  al- 
legories and  types.     That  sentiment,  which  through  impru- . 
dence  or  want  of  knowledge  fell  from  some  of  the  ancient 


MEANING  OF  WORDS.  25 

Fathers,  and  was  echoed  by  many  of  the  Romish  doctors, 
viz.  that  some  passages  of  Scripture  have  no  literal  sense  (a), 
is  dangerous  beyond  description.  I  presume  they  meant  to 
affirm  this  of  those  passages  which  they  did  not  understand. 
Such  a  sentiment  has  been  recently  defended  by  Wittius  on 
the  Proverbs  of  Solomon  ;  and  Thomas  Woolston,  taking  ad- 
vantage of  this,  has  converted  the  narrations  of  our  Saviour's 
miracles  into  mere  allegories  (b.)  ^ 

(a)  By  literal  sense  here,  Ernest!  means  a  sense  not  allegorical  or 
mystical ;  for  to  these  literal  is  here  opposed,  and  not  to  tropical,  as  it 
commonly  is.  There  are  a  multitude  of  passages  in  Scripture,  which 
have  only  a  tropical  meaning,  and  which,  nevertheless,  are  neither 
allegorical  nor  mystical.  ' 

(b)  This  shews  how  dangerous  it  is,  to  set  the  adversaries  of  reli- 
gion an  example  of  perverting  the  interpretation  of  the  Scriptures. 

§  27.  The  sense  of  words  depends  on  the  usus  loquendi. 
This  must  be  the  case,  because  the  sense  of  words  is  conven- 
tional and  regulated  wholly  by  usage.  Usage  then  being  un- 
derstood, the  sense  of  words  is  of  course  understood. 

§  28.  Ustis  loquendi  determined  in  a  variety  of  ways. 
To  determine  it  respect  must  be  had  to  time  (a),  religion  (b), 
sect,  education,  common  life  (c),  and  civil  affairs  (e) ;  all  of 
which  have  influence  on  an  author's  language,  and  character-  ^ 
ize  it.  For  the  same  word  is  employed  in  one  sense  respect- 
ing the  things  of  common  life ;  in  another,  respecting  the 
things  of  religion  ;  in  another  still  in  the  schools  of  philoso- 
phy, and  even  these  are  not  always  agreed  in  the  use  of 
words.     (Morus,  p.  48.  XII— XIII.) 

(a)  The  ancient  and  modern  sense  of  many  words  differs,  (b)  Vic- 
tim, sacrifice,  law,  etc.,  in  the  Old  Testament,  are  often  employed  in 
a  sense  v/hich  differs  from  that  of  the  same  words  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment, (c)  Thus  to  perceive  in  common  life  is  to feef  or  experience; 
in  philosophy,  to  form  an  idea  in  the  mind  ;  among  the  Academic  sect, 
it  means  to  know  a  thing  with  certainty,  in  opposition  to  mere  conjec- 
ture. So  xadaoiauog,  ouoz,  etc.,  differ  in  meaning,  when  employed 
by  a  heathen,  a  Jew,  or  a  Christian,  (e)  The  technical  and  peculiar 
sense  of  law-language  is  too  well  known  to  need  illustration. 

To  these  causes  which  operate  upon  the  usus  loquendi,  may  be 
added  the  style  of  a  writer.     We  must  inquire  whether  he  writes 

3 


1^  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

poetry  or  prose;  and  whether  the  writer  himself  is  fervid  or  cool, 
turgid  or  dry,  accurate  and  polished  or  the  reverse.  Every  writer 
has  his  own  particular  usus  loquendi;  and  most  writers,  provincial- 
isms ;  and  every  one  is  influenced  by  his  own  peculiar  circumstances. 
What  writers  can  be  more  unlike,  in  respect  to  style,  than  Isaiah  and 
Jeremiah,  Paul  and  John  ?  An  interpreter  must  make  himself  thor- 
oughly acquainted  with  all  these  various  circumstances. 

§  29.  Grammatical  and  historical  sense.  The  observance 
of  all  these  matters  belongs  in  a  special  nnanner  to  gramma- 
rians, whose  business  it  is  to  investigate  the  sense  of  words. 
Hence  the  literal  sense  is  also  called  the  grammatical ;  liter- 
alls  and  grammaticus  having  the  same  meaning.  It  is  also 
called  the  historic  sense  ;  because,  like  other  matters  of  fact, 
it  is  supported  by  historic  testimony.  (Morus,  p.  66.  XVII. 
Comp.  §  3,  note,  supra.) 

The  grammatical  sense  is  made   out  by  aid  of  the  principles  of 

frammar,  liberally  and  philosophically  (not  technically)  considered, 
'he  historical  sense  is  that  which  is  built  on  the  grammatical  one, 
but  modified  by  historical  circumstances.  Interpreters  now  speak  of 
the  true  sense  of  a  passage,  by  calling  it  the  gramma tico-historical 
sense;  and  exegesis,  founded  on  the  nature  of  language,  is  called 
grammatico-historical.  The  object  in  using  this  compound  name  is 
to  shew,  that  both  grammatical  and  historical  considerations  are  era- 
ployed  in  making  out  the  sense  of  a  word  or  passage. 

§  30.  The  grammatical  sense  the  only  true  one.  Those 
who  make  one  sense  grammatical  and  another  logical^  do 
not  comprehend  the  full  meaning  of  grammatical  sense.  We 
are  not  to  look,  surely,  for  a  sense  of  words,  which  varies 
(in  its  nature  or  simply  considered  as  the  sense)  with  every 
department  of  learning,  or  with  every  diverse  object.  For  if 
this  were  the  case,  words  would  have  as  many  kinds  of  senses 
as  objects  are  muhifarious.     (Morus,  p.  67.  XVIIl.) 

In  regard  to  the  term  grammatical,  see  the  note  above.  The  mean- 
ing of  Ernesti,  in  this  section,  is,  that  the  laws  of  language  are  the 
same,  in  whatever  department  of  writing  or  speaking  it  is  employed; 
i.  e.  the  meaning  of  a  writer  is  to  be  investigated  by  the  usus  loquen- 
di, etc.,  and  not  that  logic  or  philosophy  can  determine  what  the 
sense  of  words  must  be,  in  such  a  way  tliat  tlie  sense  may  be  called 
logical,  philosophical,  etc. 

But  when  he  says,  as  in  §  29,  that  the  literal  and  grammatical  sense 
are  the  same;  and  in  §  30,  that  the  grammatical  sense  is  the  only 


MEANING  OF  WORDS.  27 

true  one  ;  he  does  not  mean  by  literal,  that  which  is  opposed  to  tropi- 
cal (for  the  tropical  meaning  in  thousands  of  cases  is  the  grammatical 
one),  but  he  means  by  it,  the  same  as  the  grammatico-historical  sense 
above  described. 

§  31.  The  principles  of  interpretation  are  common  to  sacred 
and  profane  writings.  Of  course,  the  Scriptures  are  to  be 
investigated  by  the  same  rules  as  other  books.  Those  fanat- 
ics, therefore,  are  not  to  be  regarded,  who,  despising  literature 
and  the  study  of  the  languages,  refer  every  thing  merely  to 
the  influence  of  the  Spirit.  Not  that  we  doubt  the  influence 
of  the  Spirit ;  or  that  men  truly  pious  and  desirous  of  know- 
ing the  truth  are  assisted  by  him  in  their  researches,  specially 
in  those  things  that  pertain  to  faith  and  practice.  (Morus,  p. 
69.  XIX.) 

if  the  Scriptures  be  a  revelation  to  men,  then  they  are  to  be  read 
and  understood  by  men.  If  the  same  laws  of  language  are  not  ob- 
served in  this  revelation  as  are  common  to  men,  Uien  they  have  no 
guide  to  the  right  understanding  of  the  Scriptures ;  and  an  interpre- 
ter needs  inspiration  as  much  as  the  original  writer.  It  follows,  of 
course,^ that  the  Scriptures  would  be  no  revelation  in  themselves  ; 
nor  of  any  use,  except  to  those  who  are  inspired.  But  such  a  book 
the  Scriptures  are  not  ;  and  nothing  is  more  evident  than  that 
"  when  God  has  spoken  to  men,  he  has  spoken  in  the  language  of  men, 
for  he  ha^  spoken  by  men,  and  for  men.^' 

§  32.  Language  can  be  properly  interpreted  only  in  a  phi- 
lological way.  Not  much  unlike  these  fanatics,  and  not  less 
hurtful,  are  those  who,  from  a  similar  contempt  of  the  langua- 
ges and  from  that  ignorance  of  them  which  breeds  contempt, 
depend  in  their  interpretations  rather  on  things  than  on  words 
(a).  In  this  way  interpretation  becomes  uncertain  ;  and  truth 
is  made  to  depend  merely  on  the  judgment  of  men,  as  soon 
as  we  depart  from  the  words,  and  endeavor  to  decide  upon 
the  sense  by  the  use  of  means  not  connected  with  them.  Nor 
will  this  mode  of  exegesis  at  all  avail  to  convince  gainsayers ; 
for  they  themselves  boast  of  interpreting  in  like  manner  by 
things^  i.  e.  either  by  their  own  principles  and  opinions  before 
formed,  or  by  the  sentiments  of  philosophers.  Hence  arises 
the  abuse  of  reason,  in  the  interpretation  €>f  the  Scriptures. 

■  -^   ^--'-  '■■    "'  • 
;./^  Of  xh:- 


28  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

(a)  The  meaning  is,  that  they  decide  from  that  knowledge  of  things 
which  they  suppose  themselves  already  to  possess,  rather  than  from 
the  words  of  the  author  ;  they  decide  by  what  they  suppose  he  ought 
to  mean,  rather  than  by  what  he  says. 

§  33.  Any  method  of  interpretation  not  philological  isfaU 
lacious.  Moreover,  the  method  of  gathering  the  sense  of 
words  from  things  is  altogether  deceptive  and  fallacious ; 
since  things  are  rather  to  be  known  from  pointing  out  the 
sense  of  words  in  a  proper  way.  It  is  by  the  words  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  only  that  we  are  led  to  understand  what  we 
ought  to  think  respecting  things.  Said  Melancthon  very  truly : 
'  The  Scripture  cannot  be  understood  theologically^  until  it  is 
understood  grammatically. "^  Luther  also  avers,  that  a  certain 
knowledge  of  the  sense  of  Scripture  depends  solely  on  a 
knowledge  of  the  words. 

This  section  repeats  in  another  form,  the  idea  of  the  preceding  one. 
In  both,  Ernesti  means  to  deny  the  possibility  of  truly  interpreting 
any  book,  by  other  means  than  those  which  are  philoiogical.  &y 
things,  he  means  the  application  of  our  previous  views  of  things  to  the 
words  of  an  author,  in  order  to  elicit  his  meaning, — instead  of  pro- 
ceeding to  our  inquiries  in  the  way  of  grammatico-historical  exegesis. 
Not  that  our  previous  knowledge  of  things  can  never  aid  us, — for  it 
often  does  so;  but  that  this  can  serve  for  nothing  more  than  an  as- 
sistant to  our  philological  efforts,  as  the  following  section  shews. 

§  34.  The  analogy  of  faith  or  doctrine  not  to  guide  our  in- 
terpretation. Things,  therefore,  and  the  analogy  of  faith  or 
doctrine  (as  they  call  it),  assist  an  interpreter  only  so  far,  that 
when  words  are  ambiguous,  either  from  variety  of  signification, 
from  structure,  or  from  any  other  cause,  they  may  lead  us 
to  define  the  signification  of  them,  or  to  select  some  one  par- 
ticular meaning.  But  here  we  must  take  good  care,  that  the 
considerations  which  we  use  for  explaining  should  be  deduced 
from  the  plain,  perspicuous,  well-understood  language  of  oth- 
er passages,  and  that  the  words  which  we  are  endeavouring  to 
explain  do  not  contradict  them.  For  when  we  investigate  the 
sense  in  any  other  way  than  by  a  grammatical  method,  we 
effect  nothing  more  than  to  make  out  a  meaning,  which  in 


MEANING  OF  WORDS.  »» 

itself  perhaps  is  not  absurd,  but  which  lies  not  in  the  words, 
and  therefore  is  not  the  meaning  of  the  writer.  (Morus,  p. 
253.  XVI— XIX.) 

Very  much  has  been  said  both  for  and  against  the  analogy  of  faith, 
as  a  rule  of  interpretation.  I  may  safely  add,  that  on  this  subject, 
as  well  as  on  many  others,  very  much  has  been  said  amiss,  for  want 
of  proper  definitions^  What  is  the  analogy  of  faith  ?  It  is  either  sim- 
ply scriptural  or  sectarian  By  scriptural  analogy  1  mean,  that  the 
obvious  and  incontrovertible  sense  of  clear  passages  of  Scripture  af- 
fords a  rule,  by  which  we  may  reason  analogicallij  concerning  the 
meaning  of  obscure  passages ;  or  at  least,  by  which  we  may  shew 
what  obscure  passages  cannot  mean,  E.  g.  God  is  a  spirit,  is  omnis- 
cient, supreme,  the  creator  and  governor  of  all  things,  etc.,  are  truths 
so  plainly  and  incontrovertibly  taught  in  the  Scriptures,  that  all  the 
passages  which  would  seem  to  represent  him  as  material,  local,  lim- 
ited in  his  knowledge  or  power,  etc.,  are  to  be  interpreted  agreeably 
to  analogy  with  the  former  truths.  The  same  thing  holds  true  of 
other  doctrines  taught  in  the  same  perspicuous  manner.  We  explain 
what  is  doubtful  or  obscure,  by  the  application  to  it  of  what  is  plain. 
This  rule  is  not  appropriate  to  the  Scriptures  only.  It  is  adopted  by 
all  good  interpreters  of  profane  authors.  It  is  a  rule  which  common 
sense  prescribes ;  and  is  therefore  well  grounded. 

If  the  question  then  be  asked,  whether  scriptural  analogy  of  faith 
is  a  rule  of  interpretation;  the  answer  must  readily  be  given  in  the 
affirmative. 

But  the  analogy  of  the  faith  or  creed  of  any  parfy  of  Christians, 
taken  without  abatement,  cannot  be  applied  as  a  rule  of  exegesis, 
unless  it  can  be  assumed  that  the  whole  creed  of  that  party  is  cer- 
tainly correct.  If  a  Romanist,  a  Lutheran,  a  Calvinist,  or  a  Unita- 
rian avers,  that  the  Scriptures  are  to  be  construed  throughout  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  respective  Symbols  of  each  ;  whom  are  we  to 
credit."  The  creed  of  one  party,  in  some  respects,  contradicts  that 
of  the  others,  is  the  Scripture  then  to  have  a  contradictory  exegesis 
put  upon  it  ?  If  not,  the  analogy  of  party-faith  cannot  be  our  rule  of 
interpretation. 

In  the  contest  about  the  analogy  of  faith  being  the  guide  of  inter- 
pretation, both  parties  have  usually  been  in  the  right  in  some  re- 
spects, and  in  the  wrong  in  others.  Comp.  Campbell's  Gospels, 
Prelim.  Dissert.  IV.  §§  13.  14. 

5  35.  The  sense  of  Scripture  not  arbitrary.  Allowing  the 
above  principles  to  be  correct,  it  is  plain  that  the  method  of 
investigating  the  sense  of  words  in  the  Scriptures  is  not  more 
arbitrary  than  the  method  used  in  explaining  other  books ; 
but  equally  regulated  by  laws  deduced  from  the  nature  of  lan- 
guage. Those  then  act  very  absurdly,  who  subject  the  inter- 
s' 


30  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

pretation  of  the  holy  Scriptures  to  mere  human  opinion ;  for 
example,  to  the  decision  of  a  Roman  pontiff,  as  if  this  could 
determine  such  a  matter.     (Comp.  §  31.  Note.) 

§  36.  We  must  not  hastily  conclude  any  sentiment  of  the 
Scriptures  to  he  unreasonalle.  The  meaning,  which  accord- 
ing to  grammatical  principles  should  be  assigned  to  any  word 
of  Scripture,  is  not  to  be  rejected  then  on  account  of  reasons 
derived  from  things  or  previously  conceived  opinions  ;  for  in 
this  way  interpretation  would  become  uncertain.  In  books 
merely  human,  if  reason  and  the  nature  of  the  subject  are  re- 
pugnant to  the  apparent  sense  of  the  words,  we  conclude 
there  must  have  been  either  a  fault  in  the  writer,  or  an  error 
in  the  copyist.  In  the  Scriptures,  if  any  sentiment  does  not 
agree  with  our  opinions,  we  must  call  to  mind  the  imbecility 
of  human  reason  and  human  faculties  ;  we  must  seek  for  con- 
ciliation^ and  not  attempt  a  correction  of  the  passage  without 
good  authority.  It  is  wonderful,  that  in  this  matter  more  rev- 
erence should  be  paid  to  mere  human  productions,  than  to  the 
sacred  books. 

In  ancient  authors,  when  any  difficulty  occurs,  we  seek  for 
correction  or  conciliation  ;  as  if  they  must  be  rendered  ava- 
fiuQTrjjoi,  faultless.  But  occasion  is  often  taken  of  carping  at 
the  writers  of  the  Scriptures,  or  of  perverting  their  meaning 
or  the  doctrines  which  they  teach. 

Nothing  can  be  more  appropriate  to  the  present  times,  than  the 
caution  of  Ernesti,  not  to  conclude  hastily  against  the  reasonable- 
ness of  scriptural  sentiment.  Many  set  the  Scriptures  at  variance 
with  reason,  because  they  do  not  attain  to  the  real  meaning  of  them. 
Others  decide,  independently  of  the  Scriptures^  what  must  be  true; 
and  then,  whatever  is  found  in  the  sacred  books  which  thwarts  their 
opinions,  they  reject  as  unreasonable.  The  prudent  and  pious  inter- 
preter will  suspend  his  judgment  in  cases  of  difficulty,  and  investi- 
gate with  great  patience  and  caution  before  he  decides.  Multitudes 
of  passages  in  sacred  writ  have  been  satisfactorily  elucidated  by  crit- 
ics of  this  character,  which  have  been  given  up  as  unreasonable  by 
those  of  a  different  character.  The  time  is  coming  (I  cannot  doubt 
it)  when  alt  the  dark  places  of  the  Bible  will  be  elucidated,  to  the 
satisfaction  of  intelligent  and  humble  Christians.     But  how  near  at 


MEANING  OF  WORDS.  31 

hand   that  blessed  day  is,  I  do  not  pretend  to  know.     "  The  Lord 
hasten  it  in  its  time  !" 

§  37.  Interpretation  should  rather  he  grammatical  than  doc- 
trinal. In  comparing  reasons  for  the  exegesis  of  particular 
passages,  greater  weight  should  be  attributed  to  grammatical 
than  doctrinal  ones.  A  thing  may  be  altogether  true  in  doc- 
trine, which  yet  is  not  taught  by  some  particular  passage. 
Books  of  theology  exhibit  many  doctrinal  interpretations,  con- 
sentaneous indeed  with  Christian  principles,  but  not  deduced 
from  the  words  interpreted  ;  doctrinally  true,  but  not  gram- 
matically. 

It  is  really  matter  of  regret  to  find,  in  most  of  the  old  and  distin- 
guished writers  on  theology,  such  a  multitube  of  passages  adduced 
ao  proof-texts,  which,  when  hermeneutically  examined,  prove  to  be 
in  no  wise  adapted  to  establish  the  doctrine  in  confirmation  of  which 
they  were  cited.  It  must  be  acknowledged,  that  the  pleasure  of 
reading  many  very  valuable  works  of  this  nature  is  greatly  abated 
by  the  study  of  sacred  interpretation,  which  teaches  more  correct 
exegesis.  This  loss,  however,  is  more  than  compensated  by  the 
deep  conviction  which  springs  from  the  examination  of  genuine 
proof  passages. 

'5>  38.  Real  contradiction  does  not  exist  in  the  Scriptures. 
As  the  books  of  Scriptures  were  written  by  men  divinely  in- 
spired, it  is  evident  there  can  be  no  real  contradiction  in  them. 
God  is  not  incapable  of  seeing  what  is  consistent,  and  what  is 
contradictory  ;  nor  can  he  forget,  when  he  speaks,  what  was 
said  on  former  occasions.  If  apparent  contradictions  then 
occur,  a  proper  method  of  conciliation  is  to  be  pointed  out ; 
of  which,  however,  I  shall  say  something  in  another  place. 
(Morus,  Vol.  II.  pp.  1—49.) 

§  39.  Every  interpretation  should  harmonize  loith  the  de- 
sign of  the  writer,  and  with  the  context.  For  the  very  reason 
that  these  books  are  inspired,  every  interpretation  ought  to 
agree  with  the  design  of  the  writer,  or  harmonize  with  the 
context.  We  admit  this  principle  in  the  interpretation  of  pro- 
fane writers  ;  much  more  ought  we  to  admit  it  in  respect  to 


32  KINDS  OF  WORDS 

the  Scriptures.  Mere  men,  through  negligence  or  want  of 
knowledge,  may  insert  some  things  that  disagree  with  their 
principal  design  ;  but  not  so  the  Holy  Spirit.  Hence  the  cer- 
tainty of  any  exegesis  is  connected  with  the  design  and  series 
of  the  discourse.  Rules  of  caution,  however,  are  important 
here,  as,  in  its  proper  place,  will  be  shewn.  (Morus,  ut 
supra.) 


CHAPTER  II.  ^ 

OF  THE  KINDS  OF  WORDS  AND  THEIR  VARIOUS  USES. 

[With  this  chapter  maybe  compared,  Keil  §43,  and  §§73 — 84. 
Beck,  pp.  129— 131.  Seiler  §§41— 64.  Lowth  on  Hebrew  poetry, 
Lect.  V-XIL] 

§  40.  Design  of  the  following  chapter.  The  former  chap- 
ter treats  of  the  connection  between  words  and  ideas,  and 
deduces  from  that  connection  several  fundamental  principles 
for  the  interpretation  of  language.  The  present  chapter  is 
appropriated  to  the  consideration  of  words  as  used  in  a  literal 
or  tropical,  emphatic  or  unemphatic  sense.  It  also  treats  of 
words  as  employed  in  antithesis  ;  and  of  abstract  words  as 
employed  for  concrete  ones. 

All  these  things  belong  to  the  nature  of  language,  as  employed  to 
communicate  our  ideas;  and  therefore  are  properly  classed,  by  Er- 
nesti,  among  the  principles  of  language,  on  which  the  science  of  Her- 
meneutics  is  built.  Morus  has  thrown  this  chapter  into  his /^reccj?- 
tive  part,  and  thus  confounded  principle  with  precept.  The  rules 
which  grow  out  of  the  principles  here  developed  are  exhibited  in 
Part  II,  Chapters  V.  VI. 

§41.  Importance  of  the  following  considerations.  It  is  of 
great  importance,  in  respect  to  finding  the  sense  of  words,  to 
be  acquainted  with  those  distinctions  which  affect  the  sense, 
and  alter  or  augment  the  meaning. 


AND  THEIR  TARIOUS  USES.  33 

<5  42.  Words  proper  and  tropical.  The  first  important  di- 
vision or  distinction  of  words,  in  respect  to  their  meaning,  is 
into  proper  and  tropical,  i.  e.  literal  and  figurative,  or  (better 
still)  primary  and  secondary.     (Compare  Morus,  p.  260.  II.) 

A  proper  word  is  a  definite  name  given  to  a  certain  thing  ;  and  as 
such,  may  be  explained  by  adverting  to  the  proper  names  of  persons. 
A  tropical  word  is  one  used  oat  of  its  proper,  i.e.  original  sense  ;  e.  g. 
rosy  face,  snoicy  skin,  where  rosy  and  snowy  cannot  be  literally  or 
properly  predicated  of  the  skin.  The  names  trope  and  tropical  come 
from  the  Greek  word  T()6.iog,  inversio,  conversio. 

Tropes  arise,  (1)  From  similitude ;  wliich  maybe  either  real  or 
supposed.  E.  ff.  the  vine  creeps.  This  is  called  metaphor.  (2)  From 
conjunction;  which  is  either  real  or  supposed,  i.  e.  believed.  Real, 
where  apart  of  a  house  is  put  to  signify  the  xchole;  or  the  container 
for  the  thing  contained,  as  to  offer  the  cup,  viz.  to  offer  what  is  con- 
tained in  it,  i.  e.  the  wine.  Conjunction  is  supposed,  when  tlie  cause 
is  put  for  the  effect,  and  vice  versd,  e.  g.  blushing  for  modesty  ;  the 
sign  for  the  thing  signified;  or  the  subject  for  the  attribute.  From 
conjunction  arises  that  species  of  trope  which  is  called  metonymy. 

<J  43.   Words  first  used  in  their  proper  sense.     Originally, 

words  were  undoubtedly  used  in  their  proper  sense  ;  for  they 

were  invented  to  indicate  things,  and  by  these  things  they 

might  be  easily  explained  without  any  ambiguity.     A  small 

number  of  words  sufficed,  at  an  early  period  ;    because  there 

were,  in  the  age  of  simplicity,  but  few  objects  about  which 

speech  could  be  employed.     (Morus,  p.  262.  III.) 

What  Ernesti  says,  here  and  in  the  following  section,  about  the 
mode  of  forming  tropical  language  may  be  true  ;  but  there  are  no  facts 
to  support  it.  On  the  contrary,  the  most  rude  and  barbarous  langua- 
ges abound  most  of  all  in  words  used  figuratively.  As  we  can  trace 
no  language  back  to  its  original,  it  is  clear  that  the  propositions  ad- 
vanced by  Ernesti  are  incapable  of  direct  proof;  and  analogy,  so  far 
as  we  can  go  back,  is  against  him.  Nothing  can  be  more  destitute 
of  proof,  than  a  great  part  of  the  speculations  of  philosophizing  gram- 
marians about  the  original  state  of  language.  One  tells  us  that  the  lan- 
guage of  barbarians  has  but  few  words,  and  very  few  varieties  in  de- 
clension ;  another,  that  they  are  filled  with  6rouaron£7ioit;uiru  ;  an- 
other, that  the  roots  of  all  words  are  verbs  ;  another,  that  they  are 
nouns  ;  another,  that  all  the  original  words  are  monosyllabic,  etc. 
Some  of  these  things  may  be  true  of  some  languages  ;  but  what  can 
all  such  speculators  say,  when  they  come  to  know  the  state  of  lan- 
guage, for  example,  amon^  our  Aborigines.'  A  state  which  puts  at 
defiance  all  their  theories ;  Tor  in  minutiae  of  declension  some  of  them 
surpass  the  Greek  or  even  the  multiform  Arabic ;  and  in  most  re- 


34  KINDS  OF   WORDS 

spects  they  differ  widely  from  that  state,  which  the  above  theory 
would  teach  us  to  be  the  original  and  necessary  one. 

§  44.  Mode  of  forming  tropical  words.  But  in  process  of 
time,  objects  being  multiplied,  there  arose  a  necessity  of  using 
words  in  various  senses.  Men  now  began  to  think  and  speak 
concerning  those  things  which  had  hitherto  been  neglected  ; 
and  of  course  to  form  ideas  of  them  in  their  minds,  or  to  de- 
scribe them  in  words.  New  objects  also  were  invented  or 
discovered,  to  describe  which  words  became  necessary.  To 
serve  this  necessity,  men  resorted  to  two  different  expedients. 
Either  new  words  were  coined,  or  old  ones  were  applied  to 
new  objects.  In  those  languages  that  were  spoken  by  a  peo- 
ple ingenious  and  devoted  to  science,  or  in  those  which  by 
nature  or  art  were  flexible  and  fitted  for  the  coining  of  new 
words,  new  ones  were  most  usually  coined.  Yet  this  usage 
was  not  without  exceptions  ;  for  had  new  words  been  coined 
on  every  occasion,  the  number  of  them  would  have  been  rnul- 
liplied  without  end.  In  languages  of  a  character  differing 
from  that  just  mentioned,  there  was  a  greater  necessity  of  ap- 
plying the  same  word  to  the  designation  of  several  things. 
Hence  it  is,  that  a  language,  poor  as  to  variety  of  words 
either  in  general  or  in  particular  parts  of  speech,  employs 
the  more  frequently  the  same  words  in  different  senses.  (Mo- 
rus,  p.  262.  III.) 

§  45".  Tropical  ivords  sometimes  become  proper  ones.  But 
there  are  several  different  points  of  light  in  which  tropical 
words  are  to  be  viewed.  First,  the  primitive  or  proper  signi- 
fication, strictly  understood,  often  becomes  obsolete,  and  cea- 
ses for  a  long  period  to  be  used.  In  this  case,  the  secondary 
sense,  which  originally  would  have  been  a  tropical  one,  be- 
comes the  proper  one.  This  applies  specially  to  the  names 
of  things.  Hence  there  are  many  words,  which  at  present 
never  have  their  original  and  proper  sense,  such  as  etymolo- 
gy would  assign  them  (a),  but  only  a  secondary  sense,  which 


AND  THEIB  VARIOUS  USES.  35 

may  in  such  cases  be  now  called  the  proper  sense.     (Morus, 
p.  264.  IV.) 

(a)  E.  g.  In  English,  tragedy,  comedy,  villain,  pagan,  knave,  etc. 

§  46.  Usage  sometimes  converts  tropical  words  into  proper 
ones.  Secondly,  in  like  manner,  the  tropical  sense  of  certain 
words  has  become  so  common,  by  usage,  that  it  is  better  un- 
derstood than  the  original  sense.  In  this  case  too  we  call  the 
SQUSQ  proper ;  although,  strictly  and  technically  speaking,  one 
might  insist  on  its  being  called  tropical.  If  one  should,  by  his 
last  will,  give  a  library  [bibliothecam]  to  another,  we  should 
not  call  the  use  o{  bibliotJieca  tropical ;  although  strictly  speak- 
ing it  is  so,  for  bibliotheca  originally  meant  the  shelves  or  place 
where  books  are  deposited.     (Morus,  ibid.) 

§  47.  Tropical  names  become  proper  by  transfer.  So, 
thirdly,  when  names  are  transferred  to  things  destitute  of  de- 
signations, they  become  in  respect  to  these  things  the  same  as 
proper  names;  as  when  we  predicate  luxuriousness  of  a  crop 
(a) :  for  although  we  in  fact  use  the  word  luxuriousness  me- 
taphorically in  respect  to  the  crop,  yet  in  this  case  the  word 
may  be  called  a.  proper  one.  The  same  holds  true  of  percep- 
tion and  liberty  when  predicated  of  the  human  mind  ;  and  so 
of  many  other  things.     (Morus,  ibid.) 

(a)  So  the  Latin,  acies,  ala,  cornu,  spoken  of  an  army;  and  in  the 
same  way,  foot  of  a  moxintain,  head  of  a  river  or  bed  of  a  river,  etc.; 
all  originally  proper  nouns  used  in  a  very  different  sense,  but  now, 
as  thus  used  by  transfer,  they  have  become  proper. 

§  48.  Tropical  words  used  for  the  sake  of  variegating  the 
style.  Words  moreover  are  frequently  used  in  a  tropical 
manner,  without  any  necessity  arising  from  the  occurrence  of 
new  objects.  For  it  is  not  necessity  only  to  which  we  must 
attribute  the  use  of  tropical  words,  but  suavity  and  agreeable- 
ness  of  style  occasion  their  introduction.  To  the  genius  and 
habits  of  writers  much  also  is  to  be  attributed  ;  for, 


86  KINDS  OF  WORDS 

§  49.  First,  tropes  are  used  for  the  sake  of  variety  in  ex- 
pression ;  so  that  the  same  word  may  not  often  and  always 
recur.  To  this  species  of  tropical  language  belong  metony- 
my, synecdoche,  and  other  smaller  tropes.  In  every  thing 
variety  is  demanded,  and  without  it  taedium  quickly  follows. 
^  No  person  desirous  of  writing  elegantly  and  with  suavity  will 
fail  to  discern,  that  an  important  part  of  a  good  style  consists 
in  using  variety  of  language.     (Morus,  p.  266.  1.) 

Examples :  heaven  is  used  for  God,  sleep  for  death,  threshold  for 
house,  uncircumcision  for  Gentiles,  etc. 

Secondly,  tropical  words,  especially  metaphors,  are  used 
for  ornament.  In  metaphors,  which  are  the  most  common 
species  of  tropes,  there  is  contained  a  similitude  reduced  to 
the  narrow  compass  of  a  single  word  ;  and  the  mind  is  de- 
lighted with  metaphors,  because  we  are  so  formed  as  to  be 
pleased  with  similitudes  and  images,  particularly  with  those 
which  are  derived  from  objects  that  are  splendid  and  agreea- 
ble.    (Morus,  p.  267.  II.) 

§  50.  Tropes  used  for  ornament  specially  by  poets  and 
orators.  The  more  desirous  a  writer  is  of  ornamenting  his 
discourse,  the  more  frequently  does  he  use  tropical  language ; 
as  is  evident  from  the  style  of  poets  and  orators.  And  it  is 
with  the  special  design  that  their  style  may  be  ornate,  that 
we  concede  them  the  liberty  of  frequently  employing  tropi- 
cal language. 

(^i  51.  The  frequency  of  tropes  depends  much  on  the  ge- 
nius of  the  writer.  It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  the 
genius  of  a  writer,  and  the  subject  on  which  he  writes,  are 
intimately  connected  with  this.  Those  who  possess  great 
fervour  of  imagination  and  vivid  conception,  more  frequently 
use  tropes,  even  bold  ones,  and  (as  it  often  seems  to  others) 
harsh  ones  also.  This  results  from  the  fact,  that  they  easily 
perceive  and  frame  similitudes,  and  by  their  temperament  are 


AND  THEIR  VARIOUS  USES.  3T 

excited  to  make  comparisons.  Hence  they  often  content 
themselves  with  slight  similitudes.  But  great  subjects  by  their 
importance  naturally  excite  most  men  to  the  use  of  tropes, 
and  sometimes  of  splendid  ones.  (Morus,  p.  268.  III.  IV. 
Lowth,  Lect.  V— -XII.) 

From  the  ot^ect  of  employing  tropes,  as  above  described,  we  may 
conclude  that  he  abuses  them,  who  interprets  tliem  etymologically, 
or  seeks  any  thing  more  in  them  except  variety  and  ornament,  or 
urges  exactness  too  far  in  estimating  the  limits  of  meaning  in  tropical 
phrases. 

§  52.  Tropes  used  from  necessity  differ  from  those  employ- 
ed for  variety  or  ornament.  From  these  principles  we  may 
understand,  that  in  all  books,  but  especially  in  the  Scriptures, 
tropical  language  used  from  necessity  differs  much  from  that 
which  is  used  on  account  of  other  reasons.  In  the  first  case, 
a  thing  has  a  definite  name  by  which  it  is  called  ;  in  the  other, 
the  trope  is  used  either  for  pleasure  or  ornament.  The  former 
is  grammatical ;  the  latter  rhetorical.  In  the  first,  the  reason 
of  the  trope  lies  in  analogy  of  nature ;  in  the  second,  it  lies 
in  some  similitude.  And  since  every  thing  must  have  some 
name  either  peculiar  or  common,  and  considering  that  a  name 
must  belong  to  any  and  every  thing  grammatically,  it  follows 
that  the  iiroper  sense  of  words  is  not  lost  in  a  grammatical 
trope  adopted  as  their  name,  but  only  in  a  rhetorical.  (Morus, 
p.  270.  VII.) 

If  I  rightly  understand  this,  I  cannot  assent  to  it.  When  the  He- 
brew called  a  man  the  son  of  twenty  years,  in  order  to  designate  him 
as  being  twenty  years  old,  the  Literal  or  proper  Sense  of  the  words 
surely  was  not  intended. 

§  53.  The  sense  of  tropical  words  ii>  grammatical.  But 
as  may  be  easily  understood  from  what  has  been  said,  since 
the  meaning  of  all  tropical  words  as  well  as  proper  ones,  is 
deduced  from  the  purpose  and  design  of  those  who  employed 
them  to  designate  certain  things,  (as  is  plain  from  observa- 
tion), it  appears  that  this  meaning  is  grammatical  or  literal, 
4 


38  NATURE  OF  EMPHASIS. 

and  that  they  are  in  an  error,  who  (with  Jerome)  have  thought 
differently.  Interpretation  is  of  the  same  nature^  whether  it  is 
applied  to  words  tropical  or  proper.   (Morus,  p.  271.  VII.) 

<5  54.  Origin  of  synonymous  words.  From  the  custom  of 
using  tropical  language,  flow  synonymous  words.  In  respect 
to  these,  the  interpreter  must  beware  lest  he  seek  for  diversity 
of  meaning  where  none  really  exists  ;  which  not  unfrequent- 
ly  happens.  Usually,  in  the  same  dialect  of  the  same  nation 
and  age,  proper  words  are  not  synonymous ;  but  when  syno- 
nymes  exist  (as  for  example  they  do  in  Greek),  they  originate 
from  different  dialects  or  from  different  ages.  The  greatest 
number  of  synonymes  arises  from  tropical  words,  which,  for 
the  sake  of  variety  and  ornament,  express  the  same  idea  by 
various  names.  (Morus,  p.  271.  VIII.) 

The  interpreter  should  not  seek  for  any  definite  distinction  be- 
tween synonymes,  (1)  Where  they  are  introduced  for  the  sake  of 
variety.  (2)  Where  usage  conjoins  two  words;  as  luck  and  fortune, 
peace  and  quietness,  Lung  and  Lasting,  etc.  (3)  Where  they  are  used 
for  the  sake  of  ornament.  (4)  Where  excited  feeling  produces  a  re- 
petition of  the  same  idea,  while  different  words  are  employed.  (5) 
Where  it  is  the  habit  of  an  author  to  employ  synonymes;  e.  g.  Cicero. 

The  Hebrew  poetry  affords  the  most  striking  exhibition  of  syn- 
onymes, in  its  synonymous  parallelisms.  There,  from  the  nature  of 
the  composition,  the  second  ai'i/oq  or  stanza  is  expected,  in  general, 
to  exhibit  a  sense  like  to  the  first.  An  interpreter  would  mistake 
the  essential  part  of  his  office,  if  he  should  be  solicitious  here  to  ex- 
iiibit  a  difference  between  the  sense  of  words,  when  the  nature  of  the 
^  omposition  required  them  to  be  regarded  as  synonymes. 

NATURE    OF   EMPHASIS. 

§  55.  Definition  of  Emphasis.  In  the  use  of  language 
cases  arise,  where  the  ordinary  signification  of  a  word  re- 
ceives, if  I  may  so  speak,  accession  or  augmentation.  This 
may  be  effected  in  two  ways  ;  the  first  consists  in  the  use  of 
a  word  in  an  honorary  or  in  a  degrading  sense,  e.  g.  verha 
svcp7]fxiag  et  dvcrcprjfilag,^ of  which  it  would  be  irrelevant  to  treat 
here.  The  second  class  of  words  are  those,  which  receive 
augmentation  in  their  extent  or  force  of  meaning.    These  con« 


NATURE  OF  EMPHASIS.  39 

slitute  what  may  with  propriety  be  called  emphatic  words. 
Emphasis  then  may  be  defined,  an  accession  to  the  ordinary 
signification  of  a  word,  either  as  to  the  extent  or  the  force  of 
its  meaning.     (Morus,  p.  321.  II.) 

Emphasis  comes  from  iiKpalrtir,  which  signifies  to  shew  or  make 
conspicuous.  It  is  to  language  what  a  nod  or  a  sign  is  to  looks,  i.e.  it 
makes  more  significancy.  Examples  :  when  the  Jews  speak  of  Moses 
by  the  appellation  of  the  Prophet;  or  the  Greeks  say,  the  Orator,  the 
Philosopher,  the  Poet,  meaning  Demosthenes,  Plato,  and  Homer  ; 
these  respective  appellations  are  emphatic. 

§  56.  No  word  of  itself  emphatic.  It  may  be  easily  seen 
then,  that  no  word  of  itself  is  emphatic.  Each  word  has  by 
itself  a  certain  power,  and  designates  a  definite  idea  of  a  thing 
either  small  or  great,  in  which  there  can  be  no  emphasis. 
It  is  not  because  a  word  designates  anything  which  is  very 
great  or  very  small,  that  it  is  emphatical.  Were  this  the  case, 
then  such  words  as  God,  the  world,  the  sun,  the  king,  would  be 
always  emphatical ;  which  surely  no  one  will  assert.  (Mo- 
rus, p.  322.  III.) 

If  emphasis  be  an  occasional  accession  of  force  to  a  word,  then  the 
ordinary  meaning  of  the  word,  be  the  signification  ever  so  important, 
or  forcible,  of  course  is  not  emphatic. 

§  57.  Kinds  of  emphasis.  Emphasis  is  either  occasional 
or  constant.  We  call  it  occasional,  when  it  is  connected  with 
words  in  some  particular  place  or  at  a  certain  time,  and  from 
the  animated  feelings  of  the  speaker,  or  from  the  importance 
of  the  subject,  a  word  is  chosen  to  express  more  than  its  or- 
dinary import.  Constant  emphasis  is  that  which  usage  makes 
invariably  so,  by  employing  a  word  continually  in  an  emphat- 
ic rather  than  in  the  ordinary  sense.     Morus,  p.  323.  IV. ) 

Constant  emphasis,  if  admitted,  would  destroy  the  very  definition 
which  Ernesti  has  given  of  emphasis.  That  no  word  of  itself  is  em- 
phatic, and  that  emphasis  is  an  accession  to  the  ordinary  force  of  a 
word,  is  what  he  very  rightly  teaches  us.  What  then  is  that  empha- 
sis which  is  constant? 

§  58.  Emphasis,  how  known.    Occasional  emphasis  must  be 


4Q  NATURE  OF  EMPHASIS. 

known  by  the  context,  and  from  the  nature  of  the  discourse, 
(Morus,  p.  324.  V.) 

I  have  retained  Ernesti's  language  here  In  respect  to  the  term  oc- 
casional or  temporary  as  he  calls  it.  But  as  occasional  emphasis  is 
really  all  which  from  the  nature  of  the  thing  can  ever  exist,  I  shall 
not  hereafter  make  any  distinction,  but  speak  simply  of  emphasis. 

The  nature  of  the  subject  and  the  context  are  the  only  means  of 
knowing  whether  a  word  is  to  be  regarded  as  emphatic  ;  for  these 
must  shew  that  more  or  less  force  is  to  be  given  to  particular  terms. 
As  a  general  rule,  we  may  say  that  emphasrs  is  required  whenever 
a  frigid,  incongruous,  or  inept  sense  would  be  made  without  it. 
Thus  1  John  iii.  9,  He  that  is  horn  of  God sinneth  not  ;  the  writer  does 
not  mean  to  assert  tbis^  as  employing  the  word  sinneth  in  the  common 
and  usual  way  ;  he  means  to  say,  that  such  an  one  does  not  sin  in 
the  peculiar  sense  of  which  he  is  speaking,  i.  e.  habitually. 

As  to  constant  emphasis  (which  Morus  and  his  editor  have  admit- 
ted), the  rule  for  determining  it  is  said  to  be  the  usus  loquendi.  The 
rule  is  good,  if  the  principle  be  admitted.  The  examples  given  to- 
support  this  species  of  emphasis,  are  such  as  the  names  Jehovah  ap- 
plied to  God,  and  Son  of  man  applied  to  Christ.  But  these  prove  no 
more,  than  that  these  appellations,  applied  in  certain  circumstances,, 
have  a  significant  and  exalted  meaning ;  which  is  also  true  of  very 
many  words,  where  no  real  emphasis  is  to  be  found.  But  see  and 
compare  Morus,  p.  325.  VI.  Vll. 

§  59.  No  ground  for  dividing  emphasis  into  real  and  ver- 
bal. Some  rhetoricians  divide  emphasis  into  real  and  verbal ; 
the  former  of  which  consists  in  the  greatness  and  sublimity  of 
things,  while  the  latter  consists  of  loords  adapted  to  express 
their  qualities.  But  this  division  is  erroneous.  To  things  be- 
longs sublimity  ;  to  words,  emphasis.  Nor,  as  we  have  above 
said,  does  a  word  designating  a  great  object  therefore  become 
emphatic.     (Morus,  p.  328.  VIII.) 

§  60.  Tropical  words  are  not  of  course  and  from  their  na- 
ture emphatic.  Those  also  err,  who  make  every  tropical, 
specially  metaphorical,  word  emphatic.  In  necessary  tropes, 
or  those  used  for  the  sake  of  variety,  it  is  clear  there  can  be 
no  emphasis.  Ornamental  tropes  depend  on  mere  similitude, 
which  serves  to  render  the  discourse  agreeable.  Flagrare 
cupiditate  means  no  more  than  vehementer  cupere ;  and  no 
one  gets  a  different  idea  from  using  it.    If  then  there  be  no 


OF  ANTITHESIS.  4l 

emphasis  in  the  latter  expression,  there  is  none  in  the  former. 
The  error  arises  in  this  way,  that  some  understand  Jiagrare 
cupiditate  to  be  used  instead  of  cupere ;  and  thence  conclude, 
that  there  is  an  accession  of  meaning.  Hence  we  learn,  that 
the  emphasis  of  tropical  words  is  to  be  found  in  the  same  way 
as  that  of  proper  words.     (Morus,  p.  329.  IX.) 

§  61.  Words  in  one  language  do  not  always  correspond 
exactly  to  those  in  another.  It  may  be  proper  to  repeat  here 
a  well  known,  though  very  important  and  necessary  observa- 
tion, viz.  that  every  language  has  words  and  phrases,  to  which 
none  in  any  other  language,  or  at  least  in  that  into  which  we 
are  interpreting,  exactly  correspond.  Of  this  nature  are  many 
words  and  phrases  both  in  the  Greek  and  Hebrew  Testament. 
The  reason  of  this  lies  not  solely  in  the  difference  of  objects 
peculiar  to  every  nation  ;  such  as  pertain,  for  example,  to 
laws,  religious  rites,  manners  and  customs,  etc. ;  but  also  in 
the  variety  of  minds,  which  are  not  all  affected  in  the  same 
manner ;  and  lastly,  in  an  arbitrary  formation  of  notions,  re- 
specting those  things  which  do  not  pertain  to  substance  and 
essence.     (Campbell,  Diss.  11.) 

OF  ANTITHESIS. 

§  62.  Where  antithesis  exists^  if  the  sense  of  one  part  can 
he  found  the  other  may  be  easily  known.  Finally,  as  ideas 
are  often  contra-distinguished  from  each  other,  so  the  lan- 
guage corresponds.  Therefore,  inasmuch  as  when  ideas  are 
repugnant  to  each  other,  if  you  understand  the  one  of  course 
you  must  understand  the  other  which  is  the  opposite,  (for  what 
one  asserts  the  other  denies) ;  so  in  antithetic  language^  wheth- 
er the  subject  or  predicate  of  a  sentence,  the  rule  is  obvious, 
that  the  interpretation  of  the  one  part  must  be  directed  by  that 
of  the  other,  which  is  understood  either  from  the  ilsus  loquen- 
di,  or  where  this  is  various,  from  the  context.  E.  g.  when 
4* 


42  ABSTRACT  AND  CONCRETE  WORDS. 

muUi  and  pauci  occur  in  the  same  sentence,  and  it  is  evident 
that  multi  means  aZZ,  it  is  of  course  evident  that  pauci  cannot 
here  have  its  ordinary  sense,  but  means  non  omnes,  without 
limiting  the  idea  to  feivness  of  number  (a).  Of  a  like  kind 
are  adQ$  and  nvEv^a,  yqa^^a  and  nvsvfia  ;  in  which  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  one  is  to  be  accommodated  to  that  of  the 
other.     (Morus,  p.  167.  XIV.  I— 11.) 

(a)  But  if  multi  means  all,  does  not  pauci  (the  opposite  of  it)  mean 
noneP  In  Hebrew,  Yz  and  hb  tkh  mean  all  and  none;  and  is  not 
V'z  ^h  equivalent  to  no7i  ornnes,  in  such  a  case  ? 

ABSTRACT  AND  CONCRETE  WORDS. 

§  63.  Abstract  words  used  for  concrete.  Nor  must  the  in- 
terpreter neglect  the  distribution  of  words  into  abstract  and 
concrete.  All  languages,  specially  ancient  ones,  often  use 
abstract  terms  for  concrete  ones.  Generally  abstract  terms 
are  most  frequently  employed. 

Abstract  words  are  the  names  of  qualities  or  attributes ;  concrete, 
of  things  or  subjects.  E.  g.  divinity  is  an  abstract  word,  meaning 
the  quality  of  divine  nature  ;  but  God  is  a  concrete  term,  meaning 
the  divine  agent  or  being.  The  former  is,  by  usage,  often  put  for 
the  latter. 

§  64.  The  use  of  abstracts  for  concretes  arose  from  neces- 
sity. This  method  of  speaking  is  employed,  (1)  From  we- 
cessity.  Those  languages,  which  have  but  a  few  concrete 
terms,  riecessariJy  employ  abstract  ones ;  e.  g.  the  Hebrew 
and  its  cognate  dialects,  in  which  abstracts  are  often  used  in 
the  place  of  concretes.  Such  usage  being  once  established 
by  necessity,  it  often  extended  itself  where  necessity  did  not 
require  it. 

§  95.  (2)  From  a  desire  to  render  the  subject  spoken  of 
prominent.  When  an  abstract  is  put  for  a  subject  with  its 
pronoun,  or  for  the  subject  itself,  it  directs  the  mind  to  that 
very  thing  on  account  of  which  the  predicate  is  asserted.  No 
one  will  deny  that  this  mode  of  expression  is  energetic. 


RULES  OF  INTERPRETATION.  43 

The  meaning  of  Ernesti  seems  to  be,  that  the  abstract  noun,  when 
employed  instead  of  a  concrete,  renders  prominent  that  quality  of  the 
subject  or  agent  intended  to  be  designated,  and  which  the  writer  or 
speaker  would  naturally  desire  to  make  most  prominent. 

§  66.  (3)  The  purpose  of  ornament  is  subserved,  not  only 
by  the  prominence  given  to  a  thing  of  which  I  have  just  spo- 
ken, but  by  a  certain  elevation  and  grandeur  of  style  connect- 
ed with  this  mode  of  speaking. 

§  67.  Popular  and  learned  use  of  words.  Finally,  to  some 
words  popular  use  attributes  one  meaning,  the  use  of  the 
learned  another.  Not  that  words  naturally  signify  one  thing 
in  common  life,  and  another  in  a  treatise  of  science  ;  but  that 
they  are  used  less  skilfully  in  the  one  case,  and  with  more 
skill  and  accuracy  in  the  other.  Interpreters  who  confound 
these  usages,  of  course  pervert  the  sense  of  words. 


PART  II. 

RULES  OF  INTERPRETATION. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Introductory  Remarks. 


§  68.  Design  of  Part  11  Thus  far  we  have  been  em- 
ployed in  considering  the  general  nature  of  language,  the  va- 
rious kinds  of  words  in  use,  and  also  the  meaning  appropriate 
to  each  class.  Having  taken  this  general  view  of  the  nature 
and  properties  of  words,  we  may  now  proceed  to  deduce  from 
the  principles  already  established  various  rules  of  interpreta- 
tion, by  which  the  efforts  of  the  interpreter  are  to  be  directed. 
The  consideration  of  these  rules,  with  their  various  classes 


44  RULES  OF  INTERPRETATION. 

and  ramifications,  will  constitute  the  second  part  of  the  pres- 
ent treatise  on  Hermeneutics. 

§  69.  What  are  rules  of  interpretation  ?  They  are  di- 
rections or  formulas,  which  explain  and  define  the  mode  of 
rightly  investigating,  and  perspicuously  represenUng,the  sense 
of  words  in  any  particular  author. 

§  70.  Origin  of  these  rules.  They  are  deduced  from  the 
nature  of  language  as  above  explained  ;  and  deduced,  not  by 
logical  subtilties,  but  by  observation  and  experience. 

§  71.  Object  of  rules.  These  rules  serve  not  only  to  assist 
in  finding  the  sense  of  words,  but  also  in  judging  whether  any 
particular  sense  put  upon  words  be  true  or  false.  By  them 
too  one  may  not  only  be  assisted  to  understand  why  a  par- 
ticular sense  is  erroneous,  but  also  why  the  true  one  cannot 
be  discovered. 

§  72.  Rules  of  exegesis  connected  with  the  usus  loquendi. 
We  have  seen  above,  that  the  sense  of  words  depends  on  the 
■usus  loquendi.  Proper  rules  then  for  finding  the  sense,  or 
judging  of  it,  ought  to  have  special  respect  to  the  tisus  loquen- 
di, and  to  show  how  it  is  applied  to  every  particular  case. 

<5  73.  Usus  loquendi  general  and  special.  The  usus  lo- 
quendi, considered  at  large,  has  respect  to  a  language  gen- 
erally ;  specially  considered,  it  has  respect  to  some  particular 
writer.  To  the  common  usage  of  words  almost  every  writer 
adds  something  thai  is  peculiar  to  himself;  whence  arise  the 
idioms  of  particular  writers.  A  L^i-C  U  j.  A  ,^,,. 

§  74.  Order  in  which  the  subject  toill  be  pursued.  The 
natural  method  of  treating  the  usus  loquendi  will  be  followed  ; 
so  that  we  shall  first  consider  the  method  in  general  of  find- 
ing the  usus  loquendi  in  the  dead  languages  ;  and  then  the 
method  of  finding  it  in  any  particular  author,  but  more  special- 
ly in  the  writings  of  the  New  Testament. 


ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI.  45 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI  GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD 
LANGUAGES. 

[Compare  Keil,  §§  25— 34.    Beck,  pp.ylSl— 136.    Seller,  §8  236— 

§  75/  Vsus  loquendi/ is  known  oy  testimony.  If  the  usus 
loquendi  is  mere  matter  of  fact,  it  may  be  known,  in  the  dead 
languages,  by  the  testimony  of  those  who  lived  when  these 
languages  were  flourishing  and  in  common  use,  and  who  well 
understood  them.  This  testimony  is  direct  or  indirect.  (Mo- 
rus,  p.  74.  II.) 

By  the  itsus  loquendi  is  meant,  the  sense  which  usage  attaches 
TO  THE  WORDS  OF  ANY  LANGUAGE.  It  is  Surprising  that  any  attempts 
should  ever  have  been  made  to  find  the  sense  of  words  in  a  dead  lan- 
guage, by  means  different  in  their  nature  from  those  which  we  em- 
ploy to  find  the  sense  of  words  in  a  living  language.  The  meaning 
of  a  word  must  always  be  a  simple  matter  of  fact ;  and  of  course  it  is 
always  to  be  established  by  appropriate  and  adequate  testimony. 
Yet  how  very  different  a  course  has  been  pursued,  I  will  not  say,  by 
many  Rabbinic  and  Cabbalistic  commentators  merely,  nor  by  monks 
and  zealots  for  the  Romish  hierarchy,  but,  by  many  Protestants  who 
have  had  great  influence,  and  who  deserve  on  many  accounts  the 
higliest  respect.  Witness  the  exegetical  principles  of  Cocceius  and 
his  followers  ;  and  read,  if  the  statement  just  made  be  doubted,  many 
of  the  articles  in  Parkhurst's  Heb.  Lexicon. 

§  76.  How  to  ohtain  direct  testimony.  Direct  testimony 
may  be  obtained,  first,  from  the  writers  to  whom  the  language 
investigated  was  vernacular  ;  either  from  the  same  authors 
whom  we  interpret,  or  from  their  contemporaries.  Next, 
from  those  who,  though  foreigners,  had  learned  the  language 
in  question  {a).  Thirdly,  from  scholiasts,  glossographies,  and 
versions  made  while  the  language  was  spoken,  and  by  those 
who  were  acquainted  with  it.  But  these  must  be  severally 
treated  of. 

{a)  Thus  the  writings  of  Marcus  Antoninus  a  Roman  emperor,  and 


46  ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDl 

of  Philo  and  Josephus  who  were  Jews,  may  be  used  to  illustrate  the 
meaning  of  Greek  words,  because,  although  foreigners,  they  well  un- 
derstood the  Greek  language. 

§  77.  Testimony  of  contemporary  writers.  The  most  im- 
portant aid  is  afforded  by  writers  of  the  first  class  ;  for  their 
testimony  is  particularly  weighty.  This  testimony  may  be 
drawn  from  three  sources.  (1)  From  the  definitions  of  words. 
(2)  From  examples  and  the  nature  of  the  subject.  (3)  From 
parallel  passages.     (Morus,  p.  79.  V.) 

§  78  (1)  Definitions.  In  regard  to  these,  nothing  more 
is  necessary  than  to  take  good  care  that  the  definition  be  well 
understood,  and  then  to  consider  how  much  weight  the  char- 
acter of  the  writer  who  defines  may  properly  give  to  it. 

§  79.  (2)  Examples  and  the  nature  of  the  subject.  In  re- 
gard to  these  it  may  be  said,  that  a  good  understanding  and 
considerable  practice  is  necessary  to  enable  one  to  judge  well 
and  to  make  proper  distinctions.     (Morus,  p.  81.  VII.) 

By  examples  is  meant,  that  the  writer  who  uses  a  particular  word, 
although  he  does  not  direjtly  define  it,  yet  gives  in  some  one  or  more 
passages  an  exanrple.  of  what  it  means,  by  exhibiting  its  qualities  or 
shewing  the  operation  of  it.  TJius  Paul  uses  the  words  oroi/tia  tov 
y.oauov,  at  first,  without  an  explanation.  But  we  have  an  example  of 
the  meaning  of  it  in  Gal.  iv.  D.  Thus  nioTic  is  illustrated  by  exam- 
ples in  Heb   xi. ;  and  so  of  many  other  words. 

The  nature  of  tlie  subject,  in  innumerable  places,  helps  to  define 
which  meaning  of  the  word  the  writer  attaches  to  it  in  any  particular 
passage.  E.  g.  /Jtofc  is  pardon  of  sin,  divine  benevolence,  divine  aid, 
temporal  blessings,  etc.  Which  of  these  senses  it  bears  in  any  par- 
ticular passage,  is  to  be  determined  from  the  nature  of  the  subject. 

§  80.  Comparison  of  parallel  passages.  Great  caution  is 
necesssary  here,  in  order  to  find  the  true  sense  of  those  passa- 
ges which  are  to  be  compared  and  judged  of,  with  a  view  to 
throw  light  on  some  more  obscure  place.  Unless  such  cau- 
tion is  used,  the  object  cannot  be  well  accomplished.  On 
this  account,  the  principle  in  question  ought  to  be  well  under- 
stood ;  especially  as  all  who  are  skilled  in  interpretation  agree 
that  this  principle  of  exegesis  is  very  broad,  and  that  it  applies 


GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD  LANGUAGES.         47 

not  only  to  the  Scriptures,  but  to  all  other  books.     (Morus, 
p.  79.  VIII.) 

§  S\.  Parallelism  is  verbal  and  real.     (1)  Verbal.     This 
occurs  when  a  word  is  ambiguous  and  doubtful,  because 
neither  the  subject  nor  the  context  affords  matter  of  illustra-     jS 
tion  ;  and  this  same  word  (a),  or  its  synonyme  (b),  is  repeat-  V  '^ 
ed  in  a  similar  passage,  with  those  attributes  by  which  it  may  ""^^ 
be  defined,  or  with  some  plain  adjunct  or  intelligible  comment 
(c).     (Morus,  p.  85.  X.  XL) 

The  sense  of  many  words  is  so  plain,  that  investigation  by  parallel- 
ism, i.  e.  the  like  use  of  them  in  other  passages,  is  unnecessary.  But 
comparison  is  specially  necessary  to  illustrate  words,  (I)  Which  be- 
long to  the  Hellenistic  or  Hebrew-Greek  idiom.  E.  g.  tifoSovvTo 
nuiTtg  is  often  said,  when  the  event  to  which  it  relates  is  some  special 
favour.  The  language  here  may  be  compared  with  the  Hebrew  K'l'' 
and  TrtB,  or  the  synonymes  Su\iiuaui  ana  -daufirinat ;  by  which  it  ap- 
pears tliat  H^o;iuvrro  in  such  cases  means  admiration,  astonishment. 
(2)  Words  should  be  compared  which  have  a  kind  of  technical  reli- 
gious use.  E.  g.  uvotiIqiov,  comp.  Rom  16:  25,  Colos.  1:  27,  Eph.  3: 
45.  So  71  lOTig,  dtxatom'vtu  uiTuroia,  xanl^  ^linig,  etc.  (3)  Words  of 
unfrequent  occurrence.  The  necessity  of  this  is  obvious.  (4)  Words 
which  are  ambiguous  ;  for  words  which  are  so  in  one  place,  frequent- 
ly are,  from  the  connection  in  which  they  stand,  plain  and  easy  to  be 
understood  in  another. 

(a)  E.  g.  Christ  is  frequently  called  astone  of  stumbling.  In  1  Pet. 
2:  8,  those  who  stumble  are  said  u.rti^tiv  tm  Aoyw,  to  reject  or  disobey 
the  gospel  of  Christ.  (6)  E.  g.  2  Cor.  1:  21 .  xniaag  i^^iUg  6  Gt6c,  1 
John  2:  20,  /'^icinx  is  said  to  be  instruction  in  the  truth,  (c)  Comp. 
2  Cor.  4:  10  with  verse  11th.  Parallelisms  appropriately  so  called 
are  of  this  nature,  the  one  often  serving  to  explain  the  other.  These 
are  very  numerous  in  the  Old  Testament,  and  considerably  so  in  the 
New.     Comp.  Matt.  1:  20  with  Luke  1:  35. 

To  the  cases  already  mentioned  may  be  added,  (d)  Renewed  men- 
tion with  explanation.  Comp  1  Cor.  7:  1  with  verse  26.  Also,  (e), 
Renewed  mention  with  antithesis.  Comp.  x9uiaToc  in  Rom.  iii.  iv. 
and  V.  with  Chap.  6:  23. 

§  82.  Real  Parallelism.  This  means  that  there  is  a  paral- 
lelism of  object  or  sentiment,  although  the  words  are  not  the 
same  ;  or,  to  describe  it  in  a  manner  somewhat  different,  it 
occurs  when  the  same  thing  or  sentiment  is  expressed  in  other 
words  more  perspicuous,  or  with  fuller  and  more  numerous 
words  the  meaning  of  which  is  plain. 


n. 


k 


ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 


Real  parallelism  may  respect  a/acf  or  a  doctrine,  related  or  taught 
in  different  passages.  Examples  of  the  former  are  abundant  in  the 
Gospels,  which  in  very  numerous  instances  relate  to  the  same  facts. 
So  in  the  books  of  Samuel  and  Kings  compared  with  the  Chroni- 
cles. 

Parallelism  of  doctrine  or  sentiment  is  where  the  same  principles 
are  taught  in  both  passages.  To  this  head  of  parallelism  belong  rep- 
etitions of  the  same  composition ;  e.  g.  Ps.  14  and  53 ;  Ps.  96  and 
1  Chron.  16 ;  Ps.  18  and  2  Sam.  22  ;  some  of  Jude  and  2  Epistle  of 
Peter  ;  with  many  other  such  passages.  On  the  faithful,  skilful,  and 
diligent  comparison  of  the  different  parts  of  Scripture  which  treat 
of  the  same  doctrine,  depend,  in  a  great  measure,  all  our  right  con- 
clusions in  regard  to  the  real  doctrines  of  religion  ;  for  in  this  man- 
ner, and  in  this  only,  are  they  properly  established.  Most  of  the 
mistakes  made  about  Christian  doctrine  are  made  in  consequence  of 
partial  exegesis,  directed  not  unfrequently  by  prejudices  previously 
imbibed.  The  student  can  never  feel  too  deeply  the  importance  of  a 
thorongh  comparison  of  all  those  parts  of  Scripture,  ichich  pertain  to 
the  sa7ne  subject. 

Besides  the  verbal  and  real  parallelism  considered  above,  there  is 
another  species  of  parallelism  which  constitutes  one  of  the  principal 
features  of  Hebrew  poetry.  This  consists  in  a  correspondence  of 
two  parts  of  a  verse  with  each  other,  so  that  words  answer  to  words, 
and  sentiment  to  sentiment.  This  runs  throughout  the  book  of  Job, 
Psalms,  Proverbs,  Canticles,  and  most  of  the  Prophets.  See  Ps.  1. 
2.  19.  119.  Is.  1:  2 — 5.  40.  et  passim.  This  style, so  predominant  in 
the  language  of  the  Old  Testament,  has  passed  into  many  parts  of 
the  New,  which  strictly  speaking  are  not  poetical,  but  which  re- 
ceive tlieir  hue  from  the  influence  that  Hebrew  poetry  had  produced 
on  the  language  of  the  Jewish  nation.  See  Luke  1:  35.  1:46,  etc. 
11:27;  and  many  parts  of  the  Apocalypse,  which  is  a  kind  of  poem. 
The  attentive  and  experienced  observer  will  find  these  characteris- 
tic idioms  of  Hebrew  poetry,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  in  almost 
every  chapter  of  the  New  Testament. 

The  appropriate  method  of  studying  this  part  of  exegesis  consists, 
of  course,  in  attention  to  Hebrew  poetry.  How  great  assistance  may 
be  derived  from  a  thorough  knowledge  of  this  idiom,  no  one  can 
scarcely  imagine  who  has  not  made  the  experiment.  I  cannot  dv/ell 
upon  it  here,  except  merely  to  observe,  that  the  student  will  be  in 
no  great  danger  of  overrating  the  benefit  to  be  derived  from  a  tho- 
roujrh  acquaintance  with  it ;  and  that  he  will  find  the  advantages 
very  perspicuously  stated  by  Schleusner,  De  Parallelismo  Membro- 
rum  egregio  interpretationis  subsidio. 

As  Ernesti  has  failed  to  consider  the  appropriate  maxims  of  exe- 
gesis, in  regard  to  the  kind  of  parallelisms  now  in  question,  I  will 
add  a  few  considerations  that  may  be  useful.  (1)  In  parallelism  of 
this  kind,  seek  for  the  principal  idea  that  lies  at  the  ground  of  both 
parts  of  a  distich.  (2)  Be  not  anxious  to  avoid  the  same  sense  or 
meaning  in  both  parts,  as  though  it  would  be  tautological  and  un- 
worthy of  the  sacred  writers;  for  sameness  of  meaning,  in  innumer- 
able cases,  constitutes  the  very  nature  of  the  idiom  or  mode  of  ex- 


GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD  LANGUAGES.         49 

pression.  (3)  Inquire  whether  one  member  of  the  parallelism  is  ex- 
planatory J  or  whether  it  is  added  for  the  sake  of  ornament ;  or  is  a 
repetition  or  amplification  which  results  from  excited  feeling,  or 
from  mere  custom  of  speech.  This  inquiry  will  enable  one  to  know 
how  much  exegetical  aid  may  be  derived  from  it.  If  one  member  be 
explanatory  or  exegetical  of  the  other,  it  will  comprise  synonymous 
or  antithetic  words ;  or  one  member  will  be  in  tropical,  and  the  other 
in  proper  language  ;  or  one  will  enumerate  species,  which  belong  to 
the  genus  mentioned  in  the  other.  Instructive  on  the  above  subject 
ia  Morus,  pp.  96—107. 

But  the  student  must  not  fail  here  to  read  Lowth's  Lecturts  on 
Hebrew  Poetry,  or  the  preface  to  Lowth's  Commentary  on  Isaiah. 
With  much  profit  may  be  read,  on  this  very  interesting  and  impor- 
tant branch  of  a  sacred  interpreter's  knowledge.  Herder,  Geist  der 
Heb.  Poesie,  B.  I.  s.  22,  etc.,  an  £nglish  translation  of  which  has 
lately  been  published  by  Frof.  Marsh  of  Burlington  University,  Ver- 
-mont.  De  Wette,  Ueber  die  PsaJmen,  Einleitung,  translated  in  the 
Biblical  Repository.     Meyer,  Hermeneutik,  B.  II. 

§  83.  Parallel  passages  to  he  read  continuously  and  fre* 
quently.  A  good  interpreter,  therefore,  must  specially  attend 
to  those  passages  of  an  author,  which  resemble  each  other, 
when  he  finds  occasion  to  doubt  in  respect  to  the  meaning  of 
any  one  of  them.  He  should  read  them  over  continuously, 
or  at  short  intervals.  For  in  this  way,  while  the  passages  are 
fresh  in  his  mind  about  which  he  doubts,  or  with  which  others 
are  to  be  compared,  he  will  more  easily  trace  the  real  resem- 
blances between  them.     (Moras,  p.  107.  XVIII.) 

§  84.  Similarity  of  passages  should  he  real  in  order  to  he 
compared^  and  not  merely  verhal.  By  this  is  meant,  that  the 
same  idea  is  presented  by  both,  and  not  merely  that  the  lan- 
guage of  each  may  be  the  same.  For  real  likeness  between 
them  cannot  exist,  unless  the  idea  of  each  be  the  same  ;  nor, 
of  course,  can  the  one  throw  any  true  light  upon  the  other, 
except  there  be  a  real  similarity.  But  when  this  point  is  set- 
tled, the  interpreter  must  consider  which  of  the  two  is  the 
most  perspicuous  and  definite,  and  regulate  the  exegesis  of 
the  more  obscure  passage  by  that  which  is  the  more  perspic- 
uous. Explanation  in  this  way  often  becomes  very  obvious. 
(Morus,  p.  107.  XIX.) 

5 


50  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

But  is  there  not  akindof  i;'0rs()ov  jiQoreQov  in  this  direction  ?  Morus 
las  indeed  admitted  the  propriety  of  the  rule  ;    but  still  there  seems 
'to  me  to  be  difficulty  in  it.     In  order  to  determine  whether  two  pas- 
sages may  be  properly  compared  (one  of  which  is  obscure),  you  must 
'^first  determine   whether  there  is  real  similarity  between  them,  i.  e. 
whether  they  both  contain  the  same  idea.      But  to  determine  this, 
yimplies  of  course  a  previous  knowledge  of  what  the  obscure  passage 
('contains  ;  otherwise  you  cannot  tell  whether  the  idea  \s  the  same  in 
\both.     You  have  already  determined,  then,  how  the  obscure  passage 
/^is  to  be  interpreted,  and  so  need  not  the  comparison  after  which  you 
/  are  labouring;  or  else  you  assume  the  interpretation,  and  then  build 
'    your  exegesis  on  that  assumption.     In  either  way,  the  rule  would 
s^eem  to  amount  to  little  or  nothing. 

But  in  some  measure  to  relieve  the  difficulty,  it  may  be  said  with 
truth,  you  determine  what  idea  is  conveyed  in  each  of  the  passages 
to  be  compared,  from  the  context,  the  design  of  the  writer,  or  the 
nature  of  the  case.  Having  made  this  determination  about  each  pas- 
sage, independently  of  the  other,  you  then  bring  them  together,  and 
the  one,  being  expressed  more  fully  or  with  more  explanatory  ad- 
juncts than  the  other,  confirms  the  less  certain  meaning  of  the  other. 
A  comparison  of  passages,  then,  where  the  similarity  is  real  (that  of 
ideas)  and  not  merely  verbal,  can  never  be  made  to  any  purpose, 
where  the  obscurity  of  either  is  so  great  that  you  can  attain  no  tole- 
rable degree  of  satisfaction  about  the  meaning.'  It  can  never  be  used 
therefore  for  any  higher  degree  of  evidence,  than  for  the  confirma- 
tion of  a  sense  not  improbable  in  itself,  and  not  contradicted  by  the 
context.  * 

The  subject,  in  such  a  view  of  it,  becomes  fundamental  in  regard 
to  the  validity  of  testimony  to  the  meaning  of  words,  afforded  by 
what  are  called  parallel  passages.  The  nature  and  strength  of  the 
evidence,  and  the  proper  mode  of  its  application,  are  all  illustrated 
by  the  above  consideriltions.  Unless  the  student  forms  ideas  of  this 
subject  which  are  correct,  and  grounded  upon  the  principles  that  will 
bear  examination,  he  is  liable  to  be  carried  about  "  by  every  wind  of 
doctrine"  in  Hermeneutics,  and  to  be  cast  upon  the  opinion,  or  con- 
ceit, or  mere  confident  assertion,  of  every  commentator  or  lexicogra- 
pher, who  has  overrated  the  authority  of  passages  called  parallel  in 
deciding  upon  some  particular  word  or  phrase,  or  who  has  no  defi- 
nite views  of  the  exact  nature  and  application  of  the  evidence  in 
question. 

<5>  85.  The  exercise  of  comparison  should  he  often  repeated. 
To  the  observance  of  these  principles  frequent  practice  must 
be  added,  so  that  the  interpreter  may  easily  discern  what  pas- 
sages are  similar,  and  how  he  may  rightly  compare  them  and 
judge  of  them.  It  will  be  very  useful  here  to  consult  good 
interpreters,  not  only  of  the  Scriptures  but  of  profane  authors ; 


GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD  LANGUAGES.         51 

that  where  they  carry  these  principles  into  practice,  and  plain- 
ly make  a  right  and  skilful  application  of  them,  we  may  learn 
to  imitate  them  by  attentively  considering  the  manner  in  which 
they  attain  to  the  understanding  of  things  that  are  obscure  or 
ambiguous.  By  frequently  renewing  this  exercise,  we  may 
learn  to  go  in  the  same  path  which  they  have-travelled. 

The  books  of  the  New  Testament  present  more  inducement  to  re- 
peat this  exercise  very  frequently,  than  any  other  books.  For  (I) 
They  are  of  all  books  the  most  important.  (2)  They  are  not  only 
all  of  the  same  idiom  in  general,  but  they  have  reference  to  the  same 
subject,  viz.  the  development  of  Christianity.  They  originated  too 
from  cotemporary  writers,  possessed  of  views,  feelings,  and  language 
that  were  alike.  Hence  comparison  has  more  force  in  illustrating 
the  x\.  Testament,  than  in  the  illustration  of  either  Greek  or  Latin 
authors  ;  many  of  whom  that  agree  with  each"  other  in  all  the  cir- 
cumstances just  stated,  cannot  be  found.  But  (3)  To  all  who  admit 
that  the  same  Holy  Spirit  guided  the  authors  of  the  New  Testament, 
and  that  their  views  of  religion  in  consequence  of  this  must  have 
been  harmonious,  the  inducement  to  comparison  of  various  parts  and 
passages  with  each  other,  in  order  to  obtain  a  correct  view  of  the 
whole,  must  be  very  great;  and  the  additional  force  of  the  evidence 
arising  from  comparison,  on  account  of  the  really  harmonious  views 
of  the  writers,  must  make  this  exercise  an  imperious  duty  of  every 
theologian. 

§  86.  Many  parallel  passages  should  he  compared.  To 
compare  one  passage  only  is  often  insufficient,  whether  you 
are  endeavoring  to  find  the  usus  loquendi  by  the  aid  of  par- 
allel passages,  or  by  testimony  derived  from  the  nature  of  the 
subject  and  from  examples.  (Comp.  §  77.)  Specially  is 
this  the  case,  when  we  are  investigating  the  sense  of  words 
that  have  a  complex  or  generic  meaning  made  up  of  various 
parts.  In  this  case,  comparisons  should  be  made  from  nu- 
merous passages,  until  we  perceive  that  what  we  are  seeking 
is  fully  and  entirely  discovered.     (Morus,  p.  109.  XX.) 

Suppose  the  word  nlang  occurs  in  a  particular  passage,  where  you 
are  doubtful  what  sense  should  be  applied  to  it.  First  you  call  to 
mind  that  niong  is  a  generic  word,  having  several  meanings  related 
to  each  other,  but  still  diverse,  as  species  under  the  genus.  You 
wish  to  determine  how  many  species  of  meaning  niang  has ;  and  in 
order  to  accomplish  this,  many  passages  where  it  is  used  must  be 
compared,  in  order  that  you  may  know  whether  all  the  species  are 
found.     Tljis  being  doqe,  you  proceed  to  compare  them  with  the 


52         ,  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 


passage  under  investigation,  and  see  which  will  fit  it.  And  in  this 
way  all  generic  words  must  be  investigated,  before  the  generic  idea 
can  be  determined. 


/ 


§  87.  Testimony  of  Scholiasts  respecting  the  usus  loquendi. 
It  was  said,  §  76,  that  testimony  to  linguistic  usage  might  he 
derived  from  Scholiasts  ;  and  this  testimony  is  either  given  by 
themselves,  or  it  is  cited  by  them  from  others.  It  is  valuable, 
in  proportion  as  the  time  in  which  they  lived  approximates  to 
the  age  of  the  author  whom  they  interpret  (a) ;  and  also  in 
proportion  to  their  knowledge  of  the  language  in  which  he 
wrote  (h).  The  latter  must  be  judged  of  by  men  of  learning 
and  practical  skill ;  although  to  judge  of  it  is  not  a  matter  of 
special  difficulty.     (Morus  pp.  113 — 115.) 

Scholia  means  short  notes  upon  any  author,  either  of  an  exegetical 
or  grammatical  nature.  On  all  the  distinguished  ancient  Greek  au- 
thors Scholia  have  been  written,  in  more  recent  times  ;  many  vol- 
umes of  which  are  still  extant,  upon  Homer,  Thucydides,  Sophocles, 
Aristophanes,  etc.  In  like  manner  a  multitude  of  scholia  from  the 
ancient  Christian  Fathers,  specially  of  the  Greek  Church,  have  come 
down  to  us  in  their  works.  Originally  they  were  brief  remarks,  oc- 
casionally made  in  their  commentaries  and  other  writings.  After- 
wards these  were  extracted  and  brought  together,  and  they  now  form 
what  is  called  Catejia  Patrum.  Many  scholia  also  are  found  on  the 
margin  of  manuscripts,  or  interlined,  or  placed  at  the  end  of  a  book. 

(a)  This  is  too  generally  expressed  ;  for  surely  an  ignorant  scho- 
liast of  the  second  century  would  not  be  more  valuable  than  Chry- 
sostom  in  the  fourth.  In  short,  antiquity  adds  nothing  to  the  value 
of  a  scholiast,  except  as  it  renders  it  more  probable,  ceteris  paribus, 
that  he  may  have  a  better  knowledge  of  ancient  manners,  customs, 
history,  etc.,  than  a  modern  writer  would  have. 

(/>)  Almost  all  that  is  important  in  this  subject  turns  on  this  point. 
The  simple  question  always  is  :  Is  the  author  interpreted  well  and 
skilfully  ?  not,  when  or  where  the  commentator  lived. 

§  88.  Glossaries.  In  a  similar  way  is  the  testimony  of 
glossographers  to  be  estimated  ;  which  testimony  is  by  no 
means  to  be  despised.  Its  credit  depends  on  its  antiquity,  and 
on  the  learning  either  of  the  glossographers  themselves,  or  of 
others  whom  they  cite. 

§  89.  Nature  of  glossaries.  But  here  we  must  be  cautious 
not  to  suppose  the  Greek  glossaries  to  be  like  our  modern 


feE!5rEBALLT  tV  THE  DEAl)  LANGUAGES.  &^ 

Lexicons.  They  explain  only  particular  passages  or  words  ; 
especially  nouns  that  are  in  an  oblique  case,  or  verbs  that  are 
not  in  the  infinitive,  nor  first  person  of  the  present  tense.  An 
ignorance  of  this  construction  of  the  glossaries  has  often  been 
the  occasion  of  ridiculous  errors.  .     /^  ^^  .,,,  /  /  t-cj  •^- ; 

GLossarium  is  a  book  or  writing  comprehending  ylatoaag..^  Amoi^ 
the  Greeks,  ylwaaa  meant  either  idiomatic  word  peculiar  t6  a  certain 
dialect  only  and  unknown  in  others,  or  obsolete  word,  or  obscure  one. 
Glossary  means  a  book  containing  explanations  of  obscure  and  diffi- 
cult words.  Of  course  a  glossary  extends  only  to  a  few  of  the  words 
and  phrases  of  any  author.  It  is  not  to  be  used  as  a  lexicon  ;  for  it 
is  only  a  comment  on  particular  passages.  It  differs  therefore  in 
nothing  except  mere  form  from  very  hx\e^  scholia. 

As  to  the  authority  of  glossaries,  it  is  regulated  by  the  same  prin- 
ciples as  that  of  scholia;  mere  antiquity  of  itself  adding  nothing  im- 
portant to  its  weight,  which  is  proportioned  to  the  philological  know- 
ledge and  accuracy  of  its  author. 

The  principal  ancient  glossaries  published  are  those  of  Hesychius, 
Suidas,  Fhavorinus,  Cyrill,  Fhotius,  and  Etymologicon  Magnum. 
Compare,  on  this  note  and  the  two  preceding  sections,  Morus,  pp. 
115—130. 

§  90.  Testimony  of  versions.  The  testimony  of  versions  is 
to  be  estimated  by  their  antiquity,  and  by  the  knowledge  of 
the  original  which  the  translator  possessed.  In  order  to  judge 
of  the  latter  the  version  must  be  compared  in  many  places 
with  the  original,  in  passages  where  the  sense  is  certain.  But 
here  we  must  well  understand  the  language  of  the  version  it- 
self, lest  we  should  err  in  judging  of  it,  and  rashly  suppose 
the  translator  has  not  hit  the  true  sense,  (which  has  often 
happened  to  those  who  have  passed  sentence  on  the  Sept. 
version,  and  on  the  quotations  from  the  Old  Testament  that 
are  to  be  found  in  the  New) ;  or  lest  we  should  understand 
the  words  which  are  nicely  chosen,  in  a  low  and  vulgar  sense. 
Boyce  has  shewn  that  even  Erasmus  and  Beza  have  erred 
here.     (Morus,  p.  130.  XXXV.) 

Here  again  antiquity  is  to  be  regarded  only  as  conferring  more  ad- 
vantage on  a  translator,  in  respect  to  a  knowledge  of  ancient  customs, 
history,  etc.  In  some  cases  too  the  translator  may  have  lived  before 
the  language  which  he  translates  had  ceased  to  be  vernacular.  But 
in  either  of  these  cases,  an  ignorant  man  could  not  be  recommended 

5* 


54  OF  FINDING  THE  USUSLOQUENDI 

as  a  translator,  because  he  preceded  by  one,  four,  or  ten  centuries,  an 
intelligent,  thorough  philologist.  The  credit  of  any  version  turns  on 
Mb  fidelity  and  ability.  No  ancient  version,  either  Sept.,  Vulgate, 
Italic,  Syriac,  Chaldaic,  etc.,  vi'ill  bear  any  comparison  in  respect  to 
either  of  these  characteristics,  with  many  recent  versions  made  by 
the  finished  oriental  scholars  of  the  present  day. 

§  91.  Olher  similar  testimonies.  Similar  to  the  helps  just 
mentioned  are  those  writers,  who  have  explained  to  their 
readers  words  and  obscure  expressions  taken  from  another 
language.  E.  g.  Cicero  explains  many  Greek  words,  and 
Dionysius  Halicar.  many  Latin  ones.  Of  the  same  class  are 
writers  who  have  inserted  translations  from  another  language ; 
e.  g.  the  Latin  poets  and  historians,  from  the  Greek ;  the 
writers  of  the  New  Testament,  from  the  Hebrew  of  the  Old. 
(Morus,  p.  13L  XXXVI.) 

Passages  cited  from  the  Old  Testament  are  frequently  explained 
in  the  New,  either  by  the  connection  in  which  they  stand,  the  lan- 
guage in  which  they  are  expressed  (comp.  Is.  40:  13  with  Rom.  11: 
34),  or  by  some  adjuncts  or  direct  explanation. 

§  92.  Knowledge  of  the  peculiar  style  and  all  the  circum- 
stances of  an  author  necessary.  The  principles  of  interpreta- 
tion, thus  far,  apply  to  writers  of  all  ages  and  nations.  But 
in  addition  to  these,  there  are  some  principles  peculiar  and 
appropriate  to  certain  writers  of  a  particular  age,  nation,  or 
sect.  This  peculiar  usus  loquendi  may  be  known,  (1)  From 
the  writer's  own  testimony,  either  express  or  implied  (a). 
(2)  From  the  customs  and  principles  of  the  sect  to  which  he 
belongs  (b),  whether  philosophical  or  religious ;  and  these 
customs  and  principles  may  be  known  from  the  testimony  of 
those  who  belonged  to  the  same  sect,  or  have  explained  its 
principles.  (3)  The  interpreter  must  have  a  knowledge  of  the 
manners  and  customs  of  the  age  to  which  his  author  alludes 
(c) ;  and  this  is  to  be  obtained  by  consulting  those  who  have 
given  information  on  these  topics  (d).  (4)  The  interpreter 
should  have  a  general  knowledge  of  writers  of  the  same  age. 
(Morus,  pp.  132— 14L) 


GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD  LANGUAGES.         55 

(a)  If  an  author  have  a  manner  of  expression  wholly  sin  generis, 
then  his  own  writings  are  the  only  legitimate  source  of  information 
in  respect  to  it;  and  in  them  testimony  may  be  either  direct,  where 
the  author  himself  gives  explanations  ;  or  indirect,  where  the  expla- 
nations are  to  be  drawn  from  adjuncts  or  the  context,  (b)  Every  re- 
ligious sect  has  terms  used  in  a  sense  peculiar  to  itself.  Of  course 
a  writer  belonging  to  this  sect  may  be  supposed  to  use  its  language; 
and  an  explanation  of  it  is  to  be  found  as  Ernesti  directs,  (c)  Every 
age  has  its  own  peculiar  language,  customs,  and  sentiments,  in  some 
respect  or  other.  Consequently  a  knowledge  of  these  peculiarities 
is  necessary,  in  order  to  explain  language  that  is  predicated  upon 
them.  Hence  it  is  plain,  (d)  That  contemporary  authors  are  the 
most  probable  source  of  illustration,  next  to  the  writings  of  an  author 
himself;  as  they  were  conversant  with  the  same  manners,  customs, 
language,  sentiments,  etc.,  as  the  author. 

The  question  :  To  what  nation  did  the  author  belong  ?  is  of  great 
moment,  oftentimes,  in  explaining  his  metliod  of  using  language. 
E.  g.  what  can  be  more  diverse,  in  a  great  variety  of  respects,  than 
the  Jewish,  Roman,  and  Attic  method  of  writing? 

§  93.  The  nature  of  composition  to  he  specially  regarded 
in  the  interpretation  of  it.  History  is  one  thing,  poetry 
another,  oratory  another  (a).  Particular  periods  have  their 
special  characteristics  in  each  of  these  modes  of  composition, 
which  frequently  arises  from  a  fashion  of  writing  or  speaking 
introduced  by  some  distinguished  person.  (Morus,  p.  141 — 
147.) 

(a)  History  therefore  is  to  be  inl^erpreted  as  history,  not  as  allege^ 
ry  or  mythic"^  fictionirpoelry  is  to  be  construed  as  possessing  its  own  /"^ 
peculiar  characteristics  ;  and  so  of  the  rest.     No  one  circumstance  ^     ^ 
more  displays  an  interpreter's  knowledge  and  critical  acumen,  than  .-^ 
a  judicious  regard  to  the  kind  of  composition,  and  the  age,  cijrcum^ 


56  SUBSIDIARY  MEANS 


f  CHAPTER  III. 

OTHER    MEANS   TO   ASSIST   IN   FINDING   THE    SENSE    OF    WORDS 
BESIDES   THE   USUS   LOQUENDI. 

[Compare  Keil,  pp.  45—80.     Beck,  pp.  127—142.     Seller,  §  §  250— 
256.] 

<^  94.  Design  of  the  following  chapter.  The  preceding 
chapter  treated  of  the  method  of  finding  the  usus  loquendi^ 
i.  e.  the  meaning  which  usage  has  attached  to  words,  by  direct 
testimony.  This  testimony,  it  was  shewn,  might  be  deduced 
from  three  sources  ;  viz.  from  the  author  interpreted,  or  his 
contemporaries  ;  from  foreigners  who  understood  his  lan- 
guage ;  and  from  schoHa,  glossographies,  and  versions.  With 
these  was  united  a  knowledge  of  the  peculiar  style,  idiom, 
country,  circumstances,  etc.,  of  the  author,  as  also  the  kind 
of  compositions  which  are  to  be  interpreted.  We  come  now 
to  treat  of  indirect  testimony,  to  which  we  must  frequently 
resort  in  order  to  find  the  meaning  of  words. 

§  95.  Necessity  of  indirect  testimony.  The  usus  loquendi 
cannot  always  be  found  with  sufficient  certainty,  by  those 
means  which  have  been  pointed  out.  Proper  evidence  re- 
specting it  is  sometimes  wanting  ;  sometimes  usage  is  varia- 
ble or  inconstant,  even  in  the  same  age,  or  in  the  same  writer ; 
or  there  is  an  ambiguity  of  language,  or  of  grammatical 
forms  ;  or  an  obscurity  covers  the  subject  or  thing  treated  of; 
or  novelty  of  language  occurs  ;  or  a  neglect  of  the  ?«ws  lo- 
quendi^ which  sometimes  happens  even  in  the  most  careful 
writers.  Other  means  therefore  must  be  used,  by  which  the 
true  sense  can  be  elicited.     (Morus,  p.  148.  I.) 

<J  96.  Scope  of  a  writer  the  first  and  best  means.  The 
most  important  of  these  means  for  discovering  the  sense  of 


OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI.  57 

any  particular  passage,  is  found  in  resorting  to  the  general 
tenor  of  the  discourse.  The  design  or  scope  of  the  discourse 
in  general  is  to  be  compared  with  the  passage  investigated 
(a).  The  ground  of  this  rule  is,  that  we  ^ught  not  to  suppose 
a  good  and  judicious  writer  has  said  what  is  inconsistent  with 
his  design.  Absolute  certainty  however  is  not  always  attain- 
able in  this  way ;  for  it  sometimes  happens,  that  several  in- 
terpretations may  agree  with  the  scope  of  the  writer.  Hence 
there  are  cases,  in  which  only  a  probability  in  favor  of  a  cer- 
tain meaning  is  to  be  found ;  and  even  cases  where  not  so 
much  as  this  can  be  attained.     (Morus,  p.  149.  Ill — V.) 

(a)  But  how  is  this  scope  of  the  writer  to  be  ascertained  ?  (1) 
From  the  express  statement  of  the  writer.  E.  g.  John  20:  31.  Rom. 
3:  28.  (2)  From  the  occasion  or  circumstances  which  originated  the 
discourse,  £•  g.  the  parables  of  Christ,  and  many  passages  in  the 
Epistles.  (3)  From  history,  i.  e.  authentic  accounts  of  facts,  that 
would  very  naturally  give  rise  to  the  discourse  in  question,  and  would 
serve  to  explain  it;  e.  g.  the  epistle  of  Jude  is  directed  against  teach- 
ers who  lived  licentiously.  2  Cor.  almost  throughout  has  reference 
to  facts  which  existed  at  that  time.  If  none  of  these  things  cast  suf- 
ficient light  on  the  scope  of  the  writer,  the  whole  must  be  perused 
and  re-perused  carefully ;  by  which  unexpected  light  often  breaks  in. 

But  some  caution  in  respect  to  the  rule  in  section  96  is  proper. 
All  parts  of  a  discourse  have  not  invariably  a  strict  connection  with 
its  general  scope.  Many  things  are  often  said,  which  are  wholly 
irrelevant  to  it,  and  which  are  mere  obiter  dicta.  These  are  not  to 
be  interpreted  by  the  general  scope  of  the  discourse,  but  agreeably  to 
the  subject  that  is  treated  of  in  the  place  where  they  occur  Recurrence 
to  this  principle  is  very  important,  in  many  parts  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment. 

§  97.  Caution  in  regard  to  the  rule  above.  In  regard  to 
this  means  then  of  attaining  the  sense,  we  must  take  care  not 
to  trust  too  much  to  it,  nor  to  rely  solely  upon  it.  Nor  must 
we  rest  satisfied  with  only  some  tolerable  agreement  of  the 
sense  given  with  the  general  scope  of  the  writer.  This  the 
unlearned  are  very  apt  to  do,  for  want  of  skill  in  the  lan- 
guages ;  whence  have  arisen  many  idle  conjectures.  We 
must  insist  upon  an  evident  and  necessary  connection  with 
the  scope  of  the  discourse. 


5^  ^  SUBSIDIARY  MEANS 

But  how  shall  we  know  when  it  \s  evident  and  necessary  P  (1) 
Where  a  meaning  plainly  contradicts  the  tenor  of  a  discourse  it  ig  to 
be  rejected.  (2)  When  it  violates  the  principles  of  parallelism  and 
the  conclusions  drawn  from  them,  as  to  the  sense  of  a  passage.  [See 
§  §  80 — 86.]  (3)  Reject  a  meaning  which  gives  an  inept  and  frigid 
sense.  By  a  frigid  sense  is  meant  one  which  contributes"  neither  to 
argument,  nor  perspicuity,  nor  ornament. 

A  meaning  which  infringes  upon  none  of  these  negative  precepts, 
will  be  found  to  harmonize  with  the  subject  of  which  the  author  is 
treating,  unless  he  has  violated  all  the  rules  of  language  and  reason- 
ing. 

§  98.  Second  caution  in  regard  to  the  scope  of  the  discourse. 
Another  caution  is,  that  we  compare  the  meaning,  as  discov- 
ered by  the  scope  of-the  writer,  with  that  which  the  usu^  lo- 
quendi  affords,  and  see  whether  they  can  be  made  to  agree. 
In  other  words,  we  must  see  whether  the  usus  loque?idi  will 
tolerate  any  particular  sense  given  to  the  passage  by  the  scope 
of  the  discourse,  specially  in  respect  to  words  which  have 
various  meanings ;  or  whether  there  be  a  repugnance  to  it. 
Occasionally,  the  meaning  derived  from  the  scope  of  the  wri- 
ter will  lead  to  a  knowledge  of  something  which  may  serve 
to  establish  its  harmony  with  the  usus  loquendi. 

But  to  interpret  solely  from  the  supposed  scope  of  a  writer, 
without  the  aid  and  consent  of  the  usus  loquendi,  and  even  in 
opposition  to  it,  belongs  rather  to  rash  conjecture  than  to  in- 
terpretation by  rule.  Wherefore  this  help  is  not  to  be  used 
uiiless  in  cases  of  ambiguity,  or  of  words  which  are  arta^  As- 
yofisva,  and  generally  in  cases  where  the  best  testimony  to 
the  meaning  of  words  is  either  wanting,  or  insufficient  to  de- 
termine the  sense  (a).     (Morus,  p.  158.  VII.  and  VIII.) 

(rt)  The  reason  why  the  scope  of  a  discourse  is  not  to  be  resorted 
to,  except  in  cases  where  ambiguity  arises,  is,  that  the  usus  loquendi 
is  the  best  evidence  which  can  be  had  of  the  meaning  of  a  passage, 
and  nothing  can  be  admitted  which  shall  contradict  it,  where  it  can 
be  established  by  adequate  testimony.  But  in  case  one  doubts  what 
meaning  the  usus  Loquendi  would  assign  or  at  least  allow  to  any  word 
or  phrase,  secondary  or  subsidiary  means,  i.  e.  the  scope  of  the  dis- 
course may  be  resorted  to,  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  the  desired  illus- 
tration. 


OF  FINDING  THE  tJSUS  LOQUENDI.  59 

§  99.  Use  of  the  context  in  interpretation.  Of  more  lim- 
ited extent  (a),  but  rather  more  evident,  is  the  rule  to  have  re- 
course to  the  antecedents  and  consequents  of  a  passage,  i.  e. 
the  CONTEXT,  in  order  that  you  may  determine  its  meaning. 
This  is  done  for  two  reasons  :  either  that  we  may  choose  out 
of  several  meanings  one  which  does  not  disagree  with  the 
usus  loquendi ;  or  that  the  meaning  of  an  uncommon  word, 
not  explained  by  the  tisus  loquendi,  may  be  discovered.  Here 
however  we  must  guard  against  proceeding  beyond  probabili- 
ty ;  and  to  do  this,  we  must  observe  the  same  cautions  as 
have  just  been  given  above.     (Morus,  p.  160.  IX.) 

(a)  In  tlie  OTigindi],  angustius ;  by  which  Ernesti  probably  meant,  of 
less  imjjortance,  or  confined  tcithin  narrower  limils.  But  I  cannot  ac- 
cede to  the  propriety  of  this  sentiment ;  for  the  immediate  context, 
either  preceding,  succeeding,  or  both  together,  is  a  rule  for  judging 
of  the  meaning  of  words  of  the  very  broadest  extent.  1  might  say 
that  even  the  evidence  of  the  usus  loquendi  is,  in  very  many  cases, 
built  upon  the  context.  We  adopt  the  opinion  that  the  usus  loquendi 
sanctions  this  or  that  particular  sense,  because  the  context  clearly 
shews  that  such  a  meaning  is  to  be  assigned  to  it,  and  that  no  other 
can  be  given  without  rendering  the  sense  frigid  and  inept.  Moreo- 
ver, the  general  scope  of  an  author  docs  not  forbid  the  admission  of  a 
great  variety  of  arguments,  illustrations,  and  episodes  (if  I  may  be 
indulged  in  the  use  of  such  a  word  here),  into  the  intermediate  parts 
of  a  discourse ;  so  that  one  is  far  more  certain  of  giving  a  sense  that 
is  congruous,  by  consulting  the  immediate  context,  than  by  merely 
consulting  the  general  scope  of  the  whole.  Both,  no  doubt,  are  to 
be  regarded ;  but  of  the  two,  the  former  is  by  far  the  most  important 
means  of  assistance. 

Indeed  I  should  doubt  whether  there  is  any  one  rule  .in  the  whole 
science  of  Hermeneutics,  so  important,  and  of  so  much  practical  and 
actual  use,  as  the  one  in  question.  Great  care,  no  doubt,  is  necessa- 
ry, to  decide  with  certainty  what  sense  the  context  requires  a  word 
to  have  ;  specially  when  the  immediate  subject  is  briefly  stated. 
But  this  care  is  as  easily  practised  as  any  other  rule  is,  which  Her- 
meneutics prescribes  in  different  cases.  Violence  must  not  be  done 
to  words,  by  forcibly  subjecting  them  to  the  context,  against  etymol- 
ogy, analogy,  the  rules  of  grammar,  and  the  nature  of  language. 
But  in  every  thing  short  of  this,  all  good  lexicographers  and  com- 
mentators adapt  the  meaning  of  words  to  the  context,  in  cases  too 
numerous  to  need  any  specification.     Comp.  Morus  ut  supra. 

§  100.  Various  comparisons  useful  in  order  to  discover  the 
meaning  of  words.     Of  similar  utility  for  finding  the  sense  of 


60  SUBSIDIARY  MEANS 

ambiguous  or  obscure  words  is  the  comparing  of  subject  and 
attribute ;  of  nouns  and  adjectives  («)  ;  of  words  accompan- 
ied by  other  words  that  qualify  them,  which  may  consist  of 
adverbs,  or  of  nouns  joined  to  the  word  investigated  by  pre- 
positions and  constituting  a  kind  of  adverbial  periphrasis  {h)  j 
or  finally  of  disjunctives  (c).     (Morus,  p.  163.  XI— XIV.) 

(a)  Qualia  sint  subjecta  talia  sint  attributa,  is  tlie  old  rule  of  the 
schools  and  of  philosophy,  founded  upon  the  common  sense  of  man- 
kind. In  accordance  with  this,  we  understand  as  tropical  language 
all  those  expressions  which  ascrihe  hands,  feet,  eyes,  ascent,  descent, 
etc.,  to  God  who  is  a  Spirit.  The  principle  in  question  is  of  vast  ex- 
tent in  construing  the  figurative  language  of  the  Scriptures  ;  and  it 
also  extends  to  many  expressions  that  are  not  strictly  tropical.  Too, 
much  certainty  however  should  not  be  ascribed  to  it ;  for  some  cases 
Occur,  where  the  subject  is  imperfectly  known,  and  of  course  we  are 
unable  to  pronounce  with  confidence  what  attributes  may  be  ascribed 
to  it. 

(b)  E.  g.  y.at'  oxpiv  xQioig.  Kar'  oifiv  serves  merely  the  purpose 
of  an  adjective  qualifying  xoioig,  and  shewing  that  judgment  from 
external  appearance  only  is  meant. 

(c)  By  disjunctives  are  meant  words  placed  in  antithesis.  E.  g. 
Jieaven,  earth  ;  spirit,  flesh,  etc.  The  rule  for  finding  the  sense  in  such 
cases  is  obvious,  provided  the  meaning  of  either  term  can  be  found. 
For  whatever  meaning  one  term  has,  the  other  has  the  opposite  ;  so 
that  if  certainty  be  acquired  as  to  the  one,  it  is  of  course  acquired  as 
to  the  other,  which  is  to  be  construed  as  a  real  antithesis.  Com- 
pare §  62. 

§  101.  Analogy  of  languages  a  means  of  interpretation. 
Analogy  of  languages  may  also  assist  in  judging  of  the  mean- 
ing of  words.  This  is  of  different  kinds.  The  first  is  analogy 
of  any  particular  language,  (i.  e.  the  same  language  with  that 
to  be  interpreted,  which  analogy  was  treated  of  in  a  former 
chapter,  and  shewn  to  be  useful  in  ascertaining  the  usus  lo- 
quendi),  the  principles  of  which  are  developed  by  the  precepts 
of  grammarians.  It  is  necessary  here  only  to  touch  upon  this 
analogy.     (Morus,  p.  168.  XV.) 

Analogy  means  similitude.  E.  g.  from  the  meaning  attached  to 
the  forms  of  words,  their  position,  their  connection,  etc.,  in  one  or 
rather  many  cases,  we  argue  to  establish  a  similarity  of  meaning, 
where  the  phenomena  are  the  same,  in  another.  This  analogy  is  the 
foundation  of  all  the  rules  of  grammar,  and  of  all  that  is  established 
and  intelligible  in  language. 


OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI.  61 

§  102.  Grammatical  analogy  useful  not  only  in  finding  the 
USUS  loquendi,  hut  applicable  to  some  doubtful  cases.  E.  g. 
when  the  kind  of  meaning  generally  considered  is  evident,  (by 
comparing  other  similar  words  and  methods  of  speaking  con- 
cerning such  things  appropriate  to  the  language),  we  may 
ju^ge  of  the  special  force  or  power  of  the  word  by  aid  of 
grammatical  analogy  ;  as  1  Pet.  5:  5,  where  many  critics 
have  attached  to  iyao^^biaaa&ai  an  emphatic  sense,  we  must 
compare  the  other  Greek  phrases  which  relate  to  clothing  or 
investing.  And  thus  we  shall  see  that  the  prepositions  nfgl, 
u(i(fi,  fV,  are  used  in  composition  without  any  accession  of 
meaning  to  the  verb  thereby  ;  and  consequently  that  iyaofi- 
ftuKTacrd^ai  is  no  more  than  ivdmaa&at,  with  which  it  is  com- 
muted in  Clemens  Rom.  Ep.  1.  p.  39.  A  good  irxterpreter 
should  be  well  versed  in  such  comparisons.  (Morus,  p.  170. 
XVI.) 

vj  103.  Analogy  of  kindred  languages.  Another  analogy 
is  that  of  kindred  languages  ;  either  as  descended  from  one 
common  stock,  as  Hebrew,  Syriac,  Chaldee,  and  Arabic  ;  or 
derived  the  one  from  the  other,  as  Latin  and  Greek.  The 
former  kind  of  analogy  Schultens  has  explained,  and  often 
had  recourse  to  it  in  his  Origines  Ling.  Heb.,  and  in  his  va- 
rious Commentaries. 

Morus,  on  this  section,  says,  thvit  dialects  differ  only  in  the  mode 
of  declining,  in  the  pronunciations  and  forms  of  words,  etc.  ;  and 
ranks  the  Syriac,  Chaldee,  and  Arabic,  among  the  dialects  of  the  He- 
brew ;  while  he  calls  the  Latin  and  Greek  co^nafe  languages.  Gen- 
eral usage  however  is  against  him  ;  for  cognate  languages  of  the  He- 
brew, is  almost  the  appropriate  name  of  those  which  he  calls  dialects. 

§  104.  Use  of  this  analogy.  This  analogy  is  of  use  to  the 
interpreter,  not  only  in  assisting  him,  by  the  aid  of  one  dia- 
lect, to  restore  roots  which  have  perished  in  another  that  is 
the  subject  of  his  investigation,  and  thus  opening  a  way  of 
access  to  the  signification  of  words  ;  but  still  more  useful  as  a 

6 


62  SUBSIDIARY  MEANS 

means  of  illustrating  and  confirming  that  sense  of  words, 
which  ihe  scope  of  the  discourse  commends. 

This  is  a  subject  deeply  interesting  to  every  student  of  the  original 
languages  of  the  Bible,  especially  of  the  Hebrew.  Analogy,  mode- 
rately and  judiciously  used,  is  of  great  worth  ;  but  pushed  too  far,  it 
degenerates  into  a  violation  of  all  the  fundamental  rules  of  interpre- 
tation. Comp.  Morus,  p.  J 76.  XIX — XXII,  where  several  valuable 
cautions  may  be  found.  Better  still  may  be  found  in  the  admirable 
Preface  of  Gesenius  to  his  Hebrew  Lexicon,  translated  and  published 
in  the  Biblical  Repository.  See  also  Jahn  on  the  study  of  the  origi- 
nal languages  of  the  Scriptures,  pp.  19,  20  and  Note  G. 

<^  105.  Etymology  an  uncertain  guide.  The  fluctuating 
use  of  words  which  prevails  in  every  language,  gives  rise  to 
frequent  changes  in  their  meaning.  There  are  but  few  words 
in  any  language,  which  always  retain  their  radical  and  prima- 
ry meaning.  Great  care  therefore  is  necessary  in  the  inter* 
preter,  to  guard  against  rash  etymological  exegesis  ;  which  is 
often  very  fallacious.  Etymology  often  belongs  rather  to  the 
history  of  language,  than  to  the  illustration  of  its  present 
meaning  ;  and  rarely  does  it  exhibit  any  thing  more  than  a 
specious  illustration. 

See  an  admirable  illustration  of  this,  in  Campb.  Dissert.  IV.  §§ 
J  5— 2^. 

§  106.  Expressions  which  convey  a  similar  meaning  are  to 
he  compared^  although  in  respect  to  etymology  they  may  differ. 
That  analogy  is  particularly  useful  to  an  interpreter,  which 
leads  him  not  only  to  compare  similar  words  and  phrases, 
and  so  cast  light  from  the  one  upon  the  other ;  but  also  to 
compare  expressions,  which,  though  dissimilar  in  respect  to 
etymology^  are  employed  to  designate  the  same  idea.  Of  this 
nature  are  nsTiQaiAsvog  vjto  ti]v  u^aqxlav  compared  with  the 
Latin  addictus  alicul,  and  wg  dianvgog  compared  with  amhus* 
tus,  when  the  Latin  words  are  used  tropically.  So  we  must 
compare  the  Hebrew  C^b^^,  "JST:  with  the  Greek  ixnodojv. 
For  as  the  Greeks  clearly  use  iKTtodwv  where  the  Latins  say 
e  medio ;  so  ixnodojv  and  t2';^^n  ]'3.12  are  so  much  alike,  that 


OF  FINDING  THE  USTTS  LOQUENDI.  63 

the  Greek  would  almost  seem  to  be  made  out  of  the  Hebrew 
phrase.  Hence  we  may  see  that  the  sense  of  D'^.bs^  ']'3.72  is 
e  medio.     (Morus,  p.  180.  XXI.) 

5  107.  Foundation  of  analogy  in  all  languages.  No  one 
can  doubt  that  men  are  affected  in  nearly  the  same  way  by 
objects  of  sense.  Hence  those  who  speak  of  the  same  ob- 
jects, perceived  and  contemplated  in  the  same  manner,  al- 
though they  may  use  language  that  differs  in  respect  to  ety- 
mology, yet  must  be  supposed  to  have  meant  the  same  thing; 
and  on  this  account  the  one  may  be  explained  by  the  other. 
(Morus,  p.  178.  XX.) 

Men  are  physically  and  mentally  affected  in  the  same  manner,  by 
very  many  objects;  and  of  course,  it  may  be  presumed  that  they  en- 
tertain and  mean  to  express  the  same  ideas  concerning  these  objects, 
however  various  their  language  may  be.  Besides,  modes  of  express- 
ion are  oflen  communicated  from  one  people  to  another.  Of  the  use 
to  be  made  of  these  facts  the  following  section  treats. 

^  108.  Use  of  the  above  general  principle.  In  general, 
this  principle  is  of  great  extent,  and  of  much  use  to  the  inter- 
preter in  judging  of  the  meaning  of  tropical  language,  and  in 
avoiding  fictitious  emphasis.  Accordingly,  we  find  it  resorted 
to  now  and  then  by  good  interpreters,  with  great  profit.  But 
it  needs  much  and  accurate  knowledge  of  many  tongues  to 
use  it  discreetly  ;  whence  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  its 
use  is  not  very  common  among  interpreters.  (Morus,  p.  181. 
XXII.) 

The  following  general  cautions  on  the  subject  of  comparing  words 
and  languages  with  each  other,  may  be  of  some  utility.  (1)  The 
meaning  in  each  or  any  language  is  not  to  be  resolved  into  the  au- 
thority of  lexicons,  but  that  of  good  writers.  (2)  Words,  phrases, 
tropes,  etc.,  of  any  ancient  language  are  to  be  judged  of  by  the  rules 
of  judging  among  those  who  spoke  that  language,  and  not  by  those 
which  prevail  in  modern  times,  and  have  originated  from  different 
habits  and  tastes.  (3)  Guard  against  drawing  conclusions  as  to  the 
meaning  of  words,  in  the  same  or  different  languages,  from  fanciful 
etymology,  similarity  or  metathesis  of  letters,  etc.  (4)  When  the 
sense  of  words  can  be  ascertained  in  any  particular  language  by  the 
ordinary  means,  other  languages,  even  kindred  ones,  should  not  be 
fpsorte^  to,  e:^cept  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  illustration  or  con- 


64  SUBSIDIARY  MEANS 

firmation.     (5)  Take  good  care  that  real  similitude  exists,  whenever 
comparison  is  made.     See  Morus,  pp.  18*2 — 184. 

§  109.  Interpretation  by  appeal  to  the  nature  of  things, 
the  common  sense,  views,  and  feelings  offnen,  etc.  We  must 
also  resort  to  the  nature  of  things,  and  the  analogy  of  the 
sentiment  which  a  writer  is  inculcating,  that  we  may  find  the 
true  meaning  of  his  words,  and  not  attribute  to  them  more  nor 
less  than  he  did.  Every  writer,  spontaneously  or  from  edu- 
cation, feels  that  his  readers  must  understand  what  he  is  say- 
ing, so  that  there  is  no  danger  of  misapprehension.  It  hap- 
pens not  unfrequently,  that  on  this  account  he  uses  language 
which  is  not  altogether  accurate,  if  it  be  judged  of  by  the 
rules  of  logical  precision.  Of  this  nature  are  catachresisyhy- 
perhole,  hypallage,  and  those  phrases  which  assert  generally 
what  is  true  of  only  a  part,  or  of  some  particular  kind.  These 
and  other  like  modes  of  speech  are  introduced  by  vulgar  cus- 
tom into  every  language,  specially  into  the  oriental  ones. 
They  abound  in  poetry  and  oratory.  Nor  is  there  any  par- 
ticular reason  that  a  writer  should  take  special  pains  to  avoid 
them.  It  is  necessary  therefore  in  these  cases,  to  have  re- 
course, for  the  sake  of  interpretation,  to  the  nature  of  things 
(a),  to  innate  conceptions,  common  sense,  and  the  plain  ele- 
ments of  knowledge  (b).  Moreover,  we  must  avoid  urging 
mere  verbal  criticism  too  far,  or  introducing  far  fetched  ety- 
mologies, or  hastily  concluding  that  the  expression  of  the  au- 
thor is  faulty.  Language  is  made  by  prevailing  usage  ;  nor 
can  that  be  faulty  language,  which  agrees  with  the  usage  of 
those  who  are  well  skilled  in  it.  Wherefore  grammatical 
anomalies  are  not  only  free  from  fault  when  predominant 
usage  sanctions  them,  but  they  become  a  part  of  the  language, 
so  that  one  who  departs  from  them  may  be  said  to  write  in- 
accurately. 

(a)  E.  g.the  mind  is  inflamed ;  in  interpreting  which  expression 
we  resort  to  the  nature  of  the  mind,  to  shew  that  the  sense  of  inflam- 
ed must  be  tropical.     So  when  the  sun  is  said  to  rise,  go  doion,  etc.j 


OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI  65 

God  to  ascend,  descend,  etc  ;  we  resort  to  the  real  nature  of  the  ob- 
jects in  question  in  order  to  explain  the  language.  So  in  explaining 
prophetic  language,  if  the  event  prophesied  has  come  to  pass,  we 
resort  to  the  history  of  the  event,  to  cast  light  on  the  language  which 
predicts  it.  l 

(b)  E.  g.  pluck  out  thy  h,ght  eye  ;  cut  off  thy  right  hand.  In  con- 
struing this,  our  views  of  |he  worth  of  litie  and  of  our  members,  our 
views  of  duty  as  to  the  preservation  of  life  and  usefulness,  and  our 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  Christian  religion  in  general,  all  con- 
spire to  lead  us  to  reject  the  literal  exposition  and  to  give  the  words 
a  tropical  sense.  So  when  Christ  tells  his  disciples  to  salute  no  one 
by  the  way,  etc.;  and  in  like  manner,  in  innumerable  other  cases. 

As  to  the  various  figures  of  speech  mentioned  in  the  section  above, 
can  it  be  doubted  whether  they  occur  in  the  Scripture  ?  Catachresis 
is  the  use  of  a  word  so  as  to  attribute  to  a  thing  what  cannot  be  real- 
ly and  actually  predicted  of  it.  When  the  heavens  then  are  said  to 
listen;  the  floods  to  clap  their  hands;  the  hills  to  skip  ;  the  trees  of. 
the  forest  to  exult ;  what  is  this  but  catachresis  of  the  boldest  kind  ? 
Hyperbole  magnifies  a  thing  beyond  its  real  greatness.  When  the 
Saviour  says  :  It  is  easier  for  a  camel  to  go  through  the  eye  of  a  needle, 
than  for  a  rich  man  to  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God  ;  which  is  after- 
wards explained  as  simply  meaning,  How  hardly  shall  they  that 
have  riches  be  saved ;  was  not  his  language  hyperbole  ?  Hypallage 
means  a  change  of  appropriate  language  for  unappropriate.  E.  g. 
Luke  1:  54,  his  mouth  and  his  tongue  aiiw/^rj.  The  student,  how- 
ever, must  not  be  content  with  a  meagre  note  on  this  great  subject. 
Let  him  peruse  and  re-peruse  Lowth's  Lectures  on  Hebrew  Poetry, 
where  the  nature,  design,  and  extent,  of  figurative  language  in  the 
Scriptures,  is  better  unfolded  than  in  any  other  book  of  whien  1  have 
any  knowledge,  Comp.  also  Glassii.  Philol.  Sac.  ed.  Dathii,  Vol. 
H.     (Morus,  pp.  185-194) 

In  regard  to  that  usage  by  which  the  whole  is  put  for  a  part  and 
a  part  for  the  whole,  it  is  by  no  means  unfrequent  in  the  Scriptures. 
How  often  do  we  meet  with  nac  or  nur-rtg,  when  only  a  large  or  con- 
siderable number  is  intended.  On  the  other  hand,  a  part  is  put  as  the 
representative  of  the  whole,  in  very  many  passages  ;  e.  g.  Ps.  8:  7,  8. 
Rom.  8:  38,  39.     Surely  in  the  last  example  here,  the  apostle  does 


not  mean  to  say  that  the  things  which  he  particularizes,  are  the  on- 
ly things  which  are  unable  to  separate  us  from  the  love  of  Christ. 
He  means  to  say  that  nothing  whatever  can  effect  a  separation.  Jn 
all  such  cases,  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  subject,  and  also  the 
scope  of  the  discourse,  must  determine  the  latitude  in  which  the 
words  are  to  be  taken. 

Especially  must  common  sense,  as  Ernesti  says,  be  appealed  to  in 
the  interpretation  of  parables,  allegories,  and  all  kinds  of  figurative 
language,  proverbial  expressions,  etc.  Every  writer  adresses  him- 
self to  the  common  sense  of  his  fellow  men. 

§  110.   The  error  of  pressing  etymologies  too  far  not  un- 
frequent.    The  fault  of  pressing  etymologies  too  far,  is  more 
6* 


66  ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

general  than  we  should  be  apt  to  imagine.  For  not  only  they 
are  guilty  of  this  fault,  who  explain  all  words  by  tracing  them 
to  their  primitive  meaning,  (which  is  very  common),  but 
those  also  who  always  insist  too  strenuously  on  the  ordinary 
and  grammatical  force  of  a  word.  Hence  arise  many  false 
interpretations  and  fictitious  emphases.  But  of  this  more 
hereafter. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI  OF  THE  NEV^  TESTAMENT. 
[Keil,  pp.  4C— 60.     Beck,  pp.  131—136.     Seller,  §  §  236—257.] 

§  111.  What  has  been  said  thus  far,  in  this  treatise,  has 
respect  to  the  laws  of  interpretation  generally  considered. 
We  come  now  to  treat  of  our  subject  with  reference  to  the 
exegesis  of  the  New  Testament. 

§  112.  Knowledge  of  the  N.  Testament  dialect  important. 
In  the  first  place,  we  must  inquire  concerning  the  kind  of  lan- 
guage or  dialect  in  general  which  the  writers  of  the  N.  Tes- 
tament use  ;  for  a  knowledge  of  this  is  highly  important,  in 
order  that  we  may  be  able  to  find  the  sense  of  the  words  and 
judge  of  it ;  as  will  speedily  be  shewn. 

§  1 13.  The  question  to  be  here  investigated.  This  subject 
in  general  is  comprised  in  a  single  question,  viz ,  Is  the  N. 
Testament  in  its  words,  phrases,  and  form  of  language,  pure 
classic  Greek  (a)  ;  or  does  it  partake  of  the  Hebrew  idiom  ? 

The  former  is  defended  by  Pfochen,  Stolberg,  E.  Schmidt, 
Blackwall,  Georgi,  and  a  few  others  not  very  eminent  for 
their  knowledge  of  Greek  ;  the  latter  by  Erasmus,  Luther, 
Melancthon,  Camerarius,  Beza,  Drusius,  Casaubon,  Glass,  Ga- 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  67 

taker,  Solanus,  Olearius,  Vorstius,  and  many  others  who  were 

well  skilled  in  the  Greek  language  ;  with  whom  also  Origen 

and  Chrysostom  agree.     (Morus,  p.  195.  II.  Vide  etiam  pp. 

217—222.) 

(a)  We  call  that  a  pure  style,  which  has  neither  barbarisms  nor 
solecisms  in  it. 

<5>  1 14.  W/ial  is  excluded  from  the  present  question.  That 
this  question  may  be  rightly  understood  and  judged  of,  we 
must  premise,  that  the  inquiry  is  not,  *  Whether  some  have 
not  mistaken,  or  do  not  still  mistake,  pure  Greek  expressions 
for  Hebraisms.'  We  may  readily  concede  this;  for  error 
may  be  and  has  been  committed  here,  and  there  lare  some 
modes  of  speech  which  are  common  to  all  languages.  (Mo- 
rus, p.  204.  IV.  1.) 

§  115.  The  question  further  limited.  Nor  is  the  question, 
'  Whether  the  same  Greek  words  and  phrases,  occurring  in 
the  New  Testament,  may  be  found  in  good  Greek  authors.' 
This  we  may  often  concede.  Nor  do  we  inquire, '  Whether 
some  phrase,  apparently  a  Hebraism,  may  be  found  in  some 
sublime  or  tragic  poet,  e.  g.  in  Eschylus  or  Sophocles,  and 
used  in  the  same  sense ;  as  ^rjgd  for  the  main  land."*  For 
poets,  specially  these  and  lyric  ones,  say  many  things  in  an 
unusual  way,  which  are  not  to  be  imitated  in  common  usage. 
They  even  intermix  foreign  expressions,  and  sometimes  use 
antiquated  phrases.  Many  such  things  Stanley  has  noted  in 
Eschylus  ;  and  Zuingle  in  Pindar,  whose  preface  to  this  au- 
thor should  be  read.  The  same  is  the  case  in  Sophocles. 
(Morus,  p.  203—209.) 

§  116.  The  same  subject  continued.  Nor  is  it  inconsistent 
with  the  purity  of  N.  Testament  Greek,  that  certain  words 
are  found  which  designate  objects  unknown  to  the  Greeks, 
and  are  therefore  to  be  understood  in  a  manner  different  from 
Greek  usage,  because  they  borrrow  their  meaning  from  the 


68  ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

Hebrew  manner  of  speaking.     Of  this  kind  are  nlaxig,  find- 
voia,  and  other  words.     (Morus,  p.  209.  IV.) 

§  117.  The  question  directly  stated.  The  question  as  to 
the  idiom  of  the  N.  Testament,  turns  on  the  use  of  such  words 
and  phrases  as  designate  those  objects  that  the  Greeks  are  ac- 
customed to  designate  ;  and  the  inquiry  here  must  be,  whether 
such  words  in  the  N.  Testament  are  used  in  the  same  sense 
which  the  Greeks  attach  to  them  ;  and  whether  phrases  not 
only  have  the  same  syntax  as  that  of  classic  Greek,  but  also 
the  same  sense  as  in  the  Greek  authors ;  for  this  is  essential  to 
the  purity  of  language.  E.  g.  Sixuioaivr]  used  for  liberality ; 
svXoyia  for  plenty  ;  xoivov  for  profane.  So  eUso  dlxaiog  iv con lov 
tov  Oeov,  (HQTov  q>dyuv,  naQUdir^vuL  ivcomov  Tivog,  etc.,  have  a 
peculiar  sense  in  the  N.  Testament.     (Morus,  pp.  196,  197.) 

§  1 18.  With  what  kind  of  Greek  is  the  N.  Testament  to  be 
compared  7  In  regard  to  the  writers  with  whom  the  N.  Tes- 
tament Greek  is  to  be  compared,  we  must  see  that  they  them- 
selves are  pure,  i.  e.  ancient  prosaic  authors,  who  have  not 
derived  any  thing  in  their  style  from  the  Scriptures  or  the  N. 
Testament;  and  then  historical  writers  must  be  compared 
with  historical ;  doctrinal  with  doctrinal ;  poetical  with  poeti- 
cal (a).     (Morus,  pp.  208,  209.) 

(a)  Several  hymns  in  the  New  Testament,  and  most  of  the  Apoca- 
lypse, with  occasional  quotations  from  the  poetry  of  the  old  Testa- 
ment, are  poetical  in  their  nature,  though  not  in  their  form ;  at  least 
they  are  not  in  the  form  of  Greek  poetry. 

<5>  119.  New  Testament  Greek  not  pure.  The  question  be- 
ing thus  stated  and  defined,  we  deny,  without  hesitation,  that 
the  diction  of  the  N.  Testament  is  pure  Greek  ;  and  contend 
that  it  is  modelled  after  the  Hebrew,  not  only  in  single  words, 
phrases,  and  figures  of  speech,  but  in  the  general  texture  of  the 
language.  This  can  be  established  by  clear  examples,  more 
numerous  than  even  those  who  agree  with  us  in  opinion  have 
supposed.     For  Luke  himself,  who  is  usually  thought  to  be 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  69 

the  most  pure  in  his  style,  has  innumerable  Hebraisms.  The 
very  beginning  of  his  Gospel,  after  a  short  preface  of  pure 
Greek  (a),  immediately  goes  into  the  use  of  the  Hebrew  idi- 
om so  exactly,  that  it  seems  to  be  translated  literally  from  a 
Hebrew  original. 

(fl)  The  pure  Greek  of  this  Preface  is  very  questionable  ;  as  might 
easily  be  shewn,  if  time  and  circumstances  permitted.  .         •  3    *»- 

K  /  0  T 

^  120.  Some  phrases  are  common  to  Greek  and  Hebrew. 
To  prove  that  Hebrew-Greek  is  the  language  of  the  New 
Testament,  by  citing  examples  here,  would  be  superfluous ; 
as  these  may  be  found  in  abundance,  by  consulting  the  works 
of  Olearius,  Vorstius,  Leusden,  Glass,  and  others.  It  may  be 
proper  however  to  remark,  that  although  certain  phrases  may 
be  found  in  pure  Greek,  yet  they  may  also  be  Hebraisms. 
For  it  may  happen,  that  a  writer,  in  translating  a  Hebrew  ex- 
pression, may  adopt  words  used  by  a  good  Greek  writer ; 
which  is  an.  observation  sanctioned  by  the  authority  of  Gata- 
ker,  Hemsterhuis,  Raphel,  and  others.  E.  g.  xuquv  /a/^«ty> 
metum  metuerCy  which  are  good  Greek  and  Latin  ;  but  the  lat- 
ler  is  also  of  the  same  tenor  as  the  Hebrew  Ths  nns. 

§  121.  Arguments  to  support  the  sentiment  expressed  in 
§  119.  It  is  no  small  argument  for  the  Hebraistic  style  of 
the  New  Testament,  that  many  parts  of  it  can  be  more  easily 
translated  into  Hebrew  than  into  any  other  language  ;  so 
Erasmus  Schmidius  confesses,  though  a  strenuous  defender 
of  the  classic  purity  of  the  New  Testament.  Nay,  many 
parts  of  the  New  Testament  can  be  explained  in  no  other 
way  than  by  means  of  the  Hebrew.  Moreover,  in  many  pas- 
sages, there  would  arise  an  absurd  and  ridiculous  meaning,  if 
they  should  be  interpreted  according  to  a  pure  Greek  idiom  ; 
as  appears  from  the  examples  produced  by  Werenfels,  and 
by  me  in  my  essay  De  Difficult,  interpr.  gramm.  N.  Test. 
<5>  12  ;  to  which  many  others  might  easily  be  added.     Theo- 


70  '  ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

logy  would  have  been  freed  from  many  errors  that  have  crept 
in,  if  Hebraisms  had  not  been  interpreted  as  pure  Greek  ;  as 
Melancthon  in  his  Commentaries  has  frequently  shewn. 
(Moras,  p.  198.  III.) 

§  122.  Additional  argument.  It  is  another  argument  in 
favour  of  the  Hebraisms  of  the  New  Testament,  that  former 
Greek  and  Latin  interpreters,  who  have  followed  the  man- 
ner of  classic  Greek  in  their  interpretations,  have  often  tor- 
tured the  sense  and  made  it  plainly,  inept.  E.  g.  in  explain- 
ing avvdiafib)  TsXeicTijiog,  as  Melancthon  remarks.  The  same 
thing  has  happened  to  modern  interpreters  who  are  ignorant 
of  the  Hebrew  idiom  ;  while  to  those  who  are  acquainted  with 
it,  such  passages  are  very  plain.  But  mistakes  on  such 
ground  could  not  be  made,  if  the  apostles  had  written  pure 
Greek.     (Morus,  p.  199.) 

§  123.  Objections  answered.  We  need  not  be  under  any 
apprehension  that  the  dignity  of  the  New  Testament  will  suf- 
fer, by  the  admission  that  Hebraisms  may  be  found  in  its 
style.  Truth  cannot  injure  religion ;  and  many  reasons 
moreover  may  be  given,  why  the  Hebrew-Greek  style  was 
proper  and  necessary  for  the  New  Testament  writers. 

(1)  The  writers  of  the  New  Testament  could  not  sponta- 
neously write  Greek  well,  inasmuch  as  they  were  born  and 
educated  Hebrews  ;  nor  did  they  learn  Greek  in  a  scholastic 
way,  nor  were  they  accustomed  to  the  reading  of  Greek  au- 
thors. This  is  true  of  Paul  as  well  as  the  others.  For 
although  he  was  born  at  Tarsus,  where  schools  of  rhetoric 
and  philosophy  were  established,  it  does  not  follow  that  he 
attended  them  ;  nor  that  he  was  familiar  with  the  Greek  poets, 
because  he  quotes  a  single  verse  from  one  of  them.  Greek 
taste,  style,  and  literature,  were  plainly  foreign  to  a  man  who 
belonged  to  the  most  rigid  of  the  sect  of  the  Pharisees,  and 
was  brought  up  at  the  feet  of  Gamaliel. 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  71 

(2)  Nor  was  it  congruous  that  the  Holy  Spirit  should  in- 
spire the  apostles  to  write  pure  Greek.  For  passing  by  the 
consideration,  that  if  they  had  written  classic  Greek  no  critic 
would  now  adnnit  that  they  were  the  authors  of  the  books  as- 
cribed to  them,  we  may  say  that  the  apostles  themselves 
would  not  have  understood  their  own  language,  unless  by  ad* 
ditional  inspiration  given  for  this  very  purpose.  Much  less 
would  the  common  people  among  the  Jews  have  understood 
it ;  for  whom  these  books,  for  the  most  part,  were  primarily 
written  ;  and  who,  through  hatred  of  the  Greeks  and  of  Gre- 
cian eloquence,  would  not  have  approved  of  a  classic  style, 
it  being  so  contrary  to  the  diction  of  the  Septuagint,  and  so 
diverse  from  the  Hebrew  Scriptures. 

Finally,  as  the  New  Testament  is  built  upon  the  old,  thq 
same  diction  ought  to  be  preserved  throughout.  (Morus,  pp. 
210-217.) 

§  124.  Hebrew- Greek  idiom  does  not  necessarily  make  the 
style  of  the  New  Testament  obscure.  Nor  does  the  Hebrew 
idiom  of  the  New  Testament  injure  its  perspicuity.  Every 
writer  has  special  reference  to  his  own  times,  to  those  for 
whom  he  primarily  writes  ;  not  to  future  times,  so  as  to  neg- 
lect his  contemporaries.  The  obscurity  which  arises  from 
this  mode  of  writing  is  not  a  necessary  one,  but  results  mere- 
ly from  the  change  which  time  makes  in  languages.  It  is  an 
obscurity  common  to  all  good  ancient  writers  ;  for  the  ground 
of  it  lies  in  the  ignorance  of  later  readers,  and  not  in  the  wri- 
ters. 

§  125.  Language  of  the  New  Testament  is  Hebreio- Greek. 
Hence  the  style  of  the  New  Testament  may  justly  be  named 
Hebrew-Greek.  If  any  with  Scaliger  and  Drusius  choose  to 
call  it  Hellenistic^  let  them  not  with  Heinsius  understand  by 
this  a  peculiar  diaZec/;  which  Salmasius  has  sufficiently  re- 
futed.    Nor  would  I  name  it  the  Alexandrine  dialect  •,  for  the 


72  ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

Jews  in  other  places  wrote  in  the  same  style.  The  Alexan- 
drine dialect,  concerning  which  there  is  extant  a  little  book  of 
one  Irenaeus  an  Alexandrine  grammarian,  respects  merely 
peculiarities  of  language  appropriate  to  the  Alexandrians  ; 
such  for  example  as  existed  among  the  Attics,  lonians,  etc. 
Some  choose  to  call  it  the  Macedonian  dialect,  because  many 
words  in  the  New  Testament  are  peculiar  to  the  Macedo- 
nians, and  the  language  agrees  more  with  that  of  Polybius, 
Diodorus  Siculus,  etc.,  than  with  that  of  the  ancient  Greek 
writers.     (Morus,  pp.  222—234.) 

§  126.  It  also  comprises  Latinisms.  Nor  is  all  which  is 
not  pure  Greek  of  course  to  be  named  Hebraism ;  for  some 
words  are  of  Latin  derivation,  occasioned  by  intercourse  with 
the  Romans ;  and  others  are  of  the  Syriac,  Chaldee,  or  Rab- 
binic dialect.  Vide  Olearius  de  Stylo  Nov.  Test.  Sect,  didac. 
ii.  iii. ;  et  Wetstenium  ad  N.  Test.  Acta.  13.  48.  (Morus,  pp. 
235—238.) 

Besides  Latinisms,  as  arnxovlaruiQ,  xovntoSia,  and  such  phrases  as 
kau^aviiv  avu(ior).iov  consilium  capere,  iqyaa'iav  Sovrai  operam  dare, 
etc.,  there  are  Persian  words  to  be  found  in  the  New  Testament,  as 
,i/«yot,  ayyaoBrhiv',  Syriasms,  as  a^^a,  /<«oai'  aSa]  also  Chaldaismsand 
Rabbinisms.     See  Marsh's  Michaelis  on  the  New  Testament  idioms. 

§  127.  Method  of  finding  the  iisus  loquendi  of  the  New 
Testament  not  difflcuU.  These  things  being  settled  respect- 
ing the  general  nature  of  the  New  Testament  diction,  it  will 
be  easy  to  point  out  the  method  of  ascertaining  the  usus  lo- 
quendi, and  of  drawing  aid  from  it  in  the  interpretation  of 
particular  passages  so  as  to  assist  the  interpreter. 

§  128.  Rules  for  finding  the  usus  loquendi.  First,  the  in- 
terpreter should  be  well  skilled  in  the  Greek  and  Hebrew 
idioms  ;  so  that  he  can  distinguish  between  pure  Greek,  and 
that  method  of  writing  which  is  derived  from  another  language. 
This  is  necessary  in  order  rightly  to  interpret  either.     In  re- 


tit  THE  NEtC  TESTAMENT.  73 

garcl  to  a  good  Greek,  he  must  specially  consult  not  only  the 
writers  who  have  used  the  popular  language,  but  writers  of  a 
proximate  age,  who  have  imitated  the  Attic  diction,  though 
not  studiously.  Among  these  are  Polybius,  Diodorus  Siculus, 
and  Artemidorus  ;  in  which  authors  are  many  words  common 
to  the  New  Testament,  either  not  used  at  all  by  the  Old 
Greeks,  or  else  used  in  a  different  sense.  (Morus,  p.  23& — 
240.) 

§  129.  Much  taution  necessary  to  decide  what  is  classic 
and  what  is  Hebrew-  Greek ;  Sept.  and  Hebrew  to  be  compared. 
In  all  places,  therefore,  let  him  carefully  examine  whether  the 
diction  be  pure  Greek  or  not;  in  which  there  is  more  difficul- 
ty than  one  might  be  apt  to  suppose.  Where  the  diction  de- 
parts from  pure  Greek,  let  him  resort  to  the  Hebrew.  To 
do  this  properly,  he  must  not  only  be  acquainted  with  the  ge- 
nius of  the  Hebrew,  as  it  is  developed  in  the  forms  and  tenses 
of  words,  in  the  construction  of  them,  and  in  the  junction  of 
the  members  of  a  sentence,  (which  however  will  often  be 
sufficient),  but  he  must  also  know  by  what  Greek  words  the 
Jews  were  accustomed  to  express  Hebrew  things,  when  they 
spoke  in  the  then  common  Greek  style,  without  aiming,  like 
Philo  and  Josephus,  at  elegant  classic  diction.  In  this  way> 
by  a  proper  comparison  with  the  Hebrew,  he  may  elicit  the 
sense. 

Sometimes  there  is  no  better  method  than  to  translate  the 
Greek  directly  into  the  Hebrew  ;  which  oflen-times  may  be 
easily  done  by  a  tolerable  Hebrew  scholar,  both  as  it  respects 
single  words  and  also  phrases.  But  at  other  times,  this  is 
difficult  on  account  of  the  rare  occurrence  of  words,  or  the 
obscurity  of  them,  or  the  dissimilar  etymology.  The  Septua- 
gint,  therefore,  must  often  be  consulted  ;  and  the  interpreter 
should  be  so  familiar  with  it,  as  readily  to  know  in  what  way 
Hebrew  expressions  are  translated  into  Greek.  For  as  the 
■  ,     7 


74  ON  Binding  the  usxts  loquendI 

origin  of  speaking  and  writing  in  Greekj  concerning  sacred 
things,  took  its  rise  from  that  version,  so  it  is  evident,  that 

THIS  VERSION  MUST  BE  THE  BASIS  OF  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  THE 
HEBREW-GREEK. 

It  will  be  useful  also  to  be  well  acquainted  with  writers  on 
the  Hebraisms  of  the  New  Testament  in  general ;  such  as 
Vorstius,  Leusden,  and  specially  Gataker,  the  most  learned 
of  them  all.     (Morus,  p.  241.  ii.) 

§  130.  Aquila  and  Symmachus  to  he  studied.  It  will  be 
proper,  moreover,  to  study  the  remains  of  Aquila's  Greek 
version,  which  exhibits  a  similar  diction  ;  as  he  was  not  very 
remote  from  the  age  of  the  apostles,  and  has  some  things  in 
his  version  which  may  be  of  special  use  here.  The  version 
of  Symmachus  should  also  be  read,  who,  by  translating  into 
pure  Greek,  has  made  the  understanding  of  Hebrew  more 
easy. 

In  addition  to  the  Hebrew-Greek  mentioned  in  §§  128 — 130,  the 
Apocrypha  is  of  special  use  in  the  attainment  of  this  idiom.  Also  the 
apocryphal  books  of  the  New  Testament,  and  several  of  the  apostolic 
fathers,  exhibit  a  style  in  many  respects  partaking  of  this  idiom. 
Comp.  Morus,  p.  241—245. 

<5>  131.  When  the  Hebrew  idiom  is  to  he  preferred.  It  is  a 
sound  maxim  too,  that  when  the  same  word  or  phrase  is  He- 
braistic, and  also  good  Greek,  and  a  meaning  not  at  all  incon-i 
gruous  may  be  assigned  to  it  as  used  according  to  either  idiom, 
we  should  prefer  that  sense  which  accords  with  the  Hebrew 
idiom.  For  it  is  more  probable  that  Hebrew  writers  used 
the  latter  idiom  ;  especially  if  the  phrase,  understood  as  classic 
Greek,  should  be  of  the  more  polished  and  refined  kind.  Ac- 
cordingly I  should  explain  KaTa^oh'jv  (jniq^axog,  Hebrews  11: 
11^  by  the  Hebrew  in  Genesis  4:  25,  rather  than  from  the 
Greek  idiom.  So  uno&v^jaxHv  iv  a^aQilaig^  John  8:  24,  by 
the  Greek  idiom  would  mean,  you  will  persevere  to  the  end  of 
life  in  sinning ;  by  the  Hebrew,  you  will  he  condemned  on  ac- 
count of  your  sins.     (Morus,  p.  246.  XI.) 


OP  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  75 

Eig  xara^oXijv  artinuaTog,  in  respect  to  the  beginning  or  foundation 
of  offspring,  i.  e.  in  respect  to  conception  ;  which  neither  the  Greek 
nor  Hebrew  idiom,  as  to  any  thing  peculiar,  would  explain.  The 
nature  of  the  case  and  the  general  signification  of  the  words  offer  the 
requisite  explanation. 

§  132.  In  the  doctrines  of  religion,  the  Hebrew  idiom  is  to 
be  specially  regarded.  An  interpreter  should  particularly  ob- 
serve, that  when  things  appropriate  to  religion,  specially  to 
the  Christian  religion,  are  spoken  of,  the  idiom  should  be  re- 
ferred to  the  Hebrew  ;  because,  in  speaking  of  religious  mat- 
ters, the  writers  of  the  New  Testament  were  accustomed  to 
use  the  phraseology  of  the  Hebrew  Scriptures.  The  interpre- 
ter will  be  much  assisted  here  by  the  analogy  of  doctrine  ;  with 
which  he  ought  to  be  familiar,  lest  the  words  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament should  be  drawn  to  a  sense  alien  from  that  which  the 
authors  desired  to  express,  and  different  from  the  essential 
points  of  religion.     (Morus,  p.  246.  XII.) 

<5>  133.  Specially  is  Hebrew  idiom  to  be  regarded  in  respect 
to  the  forms,  tenses,  and  numbers  of  words.  Nor  should  the 
maxims  here  inculcated  be  applied  only  to  the  meaning  of 
words  and  phrases,  but  also  to  the  forms  and  tenses  of  verbs, 
and  also  to  the  number  of  both  nouns  and  verbs.  In  respect 
to  these  things,  the  idiom  of  the  New  Testament  not  unfre- 
quently  departs  from  classic  Greek,  and  follows  the  Hebrew. 
An  interpreter  who  neglects  this  will  fall  into  great  difficul- 
ties, and  commit  many  surprising  and  almost.ridiculous  mis- 
takes.    (Morus,  p.  248.) 

^  134.  Other  idioms  to  be  consulted  in  certain  cases. 
When  the  Hebrew  idiom  fails  us  in  the  explication  of  a  pas- 
sage or  word,  we  must  then  have  recourse  specially  to 
the  Syriac,  Chaldee,  or  Rabbinic.  All  concede  that  we 
should  have  recourse  to  the  Syriac  and  Chaldee  ;  but  all  do 
not  rightly  understand  the  nature  of  this  comparison,  as  is  evi- 
dent from  the  attempts  of  some,  who  have  endeavored  to 


76  ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENM 

cast  light  upon  the  Greek  of  the  New  Testament  by  eompar-' 
ing  the  Syriac  version  of  it.  The  right  niethod  of  proceeding 
is  to  have  recourse  to  the  Syriac,  when  we  find  ourselves  de- 
serted by  the  Hebrew.  If  we  find  the  idiom  to  be  Syriac, 
then  we  can  attain  to  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  or  word, 
when  we  have  attained  to  a  right  understanding  of  the  Syriac 
which  corresponds  with  it.  This  may  be  more  easily  and 
certainly  attained,  provided  the  Syriac  be  still  a  living  lan- 
guage ;  which  however  I  find  to  be  doubted  (a). 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  Chaldee  and  Rabbinic.  Biit 
he  who  expects  aid  different  from  that  which  has  just  been 
described,  will  seek  and  hope  for  it  in  vain.  He  will  either 
labor  to  no  purpose  in  heaping  up  what  will  be  useless ;  or 
will  abuse,  to  a  bad  purpose,  a  help  in  exegesis  which  is  by- 
no  means  to  be  despised.  At  most,  he  will  only  be  able  to 
determine  whether  the  Syriac  interpreter  has  rightly  transla- 
ted or  not.     (Morus,  p.  249,  XIII.) 

(a)  The  Syriac  is,  beyond  all  doubt,  spoken  still  among  the  literary 
class  of  the  Nestorians  ;  as  the  letters  of  the  Rev,  Justin  Perkins^ 
missionary  at  Ooroomiah  in  Persia  fully  eyijace. 

§  135.  Direct  testimony  not  always  sufficient.  Thus  far 
we  have  described  the  method  of  discovering  the  usus  lo* 
quendi  in  particular  passages  of  the  new  Testament,  by  evi- 
dence which  we  call  direct.  But  although  this  evidence  is 
important  and  goes  very  far,  yet  alone  it  is  not  always  suffi- 
cient. There  are  many  things  in  the  New  Testament  which 
are  described  in  a  novel  way,  because  the  things  themselves 
are  new.  Not  that  a  religion  absolutely  new  is  taught  ;  but 
ancient  doctrines  are  delivered  in  language  more  perspicuous, 
appropriate,  and  distinctive,  the  veil  of  figures  and  allegories 
being  removed.  New  words  were  therefore  necessary  in  or' 
der  to  decsrihe  new  things  ;  among  which  words  are  many 
that  are  adapted  to  designate  certain  things,  on  account  of 
some  similitude  to  them.    These  words,  by  the  way,  were  not 


OP  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  77 

invented  by  the  apostles,  and  could  not  have  been  ;  for  such 
invention  is  a  thing  that  belongs  to  minds  trained  up  by  litera- 
r}'  discipline,  and  not  to  unlettered  men.  We  may  conclude, 
therefore,  that  terms  of  such  a  kind  were  suggested  by  the 
Holy  Spirit ;  which  is  an  argument  in  favor  of  the  divine  in- 
spiration of  the  Scriptures.  Of  this  nature  are  such  words  as 
dttifio>i^s(T&ai,  itxQTagog,  avaytwav,  and  others.  (Morus,  p. 
249.  XIV.) 

§  136.  New  words  to  he  explained  hy  testimony  direct  and 
indirect.  Such  words  cannot  be  explained  from  the  more 
ancient  usus  loquendi,  but  have  an  interpretation  peculiar  to 
themselves  ;  yet  this  is  not  less  certain  than  the  other  which 
is  gathered  from  ancient  usage.  This  interpretation  depends 
on  the  direct  testimony  of  the  writers.  Hence  it  must  be 
gathered  from  the  collation  of  similar  passages ;  as  we  have 
already  taught  above.     (Morus,  p.  251.) 

§  137.  Greek  fathers  to  he  consulted.  Nor  is  the  testimony 
of  the  ancient  Greek  fathers  of  the  church  by  any  means  to 
be  neglected,  which  has  respect  to  the  meaning  of  words  and 
phrases  ;  whether  it  be  the  testimony  of  professed  interpre- 
ters, or  of  other  writers.  Respecting  a  choice  of  interpreters 
among  the  fathers,  and  the  use  to  be  made  of  them,  we  shall 
hereafter  treat.  I  would  merely  observe  here,  that  in  those 
authors  who  are  not  direct  interpreters,  passages  of  the  New 
Testament  now  and  then  occur  in  such  a  connection,  or  with 
such  adjuncts,  that  we  may  clearly  perceive  what  meaning 
the  age  attached  to  them.  Such  interpretations  we  find  in 
Clemens  Romanus,  Ignatius,  Hippolytus,  Cyril  of  Jerusalem, 
and  others.  The  interpreter,  in  reading  such  authors,  should 
diligently  attend  to  this.     (Morus,  p.  251.  III.) 

.   §  138.   These  may  exhihit  interpretations  of  the  primitive 
age  of  Christianity.     In  writers  of  very  early  times,  there 
7* 


78  ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENUl 

may,  not  improbably,  be  interpretations  that  have  come  down 
from  the  apostolic  age ;  certainly  if  they  are  consentaneous 
with  apostolic  doctrines,  they  are  not  lightly  to  be  rejected. 
It  is  one  mark  that  they  are  worthy  of  our  approbation,  if 
they  are  of  a  character  appropriate  to  the  apostolic  style, 
formed  and  moulded  after  the  genius  and  idiom  of  the  He- 
brew (a).     (Morus,  ubi  supra.) 

(a)  But  who  will  venture  to  decide  upon  this,  except  by  the  use 
of  the  common  means  of  interpretation  ? 

§  139.  Glossaries.  The  ancient  glossaries  may  be  of  use 
here,  specially  that  of  Hesychius  ;  in  which  is  found  many 
things  pertaining  to  certain  passages  of  the  New  Testament 
that  were  deduced  from  the  most  ancient  interpreters  of  it, 
and  which  are  of  a  character  by  no  means  to  be  despised. 

Similar  to  these  are  a  few  of  the  glossaries  of  Suidas,  and 
also  of  Photian  ;  both  of  which  are  to  be  used  with  that  cau- 
tion, in  respect  to  any  particular  word,  which  requires  us  well 
to  ascertain  whether  the  word  in  the  glossary  really  belongs 
to  the  passage  which  we  desire  to  interpret. 

In  regard  to  all  these  things,  good  judgment  is  requisite  in 
order  to  determine  what  is  useful  and  what  is  worthless,  and 
to  distinguish  between  them  ;  which  is  done  much  in  the  way 
that  has  been  above  described.     (Morus,  p.  252.  IV.) 

"J  140.  Glosses.  Even  the  glosses  in  some  nr^anuscripts 
which  have  crept  into  the  text  of  the  New  Testament  in  place 
of  the  true  reading,  may  be  used  to  assist  the  interpreter  either 
to  understand  the  true  text,  or  to  find  means  for  illustrating  or 
confirming  the  true  interpretation.  Thus  for  igivvrjaov  in 
John  7:  52,  Chrysostom  has  the  reading  igmrjaov  Homil.  51, 
and  explains  it  by  fxd&s,  tovxo  ydg  iaiiv  fQwir^ijov.  These 
glosses  may  have  flowed  from  the  ancient  schools  instructed 
by  Origen  ;  although  some  indeed  may  have  proceeded  from 
the  Latin  commentaries.     (Morus,  ubi  supra.) 


'  •'  ^'^  r^^^/     Qp  ^p£  j^j.^  TESTAMENT.  79 

%  141.  Context.  When  all  the  above  mentioned  means 
fail,  we  must  then  resort  to  the  context,  and  to  the  well  known 
nature  of  the  things  themselves.     (Morus,  p.  252.  V.) 

<J  142.  Analogy  of  faith.  The  analogy  of  Scripture  and 
of  Christian  doctrine  should  be  always  before  our  eyes,  so 
that  the  interpretation  may  be  guided  by  it,  i.  e.  that  it  may 
be  so  far  guided  by  it  as  that  no  explanation  contrary  to  it 
should  be  adopted ;  and  in  the  obscure  phrases,  where  the 
meaning  may  be  doubtful,  the  sense  may  be  accommodated 
to  the  analogy  of  Scripture  sentiment. 

This  rule  need  not  be  wondered  at,  as  common  sense  has 
sanctioned  it  and  applied  it  to  the  interpretation  of  other  books  ; 
all  of  which  are  to  be  explained,  generally,  and  in  particular 
passages,  agreeably  to  the  analogy  of  that  doctrine  which  they 
contain.  ^ 

Analogy  of  doctrine  or  faith  does  not  consist  in  the  doctrine 
which  is  approved  by  any  particular  body  of  men,  as  uncan- 
did  or  unskilful  persons  assert ;  for  then  it  would  be  various 
and  inconstant.  Grammatical  analogy  is  the  rule  of  speak- 
ing, or  form  of  speech,  constituted  by  the  laws  of  the  language, 
which  is  opposed  to  anomaly  or  a  method  of  speaking  in  op- 
position to  usage,  or  varying  from  it.  In  like  manner,  the 
analogy  of  sacred  doctrine  or  faith  consists  in  the  summary 
of  religion,  and  the  rules  plainly  taught  in  the  Scriptures ; 
whence  the  Latin  church  called  it  regula  fidei.  To  this  ana- 
logy all  things  are  to  be  referred,  so  that  nothing  may  be  dis- 
cordant with  it.  And  when  this  is  done,  the  analogy  of  faith  y 
is  said  to  be  preserved.  Nor  as  to  faiih  and  practice  does 
analogy  of  Scripture  differ  from  analogy  of  doctrine.  Exam- 
ples of  analogy,  and  of  judgment  agreeably  to  analogy,  may 
be  found  in  Galatians  6 :  15, 16.  1  Corinthians  15:  3 — 11,  etc, 
where  the  writer  calls  that  analogy  la  ngojia.  In  all  the  de- 
partments of  learning,  analogy  of  such  a  kind  has  the  force 


80  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

of  a  rule,  both  in  our  judgment  and  interpretation  of  a  passage. 
(Morus,  p.  253.  XVI.) 

In  a  special  manner  must  we  betake  ourselves  to  analogy, 
in  those  passages  which  seem  to  speak  what  disagrees  with 
that  which  is  plainly  taught  in  other  parts  of  the  Scriptures, 
and  with  common  sense,  concerning  divine  and  human  things. 
For  it  is  common  to  all  uninspired  writers,  although  eloquent 
and  thinking  and  writing  with  acuteness  and  subtilly,  that 
when  they  are  not  composing  a  summary  of  doctrine,  or  the 
elements  of  it,  nor  treating  designedly  of  any  head  of  doctrine, 
they  exhibit  the  common  views  and  elements  of  learning,  as 
taught  by  usual  discipline  and  instruction.  Nor  do  they  al- 
ways speak  of  things  in  such  a  way  as  a  subtile  and  scholas-. 
tic  method  of  discipline  would  demand ;  but  often  use  the 
more  vulgar  and  popular  methods  of  expression.  The  same 
traits  of  style  are  found  in  the  works  of  the  sacred  writers  ; 
who  in  all  respects  desired  to  speak,  and  must  have  spoken 
in  order  to  be  understood,  more  humano  ;  the  Holy  Spirit  so 
guiding  them,  that  they  differed  as  little  as  possible  from  the 
usual  method  of  speaking.  It  is  not  therefore  to  be  wondered 
at,  if  we  find  in  their  expressions  some  things  seemingly  harsh, 
since  this  is  characteristic  of  the  oriental  genius  and  method 
of  expression.     (Morus,  pp.  255 — 259.) 

Respecting  the  subject  of  analogy,  compare  §  34. 

§  143.  Difficult  idioms  to  he  specially  studied.  The  stu- 
dent who  aspires  to  the  faculty  of  interpreting,  should  be  fa- 
miliar and  well  acquainted  with  the  more  difficult  forms  of 
speech  in  the  sacred  writers,  or  those  forms  which  differ  from 
the  idioms  of  our  own  language,  and  are  not  adapted  to  ex- 
press with  simplicity,  and  logical  accuracy,  principles  of  any 
doctrine.  A  right  understanding  of  these  he  must  by  all  means 
attain  ;  so  that  he  may  not  be  impeded  in  his  inquiries,  or 
thrown  into  embarrassment  by  them.     E.  g.  many  things  are 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  81 

affirmed  simply  and  without  any  limitation^  which  however 
are  to  be  understood  as  iiaving  only  a  particular  and  partial 
application.  Specially  is  this  the  case  in  moral  propositions- 
In  like  manner,  active  verbs  do  not  always  indicate  action  or 
efficacy  properly  considered  ;  which  Glass  in  his  Philol.  Sa- 
cra, Calovius  de  persona  Christi,  p.  527,  and  Turrelin  de  In- 
terp.  Sac.  Literarum,  have  already  noted,     (Morus,  p.  256, 

I.  II.) 

§  144.  Difficult  forms  in  profane  vrriters  to  he  studied. 
It  will  be  very  useful  also  to  attend  to  such  forms  of  speech 
in  common  books,  or  classics  ;  for  there  is  scarcely  any  form 
of  speech  in  the  sacred  books,  which  is  not  found  in  other 
writings.  Nor  can  there  be  any  doubt  that  an  interpreter 
will  understand  the  Scriptures  with  much  more  facility,  if  he 
be  familiar  and  well  acquainted  with  the  difficulties  and  ob- 
scure forms  of  speech  in  other  books.  Those  things  which 
appear  to  be  somewhat  hard  or  clogged  in  the  writings  of 
Paul,  will  not  be  wondered  at,  nor  give  offence,  if  one  goes 
from  the  study  of  Thucydides  to  the  interpretation  of  the  apos- 
tle. Nor  will  such  an  one  be  alarmed  at  faults,  which  seem 
hardly  to  be  compatible  with  the  dignity  and  sanctity  of  the 
Scriptures  ;  nor  at  transpositions,  apparent  want  of  consisten- 
cy in  construction,  enallages,  and  the  like  things.  This  has 
indeed  often  happened  to  some  good  men  ;  but  they  were  not 
well  skilled  in  the  languages.  Such  an  alarm  is  rather  the 
result  of  unlearned  superstition  than  of  a  judicious  reverence 
for  the  word  of  God ;  as  Melancthon  has  justly  observed  in 
his  Dedic.  Epist.  ad  Romanos. 


82 


HULES  IN  RESPECT 


CHAPTER  V. 


RULES  IN  RESPECT  TO  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE. 
[Keil,  pp.  115—128.      Beck,  pp.  129—136.     Seller,  §§  50—78.} 

§  145.  Design  of  this  chapter.  Having  explained  the 
method  of  finding  the  sense  of  the  New  Testannent  by  the 
usus  loquendi  or  other  artificial  aids,  we  come  now  to  treat 
separately  of  certain  things  which  usually  are  not  enough  ex- 
plained, nor  made  sufficiently  explicit  in  regard  to  theory  or 
practice.  The  first  of  these  respects  tropes  ;  the  second^  em- 
phasis  ;  the  third,  apparent  contradictions  or  discrepancies. 
Of  these  in  their  order. 

§  146.  Duty  of  an  interpreter  in  respect  to  tropical  lan- 
guage. In  respect  to  tropical  language  the  office  of  the  in- 
terpreter is  twofold.  First,  he  must  rightly  distinguish  it  from 
language  not  tropical,  so  as  not  to  mistake  the  one  for  the 
other,  (as  formerly  the  disciples  of  Jesus  and  the  Jews  mis- 
took some  of  the  Saviour's  discourses  (a),  and  so  as  not  to 
pervert  the  proper  sense  of  words  by  a  tropical  interpretation. 
Secondly,  he  must  rightly  interpret  tropes,  and  give  their  true 
sense.  For  it  often  happens  that  men  think  they  have  attain- 
ed the  tropical  sense  of  words,  when  they  understand  only  the 
literal  one',  and  they  are  deluded  by  an  empty  shadow,  or 
pervert  the  trope  by  an  etymological  interpretation.  To 
avoid  these  faults,  it  is  proper  to  give  rules  drawn  from  the 
nature  of  tropical  diction  as  learned  from  use  and  observation, 
by  which  the  interpreter  may  be  guided  in  judging  of  and  in- 
terpreting figurative  language.     (Morus,  p.  274.  IX.) 

(a)  E.  g.  John  6:  52.    John  4:  11.     Matt.  16:  6-12. 

^  147.  Certain  rules  respecting  tropical  diction  examined^ 


to  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE.  ^  83 

Ih  order  to  judge  of  diction  whether  it  should  be  taken  in  a 
literal  or  tropical  sense,  the  vulgar  maxim  is,  not  readily  to 
depart  from  the  literal  sense.  But  this  maxim  is  neither  strict- 
ly true,  nor  perspicuous,  nor  adapted  to  use.     (Morus,  p.  320.) 

Not  easily  (non  facile),  if  you  rightly  understand  the  phrase^ 
means  almost  never,  very  rarely.  This  is  erroneous ;  for 
tropes  in  the  sacred  writings  are  very  common,  so  much  so 
that  Glass  has  filled  a  large  volume  with  them.  It  is  ambig«. 
uous;  for  it  describes  no  certain  mark  or  characteristic  by 
which  tropical  language  may  be  distinguished  from  that  which 
is  to  be  literally  understood  ;  which  is  certainly  a  great  fault 
in  a  rule. 

Danhauer,  Tarnoflf,  and  Calovius,  have  stated  the  princi* 
pie  in  question  with  more  distinctness,  when  they  aver  that 
the  literal  meaning  is  not  to  be  deserted  without  evident  rea* 
son  or  necessity.  No  one  will  deny  that  where  there  is  plain 
and  necessary  reason  for  departure  from  the  literal  sense,  we 
may  admit  the  tropical.  But  some  apparent  repugnance  of 
things  or  facts  is  not  hastily  to  lead  us  to  reject  the  literal 
sense.  The  older  writers  regard  the  phrase  proper  sense  as 
of  the  same  meaning  with  literal  or  historic  sense ;  and  right* 
ly  teach  that  we  should  not  depart  from  the  aislomary  signi- 
fication  of  a  word  without  a  weighty  and  sufficient  reason. 
That  we  may  sometimes  depart  from  it  is  evident,  from  the 
fact  that  the  sacred  writers  themselves  do,  beyond  all  doubt, 
sometimes  depart  from  it.  And  indeed,  in  respect  to  many 
words,  the  tropical  sense  is  the  customary  or  usual  one.  (Mo"- 
rus,  p.  320.) 

<J  148.  How  to  examine  whether  language  is  tropical. 
We  may  commonly  understand,  at  once,  whether  a  word  is 
to  be  taken  tropically  or  not,  by  simply  examining  the  object 
spoken  of,  either  by  the  external  or  internal  senses,  or  by  re- 
newing the  perception  of  the  object.     To  judge  of  figurative 


84  fttJLES  IN  RESPECT 

language,  in  such  cases,  is  very  easy ;  and  in  uninspired 
writings,  it  very  rarely  happens  that  there  is  any  doubt  about 
it,  because  the  objects  spoken  of  are  such  as  may  be  exam- 
ined by  our  senses,  external  or  internal,  and  therefore  the 
language  may  be  easily  understood  («). 

In  the  Scriptures,  however,  doubts  have  frequently  arisen 
from  the  nature  of  the  subjects  there  treated  ;  which  are  such 
as  cannot  be  subjected  to  the  examination  of  our  senses.  E. 
g.  the  divine  nature  (b),  divine  operations,  etc.,  are  subjects 
beyond  the  scrutiny  of  our  senses ;  and  the  question,  Whether 
the  language  that  respects  such  things  is  to  be  understood  lit- 
erally or  tropically  ?  has  given  rise  to  fierce  controversies, 
which  are  still  continued  (c).  In  these,  the  parlies  have  often 
disputed  about  tropical  diction,  in  a  way  which  savoured 
more  of  metaphysical  or  dialectical  subtility  than  of  truth. 
(Morus,  p.  275.  XL) 

(a)  E.  g.  Inflamed  mind  we  understand  tropically,  by  repeating 
the  perception  of  the  idea  of  mind,  and  taking  notice  that  the  litereu 
meaning  of  inflamed  is  incongruous  with  it.  In  interpreting  the 
phrase  snowy  locks,  we  appeal  to  the  external  senses,  which  deter- 
mioe  that  the  meaning  oi' snowy  here  must  be  tropical. 

(b)  To  the  language  which  respects  God  and  his  operations,  may 
be  added  all  that  respects  the  invisible  things  of  a  future  state,  i.  e. 
heaven,  hell,  etc.  The  controversy  whether  descriptions  of  this 
nature  are  to  be  literally  or  tropically  understood,  is  by  no  means 
at  an  end.  One  of  the  things  which  the  human  mind  learns  very 
slowly,  is  to  detach  itself  from  conceptions  that  arise  from  ma- 
terial objects,  and  to  perceive  that  in  alt  the  descriptions  of  a  future 
state,  words  are  of  absolute  necessity  employed  which  originally 
have  a  literal  sense,  because  language  affords  no  other.  Eveii 
the  internal  operations  of  our  own  mind,  we  are  obliged,  for  the 
same  reason,  to  describe  in  language  that  of  necessity  must  be 
tropically  understood.  Almost  all  men,  indeed,  now  allow  that 
most  of  the  language  employed  to  describe  God  and  liis  operations, 
is  necessarily  to  be  understood  as  tropical.  Most  men  will  allow 
that  the  language  which  respects  the  heavenly  world  may  be  so 
considered;  but  what  regards  the  day  of  judgment,  or  the  world  of 
woe,  they  would  strenuously  contend,  must  be  literally  understood. 
There  is  indeed  suffi  ;ient  inconsistency  in  this,  and  it  betrays  no 
small  degree  of  unacquaintance  with  the  nature  and  principles  of  in- 
terpretation ;  but  as  it  is  productive  of  no  consequences  specially  bad, 
the  error  is  hardly  worth  combating.  The  motive  no  doubt  may  be 
good,  which  leads  to  the  adoption  of  this  error.    The  apprehension 


TO  TEOPICAL  LANGUAGE.  85 

rs,  that  if  you  construe  the  language  which  respects  the  day  of  judg- 
ment or  the  world  of  woe  figuratively,  you  take  away  the  reality  of 
them.  Just  as  if  reality  dia  not,  of  course,  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  fig- 
urative language,  which  would  be  wholly  devoid  of  meaning  without 
it.  But  how  inconsistent  too  is  this  objection  !  The  very  person 
who  makes  it,  admits  that  the  language  employed  to  describe  God 
and  his  operations,  and  also  to  describe  the  heavenly  world,  is  tropi- 
cal; that  it  must  of  necessity  be  construed  so.  But  does  this  des- 
troy the  reality  of  a  God  and  of  his  operations,  and  of  the  heavenly 
world  ? 

(c)  Who  is  ignorant  of  the  innumerable  controversies  that  have 
arisen  about  the  tropical  and  literal  sense  of  a  multitude  of  passages 
in  the  sacred  writings  ?  Almost  all  the  enthusiasm  and  extravagance 
that  have  been  exhibited  in  respect  to  religion,  have  had  no  better 
support  than  gross  material  conceptions  of  figurative  language ;  or, 
not  unfrequently,  language  that  should  be  j^ropcr/y  understood  has 
been  tropically  construed.  There  is  no  end  to  the  mistakes  on  this 
ground.  Nor  are  they  limited  to  enthusiasts  and  fanatics.  They 
develope  themselves  not  unfrequently  in  the  writings  of  men,  grave, 
pious,  excellent,  and  in  other  parts  of  theological  science  very  learn- 
ed. Indeed  it  is  but  a  recent  thing,  that  it  has  come  to  be  consider- 
ed a  science,  and  a  special  and  essential  branch  of  theological  sci- 
ence— to  study  the  nature  of  language,  and  above  all,  the  nature  of 
Ihe  oriental  biblical  languages.  Long  has  this  been  admitted  in 
respect  to  the  classics,  and  all  works  of  science  in  ancient  languages. 
But  in  regard  to  the  Bible,  the  most  ancient  book  in  the  world,  and 
written  in  a  language  the  idiom  of  which  is  exceedingly  diverse  from 
our  own,  it  seems  to  have  been  very  generally  taken  for  granted,  that 
no  other  study  was  necessary  to  discover  its  meaning  than  what  is 
devoted  to  any  common  English  books.  At  least,  a  Bible  with  mar- 
ginal references,  studied  by  a  diligent  and  careful  use  of  these  refer- 
ences,  may  surely,  as  many  seem  to  think,  be  understood  in  a  satis- 
factory manner.  In  very  many  cases,  the  first  thing  has  been  to  study 
theology  ;  the  second^  to  read  the  bible  in  order  to  find  proofs  of  what 
had  already  been  adopted  as  matter  of  belief.  This  order  is  now  be- 
ginning to  be  reversed.  The  nature  of  language,  of  scripture-lan- 
guage, of  figurative  language,  and  of  interpretation,  is  now  beginning 
to  be  studied  as  a  science  ;  and  the  acquisition  of  this  is  one  of  the 
greatest  ends  of  study,  as  it  is  the  only  proper  mode  of  leading  a  the- 
ologian to  the  knowledge  of  what  the  Bible  really  contains.  Here  too 
is  a  common  arbiter  of  the  disputes  that  exist  in  the  Christian  world. 
The  nature  of  language  and  of  tropical  words  thoroughly  understood, 
will  prostrate,  among  all  intelligent  and  candid  men  who  really  love 
the  truth,  a  great  part  of  all  the  diversities  of  opinion  that  exist. 

§149.  Certain  words  not  tropical.     Those  words  are  not 
to  be  regarded  as  tropical  which  have  lost  their  original  and 
proper  signification,  and  are  used  no  longer  in  any  but  a  sec- 
ondary sense  ;  as  we  have  already  shewn. 
8 


8p         ^  RtTLES  IN  RESPECT 

^  150.  Words  tropical,  where  the  subject  and  predicate 
disagree.  Beyond  all  doubt  those  phrases  are  tropical,  the 
subject  and  predicate  of  which  are  heterogeneous  ;  as  where 
corporeal  and  incorporeal,  animate  and  inanimate,  rational 
and  irrational  are  conjoined  {a) ;  and  also  species  belonging 
to  a  different  genus.  Things  that  cannot  possibly  exist  in 
any  particular  subject,  cannot  be  logically  predicated  of  it ; 
for  the  fundamental  rules  of  logic  in  respect  to  this  are  inhe- 
rent in  the  human  mind.  If  then  such  things  appear  to  be 
predicated,  the  phrase  must  be  tropically  understood.  (Mo- 
rus,  p.  2t8.  XIL) 

By  this  rule  the  language  of  the  New  Testament  should  be 
interpreted  which  respects  the  person  of  Jesus,  to  whom  di- 
vine and  human  qualities  are  attributed.  For  the  latter  are 
attributed  to  him  as  a  man  ;  the  former,  as  a  divine  person 
united  with  the  human  ;  and  therefore  they  may  be  properly 
understood. 

(a)  E.  g.  the  fields  smile,  the  stones  cry  out,  the  floods  clap  their 
hands,  etc. 

§  151.  Laws,  history,  didactic  works,  seldom  admit  tropes. 
As  the  customary  use  of  language  shows  the  above  principle 
to  be  correct,  so  the  same  use  also  shows  that  tropical  lan- 
guage is  rarely  employed  in  several  cases  now  to  be  mention- 
ed, if  you  except  words  which  have  lost  their  primary  signifi- 
cation, or  such  as  constitute  very  easy  tropes.  Legislators  in 
their  statutes ;  historians  in  their  narrations  of  facts,  where 
they  aim  simply  at  the  declaration  of  them,  (for  some  narra- 
tions are  designedly  ornate  and  decorated  to  please  the  fancy) ; 
and  those  who  teach  any  branch  of  science  where  the  direct 
object  is  teaching  and  not  merely  occasional  allusions ;  all 
these  employ  tropes  very  seldom.  Flence  it  follows,  that  in 
writings  of  such  a  kind  tropes  are  not  to  be  acknowledged, 
unless  it, can  be  clearly  shewn  that  either  by  general  usage, 
or  by  the  use  of  the  writer,  certain  tropical  words  are  appro- 


TO  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE  87 

priated  to  designate  particular  things.  Of  this  nature  are 
several  words  of  the  New  Testannent,  e.  g.  those  which  signi- 
fy illumination^  regeneration^  etc.     (Morus,  p.  281.  XIV.) 

The  principle  laid  down  in  this  section  needs  more  explanation. 
It  is  not  correct  that  in  the  Mosaic  law,  for  example,  and  in  the  gos- 
pels and  epistles,  there  are  not  a  great  abundance  of  tropical  words. 
But  still,  it  is  true  that  these  compositions,  so  far  as  they  are  mere 
precept,  mere  narration,  and  mere  language  of  instruction,  comprise 
as  few  tropes  as  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit,  and  these  mostly 
of  the  easier  and  more  obvious  kind. 

The  importance  of  the  principle  thus  defined  is  very  great.  Some 
interpreters,  in  ancient  and  modern  times,  have  turned  into  allegory 
the  whole  Jewish  ceremonial  law.  So,  formerly  and  recently,  the 
history  of  the  creation  of  the  world,  the  fall  of  man,  the  flood,  the  ac- 
count  of  the  tower  of  Babel,  etc.,  have  been  explained  either  as 
fiv^uij  or  as  philosophical  allegories,  i.  e.  philosophical  speculations 
on  these  subjects,  clothed  in  the  garb  of  narration.  By  the  same 
principles  of  exegesis  the  gospels  are  treated  as  uvSoi,  which  exhibit 
an  imaginary  picture  of  a  perfect  character  in  the  person  of  Jesus. 
Jn  a  word,  every  narration  in  the  Bible  of  an  occurrence  which  is  of 
a  miraculous  nature  in  any  respect,  is  fivSog  ;  which  means,  as  its 
abettors  say,  that  some  real  fact  or  occurrence  lies  at  the  basis  of  the 
story,  which  is  told  agreeably  to  the  very  imperfect  conceptions  and 
philosophy  of  ancient  times,  or  has  been  augmented  and  adorned  by 
tradition  and  fancy. 

But  that  such  liberties  with  the  language  of  Scripture  are  utterly 
incompatible  with  the  sober  principles  of  interpretation,  is  sufficient- 
ly manifest  from  the  bare  statement  of  them.  The  object  of  the  in- 
terpreter is,  to  find  out  what  the  sacred  xcriters  meant  to  say.  This 
done,  his  task  is  performed.  Party  philosophy  or  skepticism  cannot 
guide  the  interpretation  of  language.     Comp.  Morus,  pp.  281 — 291. 

§  152.  Usus  loquendi  in  regard  to  things  which  cannot  he 
examined  by  our  feelings  and  conceptions.  In  regard  to  di- 
vine things  which  can  be  known  merely  by  revelation  and 
cannot  be  examined  by  the  test  of  our  own  feelings  or  views, 
we  can  judge  only  from  the  ustis  loquendi  of  the  sacred  wri- 
ters, whether  their  language  is  to  be  understood  literally  or 
tropically. 

This  usage  can  be  known  only  from  the  comparison  of 
similar  passages ;  which  is  done  in  various  ways.  (1)  When 
different  words  are  employed  in  different  passages  respecting 
the  same  thing,  it  is  easy  to  judge  which  are  tropical.  E.  g. 
ihe  phrase  to  he  horn  of  water,  John  3:  5,  is  tropical;  for  the 


88  RULES  IN  RESPECT. 

same  thing  is  literally  expressed  in  Mark  16:  16  {a).  (2). 
When  the  sanae  word  is  used  every  where  respecting  the 
same  thing,  it  has  di  proper  sense  (h).  (3)  When  the  same 
method  ofexpression  is  constantly  used  respecting  divers  things, 
which  are  similar,  or  which  have  some  special  connection,  it 
is  to  be  understood  literally  (c).     (Morus,  p.  291.  XV.) 

(a)  So  the  iri^a  covenant  which  God  made  with  Abraham,  is  ex- 
plained in  Gal.  3;  16  as  meaning  a  promise.  The  latter,  as  being 
plain,  is  to  direct  us  in  the  interpretation  of  the  other  passage,  (b) 
£.  g.  ctraciraaig  rsyooiv,  fyj/o£T«i  ootua,  Lwonoisirat,  are  constantly 
used  in  respect  to  that  which  is  to  take  place  at  the  end  of  the  world, 
and  therefore  are  not  tropical. 

(c)  Which  rule  requires  some  abatement.  E.  g.  God  gave  the  Is- 
raelites bread  from  heaven,  and  Christ  gives  his  disciples  bread  from 
heaven.  The  latter  is  very  different  from  manna.  Jn  fact,  the  latter 
case  is  plainly  an  instance  of  tropical  language.  The  context,  then, 
or  nature  of  the  subject  treated  of,  is  to  be  our  guide  in  such  cases. 

§  153.  Adjuncts  useful  in  determining  when  words  are 
tropical.  We  may  also  form  a  judgment  respecting  tropical 
language,  from  the  adverbs,  epithets,  or  other  limitations  ex- 
pressing the  manner  or  nature  of  things.  (Morus,  p.  295. 
XVI.) 

This  case  resolves  itself  substantially  into  the  principle  of  the  fol- 
lowing section. 

§  154.  Context  to  he  consulted.  The  context  also  will  fre- 
quently assist  us.  For  when  the  whole  passage  is  allegorical, 
we  must  acknowledge  a  trope  in  particular  parts  that  are  con- 
nected with  the  whole  allegory.  E.  g.  nvgog,  in  1  Cor.  3:  13, 
which  relates,  to  lilAa^and  x^tov  in  the  context.  In  like  man- 
ner the  language  is  to  be  regarded  as  tropical,  when,  although 
the  preceding  context  is  to  be  literally  understood,  there  is  a 
manifest  transition  to  allegory.  (Morus,  ubi  supra.  Comp. 
also  §  99.) 

Thus  far  respecting  the  means  of  distinguishing  what  is 
tropical. 

§  155.  Sources  of  tropical  interpretation.     In  regard  to 


TO  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE.  89 

interpreting  tropical  language,  we  may  observe  that  there  are 
two  sources  of  aid.  The  one  is  the  subject  itself;  the  other, 
the  usiis  loquendi.  The  interpretation  by  the  aid  of  the  sub- 
ject is  easy,  when  the  nature  of  it  affords  an  obvious  simili- 
tude ;  e.  g.  (po}Tiafji,6g  is  easily  understood  as  used  tropically. 

In  regard  to  the  usus  loquendi,  the  general  usage  of  the 
Hebrew  tongue  in  respect  to  tropical  words  must  be  first  un- 
derstood, as  in  words  corresponding  to  ^to^,  -d^avaxov,  Tifitj, 
do^T],  etc. ;  then  Greek  usage  in  general.  Passages  must  also 
be  compared  in  which  the  same  thing  is  expressed  by  a  prop- 
er word,  or  in  which  such  proper  word  is  employed  in  the 
context  so  that  the  sense  is  obvious.  Here  too  we  may  use 
the  comparison  of  words  that  are  conjoined  and  similar  ;  ex- 
amples of  which  will  hereafter  be  produced. 

§  156.  Caution  to  be  used  in  judging  from  etymology. 
We  must  be  very  cautious,  however,  not  to  judge  of  tropes 
from  mere  etymology  ;  as  this  is  very  fallacious.  E.  g. 
oQ&oTo^slv,  in  2  Tim.  2:  15,  some  have  interpreted  as  imply- 
ing a  distinction  between  the  law  and  the  gospel ;  which  is 
mere  trifling,  For  Xoyog  aXrj&Elag  in  the  context  means  the 
gospel;  the  law  is  not  the  subject  of  discourse  here.  Analo- 
gy of  the  language  might  have  taught  them,  that  hq^oTonitv 
here  means  to  possess  right  views  of  the  gospel  and  correct- 
ly to  communicate  these  to  others.  So  the  ancients  understood 
it,  and  Gerhard  among  the  moderns  ;  Igd^oTOfila,  being  an- 
ciently commuted  with  og&odo^la,  and  xaLvoxofiuv  being  used 
to  signify  entertaining  and  disseminating  novel  opinions  re- 
specting  religion.     (Morus,  p.  298,  XIX.) 

^  157.  Method  of  determining  whether  a  trope  is  adequate- 
ly understood.  It  is  one  proof  that  you  understand  tropical 
language,  if  you  can  substitute  proper  words  for  tropical  ones. 
Not  that  a  person  who  can  do  this  always  rightly  understands 
the  words  ;  but  if  he  cannot  do  it,  he  certainly  does  not  un- 
8* 


90  ALLEGORIES. 

derstand  them.  The  sacred  writers  themselves  sometimes 
subjoined  proper  words  to  tropical  ones,  e.  g.  Col.  2:  7.  The 
best  Greek  and  Latin  writers  frequently  do  the  same  thing. 

It  is  useful  also  to  make  the  experiment,  whether,  when  the 
image  presented  by  the  tropical  expression  is  removed 
from  the  mind,  any  idea  still  remains  in  it  different  from  the 
image  itself  which  can  be  expressed  by  a  proper  word.  This 
experiment  is  specially  to  be  made  when  words  designating 
sensible  objects  are  transferred  to  the  expression  of  intellec- 
tual ones,  e.  g.  -d^dvaiog,  'Ccoi],  dLad^ri>i%  etc  ;  in  respect  to  which 
it  is  easy  to  be  deceived.     (Morus,  p.  300.  XX.) 

The  context,  the  nature  of  the  subject,  and  parallel  passages  are 
the  most  effectual  means  of  ascertaining  this. 

OF  ALLEGORIES. 

[Compare  Keil,  pp.  115—120.  Beck,  p.  129.  II.  Seiler,  §§41— 
78.  Much  more  satisfactory  will  be  Morns,  Dissert,  de  causis  Mle- 
goricB  ezplicandiSj  in  his  Dissert.  Theol.  PkiloL.  Vol.  1.  pp.  370 — 393.] 

§  158.  Allegories  how  interpreted.  As  allegories  frequent- 
ly occur  in  the  sacred  books,  which  abound  in  tropical  diction, 
it  seems  proper  to  say  something  here  of  the  method  of  inter- 
preting them.  First  of  all,  the  general  design  of  the  allegory 
is  to  be  ascertained  ;  which  is  easily  done  when  it  is  connect- 
ed with  a  context  explanatory  of  its  design.  For  the  most 
part,  however,  it  is  expressly  declared.  (Morus,  p.  301. 
XXL) 

^ Allt^yoyQia  is  derived  from  aXXo  ayayfiiLxai,  i.  e.  a  different  thing  is 
said  from  that  which  is  meant.  It  differs  from  metaphor,  in  that  it  is 
not  confined  to  a  word  but  extends  to  a  whole  thought,  or  it  may  be 
several  thoughts.  Allegory  may  be  expressed  moreover  by  pictures, 
Ezech.  4:  1  ;  by  actions  Ezech.  ill.  IV,  V.  Luke  22:  3(5;  or  by  any 
significant  thing. 

One  most  important  principle  in  explaining  allegories  is  omitted  by 
Ernesti.  1  refer  to  the  rule,  that  comparison  is  not  to  he  extended  to 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  allegory.  Thus  in  the  parable  of  the  good 
Samaritan,  the  point  to  be  illustrated  is  the  extent  of  the  duty  of  benefi- 
cence. Most  of  the  circumstances  in  the  parable  go  to  make  up  merely 
the  verisimilitude  of  the  narration,  so  that  it  may  give  pleasure  to  hira 
who  hears  or  reads  it.    But  how  differently  does  the  whole  appear, 


ALLEGORIES.  91 

wh^n  it  comes  to  be  interpreted  by  an  allegorizer  of  the  mystic 
school  r  The  man  going  down  from  Jerusalem  to  Jericho  is  Adam 
wandering  in  the  wilderness  of  this  world  ;  the  thieves  who  robbed 
and  wounded  him  are  evil  spirits ;  the  priest  who  passed  by  on  the 
one  side  without  relieving  him  is  the  Levitical  law ;  the  Levite  is 
good  works ;  the  good  Samaritan  is  Christ ;  the  oil  and  wine  are 
grace,  etc.  What  may  not  a  parable  be  made  to  mean,  if  imagination 
is  to  supply  the  place  of  reasoning  and  philology  ?  And  what  riddle 
or  oracle  of  Delphos  could  be  more  equivocal,  or  of  more  multifarious 
significancy,  than  the  Bible,  if  such  exegesis  be  admissible  ?  It  is  a 
miserable  excuse  which  interpreters  make  for  themselves,  that  they 
render  the  Scriptures  more  edifying  and  significant  by  interpreting 
them  in  this  manner.  And  are  the  Scriptures  then  to  be  made  more 
significant  than  God  has  made  them  ;  or  to  be  mended  by  the  skill 
of  the  interpreter,  so  as  to  become  more  edifying  than  the  Holy  Spirit 
has  made  them  ?  If  there  be  a  semblance  of  piety  in  such  interpre- 
tations, a  semblance  is  all.  Real  piety  and  humility  appear  to  the 
best  advantage  in  receiving  the  Scriptures  as  they  are,  and  expound- 
ing them  as  simply  and  skilfully  as  the  rules  of  language  will  render 
practible,  rather  than  by  attempting  to  amend  and  improve  the  reve- 
lation which  God  has  made. 

§  159.  This  being  done,  the  primary  word  is  to  be  sought 
for,  and  the  force  of  it  expressed  by  a  proper  word.  Other 
tropical  words  are  then  to  be  explained  agreeably  to  this  (a). 
In  this  way  the  explanation  of  particular  things  will  be  ren- 
dered more  easy,  and  we  may  avoid  errors.  The  design  of 
the  exhortation  in  the  form  of  allegory,  found  in  1  Corinthians 
5:  6,  is,  that  the  Corinthians  should  bfe  purified  from  vitious 
inclinations  and  the  faults  springing  from  them.  Zvfirj,  there- 
fore, here  means  vice ;  a^vfjiogf  free  from  vice,  viz.  the  being 
a  true  Christian.  "EoQTa^uv,  consequently,  is  not  to  celebrate 
a  feast,  according  to  its  proper  signification,  for  a  tropical 
meaning  is  required.  It  means  to  serve  God,  to  worship  God, 
to  be  a  Christian,  to  he  free  from  former  vices  and  worship 
him  in  purity. 

It  is  altogether  incongruous  to  understand  one  part  literally 
and  another  tropically,  in  the  same  allegory  (b) ;  as  those 
do  who  take  nvgog  in  1  Corinthians  3:  15  literally,  when  all 
the  context  is  to  be  understood  tropically.  Indeed  the  ex- 
pression w?  dia  nvgog  makes  it  plain,  that  the  word  is  to  be 
figuratively  understood.     (Morus,  p.  309.  XXV.) 


92  ALLEGORIES. 

(a)  The  meaning  of  the  author  is,  tliat  the  word  which  designates 
the  leading  design  of  the  allegory  being  explained,  the  remainder  is 
to  be  interpreted  in  conformity  with  it. 

(b)  This  rule  is  of  great  importance  and  of  wide  extent.  I  wish  I 
could  add,  that  it  is  not  every  day  transgressed  by  multitudes  who 
expound  the  Scriptures. 

To  the  brief  precepts  here  given  by  Ernesti,  may  be  added  from 
Morus,  (1)  That  we  must  sometimes  resort  to  history,  in  order  fully 
to  explain  allegory.  E.  g.  the  kingdom  of  God  is  likened  to  leaven, 
which  gradually  ferments  the  whole  mass  into  which  it  is  put;  and 
to  a  grain  of  mustard  seed,  which  gradually  springs  up  and  becomes 
a  large  plant.  History  shows  that  the  Church  has  arisen  from  small 
beginnings,  and  is  extending  itself  through  the  earth.  (2)  The  na- 
ture of  the  subject  will  frequently  direct  the  interpretation  of  the  al- 
legory. E,  g.  Ye  are  the  salt  of  the  earth,  etc..  Matt.  5:  13.  The 
subject  is,  the  instructions  to  be  given  by  the  disciples.  The  leading 
word  (salt)  in  the  allegory  means  instruction  ;  and  the  sentiment  of 
the  passage  is :  Ye  are  the  teachers  by  whom  others  are  to  be  pre- 
served from  corruption,  i.  e.  destruction.     See  Morus,  pp.  311 — 313. 

§  160.  Parables.  Not  unlike  to  the  method  of  interpret- 
ing allegories  is  that  of  explaining  parables,  which  often  con- 
tain allegory.  We  must  guard  here  against  urging  too  far 
the  meaning  of  all  parts  of  a  parabolical  narration,  and  refer 
the  particular  parts  to  the  general  design,  so  that  all  may  be 
accommodated  to  it.  It  is  a  very  common  fault  of  interpre- 
ters to  urge  the  explanation  too  far ;  but  it  is  a  very  great 
fault.  Therefore  in  Luke  15:  11,  etc.,  we  are  not  to  seek  for 
a  doctrinal  meaning  in  o-roA?;,  fioa/og,  daxTvXiog,  etc.  Such 
circumstances  are  commonly  added  to  complete  iheform  of 
the  narration,  and  to  make  it  a  more  finished  picture  of  what 
might  be  supposed  to  have  happened  ;  as  is  commonly  done 
in  stories,  fables,  and  other  things  of  like  nature.  (Morus, 
pp.  314—320.) 

Parable,  in  Greek  usage,  means  any  comparison  introduced  into  a 
discourse.  It  may  be  called  an  example  taken  from  things  real  or  fic- 
titious, and  designed  for  special  and  graphical  illustration.  The 
means  of  explaining  it  are  the  context,  the  subject,  the  occasion, 
etc.,  as  in  allegory.  The  caution  suggested  by  Ernesti  against  inter- 
preting all  the  minute  circumstances  of  a  parable  so  as  to  give  them 
a  mystic  significancy,  is  very  important. 

It  should  be  added  here,  that  allegory  differs  from  parable  only  in 
the  style  and  mode  of  expression.  Take  an  allegory  and  express  it 
in  the  historic  style,  and  you  convert  in  into  a  parable.     Hence  the 


KULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS.  93 

same  rules  of  exegesis  apply  to  both.  Comp.  Beck,  p.  134.  Keil, 
§§  78—81.  Seller,  71—78  and  §  183.  But  specially  worthy  of 
thorough  study  is  Storr's  Comment,  de  Parabolis  Christi,  Opuscula. 
Vol.  1,  p.  89.  See  Lowth's  Lectures  on  Allegory  and  Parables, 
Lect.  X — xii. . 


CHAPTER  VI. 


RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS. 
[Keil,  §  42.    Beck,  p.  130.  111.     Seiler,  §  §  65—70.] 

§  161.  Errors  respecting  emphasis  very  frequent.  In  no 
part  of  an  interpreter's  business  are  errors  more  frequently 
committed,  than  in  judging  of  emphasis.  The  reason  of  this 
is,  that  many  are  too  prone  lo  find  emphasis  every  where ; 
for  they  suppose  that,  by  so  doing,  they  exhibit  the  sacred 
writers  as  speaking  in  a  manner  more  worthy  of  themselves 
and  of  the  divine  origin  of  the  Scriptures.  However,  noth. 
ing  can  have  dignity  attached  to  it  which  has  not  truth  for  its 
basis. 

§  162.  Ground  of  these  errors.  The  ground  of  this  is, 
want  of  skill  in  the  knowledge  of  the  original  Scripture  lan- 
guages ;  for  many  who  interpret,  are  obliged  in  general  to 
depend  merely  on  the  definitions  of  Lexicons,  and  are  igno- 
rant of  the  analogy  of  languages,  because  they  have  not  been 
sufficiently  accustomed  to  these  studies.  It  is  common  for 
men  of  this  sort  to  push  etymologies,  especially  tropical  ones, 
to  an  excessive  length  ;  from  which  very  little  that  is  useful 
can  be  extracted.  Yet  from  these,  they  form  notions  which 
never  entered  the  minds  of  the  sacred  writers.  They  form 
moreover  rules  respecting  emphasis,  independently  either  of 
any  reason  drawn  from  the  nature  of  things  and  of  language, 
or  of  the  usus  loquendi. 


94  RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS. 

Mistakes  such  as  these  may  be  very  easily  committed  with 
respect  to  the  Hebrew  language,  in  regard  to  those  forms  of 
speech  in  the  New  Testament  which  are  deduced  from  the 
Hebrew  ;  because  this  idiom  is  so  unlike  the  occidental  lan- 
guages of  modern  Europe. 

§  163.  Need  of  rules  to  direct  us  in  judging  of  emphasis. 
On  this  account  there  is  more  need  of  well  grounded  precepts, 
drawn  from  the  nature  of  human  language  and  of  things,  that 
we  may  judge  correctly  of  emphasis  ;  so  that  we  may  neith- 
er pass  by  those  which  are  real,  nor  follow  after  those  which 
are  imaginary.  Erasmus  (on  1  Cor.  7:  1)  thinks  this  may 
be  endured  in  hortatory  and  consolatory  preaching ;  but  for 
myself,  I  had  rather  every  thing  should  have  a  solid  founda- 
tion, as  there  is  no  need  of  any  thing  fictitious.  In  serious 
argument,  fictitious  emphases  is  intolerable.  Indeed  it  is  noth- 
ing less  than  to  sport  with  that  which  is  sacred. 

§  164.  Insufficient  rules.  The  vulgar  rule,  which  bids 
us  beware  of  making  fictitious  emphasis  or  of  neglecting  real 
ones,  although  good  sense,  is  in  fact  no  rule  ;  as  it  does  not 
serve  at  all  to  direct  the  mind  in  judging  where  emphasis 
really  exists.  No  one  believes  himself  to  wdke  fictitious  em- 
phasis. There  are  some  other  maxims  concerning  empha- 
sis, which  are  not  formed  with  good  judgment,  nor  worthy  of 
refutation  here. 

§  165.  Kinds  of  writing  where  emphasis  is  rare.  To 
proceed  with  precepts.  First,  it  is  clear,  that  in  regard 
to  subjects  which  are  to  be  explained  with  great  nicety  ;  in 
perspicuously  exhibiting  the  precepts  that  respect  any  branch 
of  the  sciences  ;  laws ;  in  simple  narrations  of  facts,  etc. ; 
emphasis  can  scarcely  find  place.  For  emphasis  is,  in  a 
certain  sense,  tropical  or  figurative  ;  and  this  kind  of  language 
does  not  belong  to  writings  of  the  classes  just  named,  as  I 
have  already  shewn  %  151,  and  as  all  concede.  (Morus,  p, 
330.  XL) 


RULES  RESPECTING  EMfHAStS.  99 

That  is,  simple  narration,  simple  instruction,  simple  legislation,  for 
the  most  part  is  destitute  of  emphasis,  except  such  as  is  of  the  lower 
and  more  usual  kind.  But  in  the  Pentateuch,  Gospels,  and  Epistles^ 
for  example,  which  are  specimens  of  the  different  kinds  of  composi- 
tion in  question,  are  intermixed  many  passages  which  contain  words 
that  are  peculiarly  emphatic. 

§  166.  No  word  of  itself  is  emphaticah  Secondly,  we 
must  guard  against  finding  emphasis  in  any  word  of  itself, 
whether  used  properly  or  tropically  ;  because,  as  has  been 
already  shewn,  no  word  used  either  figuratively  or  literally 
has  of  itself  an  emphasis.  Emphasis  implies  an  accession  of 
meaning  to  the  ordinary  signifcaiion  of  a  word. 

§  167.  Emphasis  not  to  he  taught  hy  etymology  or  recut- 
ring  to  the  original  sense  of  words.  Thirdly,  emphasis 
should  not  be  deduced  from  the  etymology  of  a  word,  (which 
often  misleads  as  to  the  proper  sense  of  it) ;  nor  in  tropical 
expressions  should  we  recur  to  the  proper  sense  of  the  words 
to  deduce  emphasis  from  it ;  as  has  sometimes  been  done  in 
respect  to  the  word  Igiwav.  Tropically  used,  this  word  does 
not  signify  to  seek  with  great  exertion  and  diligence  ;  for  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  said  igivvuv  la  ^u&t]  ttJ?  ^iOTrjiog,  to  whom  this 
emphatic  meaning  surely  will  not  apply.  The  ancient  inter- 
preters used  iosvvuv  in  the  same  sense  as  yivcaaxsiv.  In  both 
of  the  above  points  errorsare  very  frequent.  (Morus, p.  331. 
XII.) 

^  168.  Prepositions  in  composition  do  not  always  make 
any  accession  of  meaning  to  a  word.  In  Greek  words,  more- 
over, we  are  to  take  special  care  not  to  make  any  accession 
of  signification  to  the  word,  simply  because  it  is  compounded 
with  a  preposition.  E.  g.  avd,  ano,  ngo,  avv,  ix,  nigl,  com- 
pounded as  in  ttvaaTaVQOvv,  avavri&Hv,  avft^agrvQEtv,  nqoyivtaa- 
xHv,  etc.  Many  are  accustomed  to  build  arguments  on  such 
imaginary  emphasis,  and  oftentimes  very  incongruously; 
while  use  and  observation  teach  us,  that  these  prepositions  do 


96  RtTLES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS. 

not  always  change  the  meaning  of  simple  words  ;    nay,  they 

very  commonly  are  redundant,  as  in  Polybius.     The  custom 

of  the  language,  in  such  cases,  must  be  well  studied.     (Morus, 

p.331.  XIIL) 

While  there  is  some  truth  in  this  statement,  viz.,  it  is  a  fact  that 
many  have  sought  too  much  emphasis  in  CGim.pound  words,  yet  that 
prepositions,  etc.,  in  union  with  verbs  or  other  words  serve  always  to 
modify  their  meaning  in  some  respect  or  other,  Tittmann  has  most 
fully  and  satisfactorily  shewn  in  an  Essay  translated  and  printed  in 
the  Bibl.  Repository,  Vol  I.  p.  168  seq. 

^  169.  Emphasis  not  to  he  deduced  merely  from  the  plural 
number.  We  must  be  cautious  also  that  we  do  not  deduce 
emphasis  merely  from  the  use  of  the  plural  number,  supposing 
that  where  the  plural  is  put  instead  of  the  singular  it  necessa- 
rily denotes  emphasis.  This  is  not  correct  either  in  regard 
to  Hebrew  {a)  or  Greek.  With  good  reason  Melancthon 
blames  Origen  for  making  a  distinction  between  ovgavov  and 
ovgavovg.  A  similar  mistake  Origen  also  made  in  regard  to 
oixTiQ}iotg,  in  Romans  12:  1 ;  which  many  have  incautiously 
imitated,  as  Bengel  has  the  former  error.  (Morus.  p.  332. 
XIV.) 

(a)  If  all  that  is  meant  here  be  simply  that  some  nouns  have  only 
a  plural  form,  that  others  are  used  both  in  the  singular  and  plural 
with  the  same  meaning,  and  that  in  neither  of  these  cases  is  empha- 
sis to  be  found,  this  may  readily  be  conceded.  But  Ernesti,  and  his 
commentators  Morus  and  Eichstaedt,  have  stated  the  assertion  in  the 
absolute  form,  that  the  plural  has  no  emphasis  even  in  the  Hebrew 
language.  1  have  softened  this  assertion  in  the  translation ;  and  I  add 
here,  that  it  is  so  far  from  being  correct,  that  the  pluralis  excellentiae 
(e.  g.  in  d^V^'3  ,  Q'^ri'^S  ,  5^3  "IS  ,  etc.)  is  formed  on  the  very  basis 
that  the  plural  is  intensive  in  such  cases.  This  principle  extends  to 
many  cases  of  the  Hebrew  ;  e.  g.  their  inward  part  is,  j-n'^n  depravi- 
ties, i.  e.  very  depraved.  It  is  a  principle,  however,  which  no  gram- 
marian has  yet  sufficiently  defined  and  established. 

§  170.  Abstract  words  not  of  course  emphatic  when  used 
for  concrete  ones.  In  like  manner,  we  must  beware  of  at- 
taching emphasis  to  an  abstract  word  which  stands  merely  for 
a  concrete  one.     Some  learned  men  have  done  this ;  and  ev- 


/ 


k..^X^/l... 


RTTLES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS.  97 

en  Glass  himself  admits  that  it  may  properly  be  done,  as  do 
many  others  who  have  followed  his  example.  But  they  have 
neither  given  any  good  reason  for  this,  nor  shewn  the  origin 
or  cause  of  the  pretended  emphasis ;  so  that  it  seems  to  be 
rather  a  thing  which  they  wish,  than  one  which  they  can  in- 
telligibly teach.  The  true  ground  of  using  abstract  words  in 
the  room  of  concrete  ones,  is  ehher  from  necessity  or  for  the 
sake  of  perspicuity,  not  on  account  of  emphasis.  In  the  sa- 
cred books  the  necessity  of  it  springs  from  the  Hebrew  dialect, 
which  often  employs  abstract  words  in  this  manner  because 
it  has  only  a  few  concrete  ones.  The  mistake  of  the  interpre- 
ters in  question  arises  from  the  infrequency  of  the  practice  in 
the  Latin,  and  in  their  own  vernacular  tongue.  But  dissimi- 
larity of  idiom  does  not  constitute,  as  a  matter  of  course,  any 
real  emphasis.  The  ground  above  taken  is  quite  clear  also 
from  another  circumstance,  viz.,  that  in  the  same  forms  of 
expression  abstracts  and  concretes  are  commuted  for  each 
other.  Comp.  Col.  1:  13  and  Matt.  3:  17.  Also  Eph.  5:  8 
and  4:  18,  etc.     (Morus,  p.  332.  XV.) 

<5>  171.  Emphasis  must  not  he  deduced  merely  from  oriental 
idioms.  In  the  sacred  books,  and  specially  in  the  Hebraisms 
of  the  New  Testament,  we  must  take  care  not  to  seek  for  and 
recognize  emphasis  merely  in  the  idiom  which  is  so  very  dis- 
similar to  ours.  Many  persons,  though  acquainted  with  the 
Hebrew  have  often  made  this  mistake.  But  nothing  is  more 
fallacious.  In  the  oriental  languages  many  things  appear 
hyperbolical,  (if  you  translate  them  literally,  i.  e.  merely  by 
the  aid  of  common  lexicons  and  etymology),  which  are  not  in 
reality  hyperbolical.  E.  g.  in  Lamentations  it  is  said  :  My 
trouble  is  great  as  the  sea ;  yet  this  is  simply  equivalent  to  the 
Latin  expression  :  Mala  mea  sunt  maxima,  (Morus,  p.  335. 
XVI.) 

It  is  true  that  such  is  the  real  meaning  of  the  Hebrew  expression; 
but  this  does  not  determine  the  question,  whether  the  method  of  ex- 

9 


99  RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS* 

pressing  this  seutiment  is  not  hyperbolical.  Most  plainly  it  is  so  ;  aa 
really  so  as  when  our  Saviour  says,  that  "  it  is  easier  for  a  camel  to 
go  through  the  eye  of  a  needle  than  for  a  rich  man  to  enter  into  the 
kingdom  of  God,"  and  yet  only  meanSj  as  another  passage  clearly 
shews,  that '  it  is  very  difficult  for  a  rich  man  to  be  saved,  or  impossi- 
ble for  those  who  trust  in  riches  (artd  continue  to  do  so),  to  be  sa- 
ved.' 

<5>  172.  How  to  discover  emphasis  in  doubtful  cases.  If 
there  be  no  adequate  testimony  to  shew  that  any  word  has  a 
constant  emphasis,  we  must  consult  usage.  And  here  we 
should  first  inquire,  whether  in  all  the  passages  where  the 
word  is  found,  emphasis  would  be  congruous.  Next,  whether 
in  the  same  passage,  or  a  similar  one,  another  word  may  be 
substituted  in  the  room  of  this,  which  other  contains  a  special 
designation  of  intensity.  If  neither  of  these  be  the  case,  but 
the  word  in  question  may  be  commuted  for  others  which  are 
plainly  unemphatic ;  or  in  some  of  the  passages  where  the 
word  occurs,  a  special  designation  of  intensity  is  made  by 
adding  some  other  word  for  this  purpose  ;  then  there  is  no 
emphasis  to  be  recognized  in  the  word  in  question.  E.  g. 
some  have  attached  emphasis  to  anoy.aQadoxlag  in  Romans  8: 
19;  but  in  Phil.  1:  20  it  would  be  incongruous.  There  it  is 
used  as  a  synonyme  with  iluldc  (a),  and  in  fact  commuted 
with  it  in  verse  22 ;  so  also  by  the  LXX.  Nor  is  emphasis 
always  attached  to  such  phrases  as  xagav  xalgsiv  (b)  ;  for 
such  phrases  are  often  used  when  another  word  is  added  to 
indicate  intensity,  e.  g.  Matt.  2:  10.  This  would  be  useless  if 
they  indicated  intensity  of  themselves. 

(a)  Not  at  all.  ^ yJnor.uoadoy.ia  there  means  earnest  desire  or  ex* 
pectation.  It  characterizes  the  attitude  of  a  man  standing  with  his 
head  bent  forward  by  reason  of  his  earnest  wish  or  expectancy  in  re- 
spect to  any  particular  thing.  ^E?.7iiQ  is  another  characteristic,  ad- 
ded to  shew  that  this  earnest  waiting  or  expectancy  was  rendered 
more  interesting  by  reason  of  hope. 

(b)  But  in  Hebrew,  it  is  admitted  by  the  best  oriental  scholars,  not 
only  that  such  forms  as  Vt^'i'S  h'H'^^  admit  of  emphasis,  but  that  the 
prevailing  usus  loquendi  expresses  it  in  this  way.  The  imitation  of 
this  in  Hebrew  Greek  may  consequently  be  emphatic  although  it  is 
not  always  and  necessarily  so. 


RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS.  99 

§  173.  Further  rules  to  discover  emphasis.  The  usual  or 
temporary  emphasis,  arising  from  the  affection  of  the  speaker 
6r  some  other  cause,  may  be  recognized  without  difficuhy  by 
the  following  mark,  viz.,  if  the  ordinary  signification  of  the 
word  is  far  below  the  manifest  intensity  of  the  affection  which 
the  speaker  or  writer  feels,  or  is  incompetent  to  describe  the 
greatness  of  the  object.  If  emphasis  be  not  admitted  in  such 
cases,  the  discourse  would  he  frigid;  which  fault  is  certainly 
very  foreign  from  the  style  of  the  sacred  writers. 

^  174.  Continued.  Another  rule  for  finding  whether  a 
word  or  phrase  is  emphatic,  is  this.  If  the  usual  force  of  the 
word  or  phrase  would  give  a  frigid  meaning,  when,  on  the 
other  hand,  an  apt  one  would  arise  if  some  intensity  were  giv- 
en to  the  word,  there  is  a  plain  necessity  of  emphasis;  which 
is  the  best  guide  for  finding  it.  So  in  1  Cor.  4:  3,  4,  avaxgi- 
VHv  is  constantly  emphatic,  for  it  means  either  to  he  tried  hy 
the  judgment  of  another^  or  to  take  to  one's  self  the  right  of 
trying  and  judging,  or  to  have  the  right  of  judging,  or  to  be 
ahle  rightly  to  judge.  But  if  you  translate  it  simply  to  judge, 
a  frigid  sense  would  be  given  to  it  not  at  all  adapted  to  the 
context.  In  like  manner  nhxiv  in  Col.  1:  4  is  used,  as  the 
context  shows,  to  denote  the  constancy,  greatness,  or  fruitful- 
ness  of  faith.  For  Paul  was  not  necessitated  to  know,  by  re- 
port, that  the  church  at  Colosse  had  simply  Christian  faith, 
since  he  had  founded  that  church.  So  in  Rom.  1:  8,  that 
faith  must  have  been  special  which  was  celebrated  throughout 
the  world.  Also  in  Matt.  4:  2  iniivaas  must  imply  intensity, 
as  we  may  gather  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 

§  175.  Emphasis  must  not  contradict  the  usus  loquendi. 
In  judging  of  emphasis  the  usus  loquendi  is  not  to  be  neglect- 
ed. It  must  be  so  far  consulted,  as  to  see  that  the  emphasis 
implies  nothing  repugnant  to  it 


100  MEANS  OF  HARMONIZING 


CHAPTER  VII. 


MEANS  OF  HARMONIZING  APPARENT  DISCREPANCIES. 

[Keil,  §  102.     Beck,  pp.  192—194.] 

§  176.  If  two  passages  contradict  each  other,  the  text  of  one 
must  he  faulty.  If  it  could  be  plainly  shown,  that  two  passa- 
ges of  Scripture  are  so  repugnant  to  each  other  that  no  method 
of  conciliation  is  practicable,  it  then  necessarily  follows,  that 
one  of  the  readings  in  the  usual  copies  must  be  faulty.  Con- 
sequently an  emendation  of  the  text  must  be  sought.  Of 
this  iiature  perhaps  is  the  passage  in  John  19:  14,  compared 
with  Matt.  27:  45  and  Mark  15:  25.  Also,  as  many  think, 
Luke  3:  36,  compared  with  Genesis  10:  24 ;  though  this  is 
not  clear,  in  my  view.  Some  add  Matt.  27:  9,  compared  with 
Zechariah  11:  12,  13.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  3.  I.) 

§  177.  If  the  text  of  both  be  genuine,  then  conciliation  is 
to  he  sought  where  apparent  discrepancies  exist.  If  the  text 
of  both  passages  plainly  appears  to  be  genuine,  so  that  it  can- 
not fairly  be  questioned,  then  it  must  be  understood  that  there 
is  a  mere  appearance  of  inconsistency ;  which  should  be  re- 
moved, and  the  passage  conciliated  by  a  proper  interpreta- 
tion.    (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  7.  II.) 

<J  178.  Discrepancies  doctrinal  and  historic.  The  appear- 
ance of  inconsistency  sometimes  occurs  in  passages  of  a  doc- 
trinal, and  sometimes  of  a  historical  kind.  The  writers  of  the 
N.  Testament  sometimes  appear  to  be  at  variance  with  them- 
selves (a) ;  sometimes  with  each  other  (h) ;  and  occasionally 
with  the  writers  of  the  Old  Testament  (c).  Many  writers 
have  laboured  to  harmonize  these  apparent  discrepancies ; 
some  devoting  themselves  to  the  consideration  of  a  particula.r 


APPARENT  DISCREPANCIES.  101 

class  of  them,  and  others  treating  of  the  whole.     A  catalogue 

of  these  writers  may  be  found  in  Le  Long,  PfafF,  Fabricius, 

and  others.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  8») 

(a)  E.  g.  1  Cor.  8:  1  comp.  verse  7.  (b)  E.  g.  Paul  asserts  that  a 
man  is  justified  by  faith  and  not  by  works;  James,  that  he  is  justi- 
fied not  by  fiiith  only,  but  also  by  works,  (c)  E.  g.  in  many  passa- 
ges cited  from  the  Old  Testament  by  tlie  writers  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment. 

§  179.  Causes  of  apparent  discrepancy  in  doctrinal  pas- 
sages. In  doctrinal  passages,  an  apparent  contradiction  that 
is  to  be  removed  arises,  for  the  most  part,  either  from  the 
style  of  the  authors  which  is  rather  of  the  popular  kind  than 
that  of  nice  refinement,  or  from  the  genius  of  the  oriental 
languages  which  differs  so  widely  from  that  of  the  western 
ones.  An  apparent  contradiction  in  respect  to  doctrines 
plainly  taught,  (which  has  often  been  objected  to  our  religion 
by  impious  and  profane  men,  e.  g.  Julian  in  Cyril's  works, 
who  says  that  it  is  expressly  taught  there  is  but  one  God,  and 
yet  Matt,  xxviii.  ascribes  Divinity  to  three),  is  to  be  removed 
by  theologians  in  the  way  of  explaining  things  rather  than 
words  merely ;  and  so  it  comes  not  directly  within  the  pro- 
vince of  the  interpreter.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  9.) 

<^  180.  Method  of  harmonizing  apparent  doctrinal  discre- 
pancies. The  method  of  harmonizing  doctrinal  passages  may 
be  regulated  by  the  following  maxims.  An  obscure  passage, 
i.  e.  one  in  which  is  something  ambiguous  or  unusual,  should 
be  explained  in  accordance  with  what  is  plain  and  without 
any  ambiguity  (a).  Again,  a  passage  in  which  a  doctrine  is 
merely  touched  or  adverted  to,  is  to  be  explained  by  other 
passages  which  present  plain  and  direct  exhibitions  of  it  (b). 

We  must  however  be  careful  to  harmonize  apparent  discre- 
pancies, if  it  can  be  done,  by  recourse  to  the  usus  loquendi; 
so  that  all  occasion  of  doubt  or  cavilling  may  be  removed. 
For  it  is  very  desirable  that  the  u^us  loquendi  should  justify 


^^- 


102  MEANS  OF  HAKMONIZING 

that  sense  which  we  put  on  any  doubtful  passage,  from  hav- 
ing compared  it  with  passages  that  are  plain  and  clear.  (Mo- 
rus,  Vol.  II.  p.  9  and  10.) 

(a)  E.  g.  we  explain  all  anthropopathic  expressions  in  regard  to 
God,  by  the  plain  truth  that  his  nature  is  spiritual. 

(0)  E.  g,  the  subject  of  justification  in  Rom.  iii,  is  designedly 
treated  at  large;  of  the  resurrection,  in  1  Cor.  xv  Such  passages 
are  called  classic  (loci  classici),  and  by  them  other  expressions  which 
simply  occur  obiter  are  to  be  explained. 

§  181.  Continued.  It  is  very  important  to  remember, 
that  many  things  of  a  doctrinal  nature  are  simply  and  abso- 
lutely declared,  agreeably  to  common  usage  in  all  languages, 
which  still  have  only  a  relative  sense.  This  may  be  account- 
ed for  from  the  fact,  that  there  are  parts  of  religion  which  are 
commonly  known  and  understood  ;  therefore  such  parts  do 
not  need  accurate  limitations.  E.  g.  that  we  are  saved  by 
faith  is  one  of  the  elementary  principles  of  the  Christian  reli- 
gion. The  sacred  writers  therefore  do  not,  on  every  men- 
tion of  any  duty,  remind  us  of  this  principle;  as  they  expect 
us  to  keep  it  in  memory.  When  they  say  then  that  alms- 
giving is  acceptable  to  God,  they  expect  to  be  understood  as 
meaning  if  it  be  accompanied  by  faith.  In  this  way  apparent 
discrepancies  may  be  reconciled  ;  and  the  reconciliation  be- 
comes the  more  probable,  as  the  reason  for  it  can  be  given. 
(Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  11.) 

Apparent  discrepancies  arising  from  oriental  style  or  manner  of 
expression  (§  179)  are  pretty  numerous.  E.  g.  pluck  out  the  eye 
that  offends  thee  ;  it  is  easier  for  a  camel  to  go  through  the  eye  of  a 
needle,  etc.;  to  follow  Christ,  one  must  hate  parents,  etc.,  Luke  14: 
20.  The  context,  passages  similar  as  to  subject,  the  nature  of  the 
style,  the  subject  itself,  etc.,  are  the  means  of  finding  the  true  sense 
of  such  places  ;  and  then  the  hartnony  of  them  with  other  passages 
is  obvious.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  pp.  11 — 14.) 

Apparent  discrepancies  between  various  writers,  or  between  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  same  author,  not  unfrequenlly  occur.  E,  g.  Rom. 
III.  and  James  ii.  in  respect  to  justification.  The  mode  of  concilia- 
tion is  simply  to  obtain  a  complete  view  of  the  meaning  of  each  writer. 
It  will  then  be  seen,  for  example  in  this  case,  that  Paul  is  arguing 
against  those  who  would  establish  meritorious  justification  ;  James, 
against  Antinomian  views  of  the  gospel.     Works,  in  Paul's  epistle, 


APPARENT  DISCREPANCIS.  103 

means  complete  obedience  to  the  law  ;  in  James,  it  means  such  obedience 
as  must  be  the  necessary  consequence  of  Christian  faith.  The  object  of 
both  apostles  being-  fully  understood,  all  discrepancy  vanir^hes.  In 
like  manner,  the  advice  of  Paul  in  1  Cor.  vii.  respecting  matrimo- 
ny, is  only  pro  tempore,  and  dictated  merely  by  the  present  exigen- 
cies of  the  times  ;  for  the  apostle,  in  many  other  places  of  his  writings, 
has  expressed  a  different  sentiment,     (Morus,  pp.  14 — 17.) 

Similar  to  the  apparent  discrepancy  just  mentioned,  is  the  case 
where  different  predicates  are  apparently  asserted  of  the  same  subject. 
E.  g.  Rom.  'S:  20,  it  is  said  that  a  man  cannot  be  justified  by  works  j 
but  in  2:  13,  it  is  stated  that  the  Tcoir^at,  doers,  of  the  law  shall  be 
justified.  Here  one  verse  states  the  rule  of  ^co-a/ justification  ;  the 
other  asserts  that  no  man  can  claim  it  on  the  ground  of  that  rule. 
Again,  where  we  are  said  to  he  justified  by  faith,  the  meaning  is,  that 
we  receive  pardon  on  the  ground  of  gratuity  ;  but  justification,  as  ap- 
plied to  the  doers,  of  the  law,  means  reward  on  the  ground  of  merit  or 
perfect  obedience.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  17.  VI.) 

Discrepancies  seem  to  exist,  at  times,  between  the  writers  of  the 
Old  Testament  and  the  New,  merely  from  the  different  manner  in 
which  tliey  express  themselves  on  the  same  subjects ;  when  this  is 
rather  to  be  attributed  to  different  degrees  of  light  which  the  writers 
had,  and  to  the  differences  in  the  eras,  manners,  habits,  etc.,  of  each. 
E.  g,  the  subject  of  war ;  of  loving  enemies  ;  of  benevolence  to  the 
Gentiles;  of  God's  equal  and  paternal  regard  to  them;  of  gratuitous 
justification,  etc.  A  representation  less  perfect,  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, need  not  be  understood  as  contradicting  one  more  perfect  in 
the  New.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p   18.  Vll.) 

Finally,  in  every  case  of  apparent  doctrinal  discrepancy,  the  rule 
to  guide  the  interpreter  is  simple,  viz.,  find  the  true  meaning  of  each 
writer;  take  every  thing  into  view,  which  the  principles  of  interpret- 
ing language  requires,  viz.,  the  subject,  scope,  context,  design,  age, 
habits,  style,  object,  etc.,  of  the  author;  and  when  the  meaning  is 
found  of  each  writer,  the  passages  may  be  brought  together  without 
fear  of  any  real  discrepancy. 

^  182.  Origin  of  apparent  historical  discrepancies.  Ap- 
parent discrepancies  of  a  historical  nature  originate  from  a 
difference  of  design  and  manner  in  narrating  the  same  thing  ; 
as  often  happens  in  the  Gospels.  For  a  diversity  of  design 
varies  the  choice  of  circumstances.  Many  circumstances  dif- 
fer, after  all,  in  nothing  important  as  to  designating  the  ideas 
which  the  authors  in  common  mean  to  designate  ;  and  often- 
times they  may  be  either  commuted  for  each  other,  or  omit- 
ted. It  is  of  no  importance,  sometimes,  whether  a  thing  be 
asserted  in  a  generic  or  specific  form.  Hence,  appearances 
of  discrepancy  have  frequently  arisen.  (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p. 
22.  IX.) 


104  MEANS  OF  HARMONIZING 

§  183.  Continued.  But  far  more  frequently  an  appear- 
ance of  discrepancy  arises  from  the  mere  manner  of  expres- 
sion ;  which  seems,  at  first  view,  to  imply  a  difference  in  the 
things  described,  while  it  is  merely  a  difference  in  the  mode 
of  describing  them.  It  is  very  evident  that  the  best  and  most 
careful  writers  do  not  always  exhibit  the  same  precise  and 
accurate  method  in  respect  to  the  names  of  things,  persons,  or 
places  (a) ;  in  regard  to  numbers  {b)  ;  dates  (c)  ;  years,  etc. 
Nor  are  they  usually  blamed  for  this,  nor  ought  they  to  be. 
Hence,  where  several  names  of  the  same  object  exist,  they 
sometimes  exhibit  one,  and  sometimes  another.  In  regard  to 
the  manner  of  expressing  time,  places,  and  numbers,  some- 
times they  use  the  more  vulgar  and  indistinct  method,  and 
sometimes  the  more  nice  and  accurate  one.  In  designating 
time  they  vary.  They  sometimes  put  genus  for  species,  and 
vice  versa.  Examples  of  such  a  nature  occur  in  common 
histories,  and  also  in  the  Gospels. 

(a)  E.  tr.  Matt.  17:  14,  comp.  Luke  9:  38.  Gadarene  and  Gerga- 
sene,  Matt.  8:  28,  comp.  with  Mark  5:  2.  Matt.  5:  I ,  comp.  Luke  6: 
17.  (b)  Matt. 27:  44,  comp.  Luke  23:  39.  Matt.  8:  5—9,  comp.  Luke 
7:  1—10.  Matt.  8:  28,  comp.  Mark  5:  2.  Acts  7:  14,  comp.  Gen.  46: 
27.  Acts  7:  6,  comp.  Gal.  3:  17.  (c)  Luke  2:  2,  comp.  with  the 
history  of  the  Syrian  Proconsuls. 

§  184.  We  should  he  conversant  ivith  conciliations  of  2)as- 
sages  in  the  best  classic  authors.  With  these  usages  in  writing 
history  we  ought  to  be  well  acquainted,  either  by  our  own 
study  of  the  classics,  or  from  the  remarks  of  skilful  interpret- 
ers, e.  g.  Perizonius  in  Animadverss.  hist.  et.  al.  lib.,  Duker 
on  Livy,  Wesseling  on  Herodotus  and  Diodorus.  An  ac- 
quaintance with  these  will  enable  us  promptly  to  obtain  aid 
from  them,  when  it  is  needed  for  harmonizing  passages  which 
seem  to  disagree  ;  for  it  is  plain  that  the  difficulty  of  harmo- 
nizing passages  arises,  for  the  most  part,  from  want  of  skill  in 
this  exercise.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  28.  XIII.) 

§  185.  Historical  facts  not  to  be  confounded  because  of  a 


APPARENT  DISCREPANCIES.  105 

slight  similitude^  nor  to  he  represented  as  different  on  account 
of  some  slight  discrepancy.  In  historic  discrepancies  we  must 
guard  against  confounding  things  which  really  differ,  merely 
because  they  have  some  similitude ;  or  deducing  discrepan- 
cies thence,  as  has  often  happened,  in  the  interpretation  of 
profane  authors.  On  the  other  hand,  we  must  not  rashly 
multiply  facts  because  there  are  some  slight  discrepancies  in 
the  narration  of  them.  The  reading  of  history,  and  of  good 
commentaries  upon  different  authors,  is  very  important  to  as- 
sist one  here. 

On  the  subject  of  harmonizing  the  narrations  contained  in  the 
Gospels,  it  is  difficult  to  say  any  thing  here  which  will  give  even  a 
faint  representation  of  the  efforts  that,  have  been  made.  Several 
hundred  karmonieis  have  been  published.  Some  have  chosen  one 
Gospel  as  exhibiting  the  regular  order  of  time,  and  made  the  rest  to 
conform  to  it ;  others  iiave  rejected  the  supposition  of  perfect  chro- 
nological order  in  any.  Some  have  made  the  number  of  facts  related 
as  small  as  possible,  and  forced  the  language  to  a  harmony ;  others 
have  multiplied  the  number  of  facts,  so  that  every  narration  compris- 
ing a  single  circumstance  of  discrepancy  from  others,  has  been  sup- 
posed to  contain  a  history  of  a  similar  jjut  ttill  of  a  separate  fact. 
Some  have  supposed  the  public  ministry  of  Christ  to  have  continued 
for  three  years;  others  Jbr  more  than  seven. 

Dispute  about  the  sources  of  the  Gospels  has  been  multiplied  al- 
most without  bounds,  among  the  German  critics.  By  different  wri- 
ters, each  of  the  first  three  Evangelists  lias  been  considered  as  the 
source  of  the  rest ;  while  others  allow  that  there  are  two  indepen- 
dent writers,  and  the  rest  are  compilers.  Many  others  suppose  that 
original  Hel»rew  or  rather  Syro-Chaldaic  documents  existed  in  writ- 
ing, from  which  the  first  three  evangelists  drew  in  common.  Hence 
their  resemblance  to  each  other  in  respect  to  diction.  But  different 
copies  of  such  documents,  they  suppose,  were  used  by  the  Evange- 
lists, which  had  been  interpolated  or  augmented.  Hence  their  dis- 
crepancies. Some  assert  a  perfect  harmony  betvi'een  the  Evange- 
lists even  in  the  minutest  circumstances;  while  other.s  maintain  dis- 
crepancies which  amount  to  absolute  contradictions. — Where  shall 
the  young  interpreter  go,  to  find  a  refuge  from  such  a  chaos  of  doubts 
and  difficulties  as  are  here  presented.?  If  I  may  venture  to  express 
an  opinion,  which  is  not  the  mere  result  of  speculation,  I  would  say  : 
Let  him  go  to  the  diligent,  thorough,  repeated  study  of  the  gospels, 
with  a  candid  mind,  united  to  a  life  of  prayer  and  faith.  Let  hira 
carry  with  him  to  this  study  a  fundamental  knowledge  of  the  nature 
of  language,  that  he  may  not  be  embarrassed  with  the  mere  forms  of 
words.  I  will  venture  to  add,  that  he  will  find  it  necessary  to  be- 
lieve with  Jerome,  that  the  Scripture  consists  in  the  sense  of  a  yassage^ 


106      MEANS  OF  HARMONIZING  APPARENT  DISCREPANCIES. 

and  not  in  the  words  only ;  which  are  the  mere  costume  of  the  sense. 
Notions  oi verbal  inspiration  may  be  and  often  have  been  such,  as  to 
render  the  conciliation  of  the  Evangelists  a  desperate  undertaking. 
That  notion  v^hich  attaches  absolute  perfection  to  the /orm  q/Zan- 
^Mfl^e,  as  well  as  the  sense  which  it  conveys,  makes  the  reconcil- 
iation of  them  impossible.  In  some  cases,  two,  three,  or  even  the 
four  Evangelists  relate  the  same  thing  in  different  words.  Now  if 
the  form  of  the  words  in  one  is  absolutely  perfect,  what  is  to  be  said 
of  the  other  three,  who  have  adopted  different  forms  ?  And  if  the 
form  of  a  narration  in  Luke,  with  two,  three,  or  more  circumstances 
interwoven  is  absolutely  perfect,  what  becomes  of  the  narrations  in 
Matthew  and  Mark,  where.one  or  more  of  these  circumstances  are 
omitted  ?  - 

It  is  a  fact  which  admits  of  no  doubt,  that  the  sacred  writers  differ 
from  each  other  as  much  in  respect  to  the  mode  of  writing,  as  profane 
authors  do.  The  proper  question  always  is  :  What  is  the  meaning 
which  they  design  to  convey.?  What  is  their  principal  or  special 
object  in  conveying  it  ?  These  questions  being  answered,  it  matters 
little  in  what  garb  this  meaning  is  clad  ;  or  whether  more  or  fewer 
circumstances  accompany  it,  that  are  not  essential  to  the  main  point. 

Considerations  of  this  nature  will  help  to  remove  the  apparent 
discrepancies  of  the  Gospels,  as  they  are  now  presented  to  us.  And 
as  to  speculations  about  the  origin  of  them,  very  little  terra  jirma 
has  yet  been  won  by  all  the  adventures  that  have  been  undertaken. 

The  student  may  read  with  some  profit,  Morus  Vol.  II.  pp.  24 — 49; 
and  many  of  Newcome's  notes,  printed  at  the  end  of  his  Harmony, 
are  the  result  of  good  sense  joined  with  much  critical  experience. 

§  186.  Doubtful  passages  to  be  interpreted  by  plain  ones. 
In  harmonizing  passages,  it  is  very  important  to  determine 
which  is  to  be  accommodated  to  the  other.  We  ought  to  have 
some  rule  here,  lest  we  should  wander  from  our  way.  The 
rule  is  this :  If  one  passage  be  plain  and  accurately  expressed, 
so  as  to  admit  of  no  doubt,  it  cannot  admit  of  any  accommo- 
dation. The  doubtful  one  must  be  accommodated  to  the 
plain  one. 

^  187.  A  perfect  Harmony  not  to  be  expected.  After  all,  I 
should  admit  with  PfafT  that  a  perfect  Harmony  of  the  Gos- 
pels can  hardly  be  made  by  rule.  Conjecture  must  some* 
times  be  applied  to  the  rules  of  harmonizing,  and  to  the  use 
of  them  in  particular  cases.  But  it  is  well  to  observe  here, 
that  the  subject  respects  merely  occasional  historical  facts,  of 
which  one  may  be  ignorant  without  endangering  his  salvation* 


dN  TRANSLATING  THE  SCRIPTURES.  107 

Nay,  better  submit  to  be  ignorant  here,  than  to  torture  one's 
brain  to  find  out  what  is  not  of  essential  importance. 


PART  IlL 

ON  TRANSLATING  THE  SCRIPTURES. 

§  188.  An  interpreter  should  understand  the  Scriptures^ 
and  be  able  to  explain  them  well.  An  interpreter  should  not 
only  possess  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  Scriptures,  but 
also  the  faculty  of  interpreting  and  explaining  them  well.  On 
this  subject  it  may  be  proper  to  say  a  few  things. 

The  object  of  interpretation  is  to  give  the  sense  of  an 
author,  without  addition,  diminution,  or  change.  A  version 
ought  to  be  an  exact  image  of  the  original  or  archetype,  in 
which  image  nothing  should  be  drawn  ehher  greater  or  less, 
better  or  worse,  than  the  original.  It  should  be  so  composed 
that  it  might  be  acknowledged  as  another  original  itself.  It 
follows,  that  a  translator  should  use  those  words,  and  those 
only,  which  clearly  express  all  the  meaning  of  the  author^ 
and  in  the  same  manner  as  the  author.  But  this  needs  illus- 
tration. 

^  189.  The  words  of  the  version  ought  to  correspond  as 
exactly  as  possible  to  those  of  the  original.  First,  as  the 
same  meaning  must  be  conveyed,  those  words  are  to  be 
selected  the  force  of  which  plainly  corresponds  to  that  of  the 
original,  and  which  are  not  ambiguous,  but  of  a  plain  and 
established  meaning  among  those  for  whom  the  translation  is 
made.  Those  words  are  to  be  preferred  (if  such  can  be 
found)  which  correspond  altogether  with  the  words  of  the 
author,  in  respect  to  etymology,  tropical  use,  and  construc- 
tion.    But  great  caution  is  necessary  here,  in  judging  whether 


108  ON  TRANSLATING  THE  SCRIPTtlRES. 

the  usage  of  the  two  languages  agrees.  Otherwise  no  version 
can  be  made,  which  can  be  well  understood  by  those  who  are 
ignorant  of  the  original  language  ;  but  rather  an  obscuration 
of  the  author  ensues,  and  not  unfrequently  a  perversion  of 
hinfi.  For  nien  will  understand  the  words  of  a  Latin  version, 
according  to  the  Latin  usus  loquendi,  (and  so  of  a  German 
translation)  ;  when  they  ought  to  be  understood,  if  the  rule 
above  be  violated,  according  to  the  Greek  or  Hebrew  idiom. 
Or  perhaps  the  unlearned  reader  will  not  understand  them  at 
all,  although  from  the  habit  of  hearing  and  using  the  words 
he  may  think  he  understands  them.  A  frequent  case  indeed 
among  the  unlearned  ;  and  I  may  add,  among  their  teachers 
also. 

§  190.  When  one  cannot  translate  ad  verbum  he  must  trans- 
late ad  sensum.  But  if  appropriate  words  as  above  described 
cannot  be  selected,  on  account  of  the  difference  of  idiom  be- 
tween the  two  languages  (the  original  and  that  of  the  transla- 
tor),  which  often  express  the  same  things  by  words  that  do 
not  correspond  in  their  etymology  or  their  proper  signification, 
(specially  is  this  the  case  with  the  oriental  and  occidental  lan- 
guages, so  that  a  literal  translation  of  the  former  would  be 
often  unintelligible  in  the  latter),  then  we  must  relinquish  the 
design  of  translating  ad  verhum,  and  content  ourselves  with 
merely  giving  the  sense  of  the  original  plainly  designated. 

§  191.  A  knowledge  of  Hebrew  as  well  as  Greek  necessary 
to  translate  the  New  Testament.  This  can  be  efTected  only 
by  one  who  has  an  accurate  knowledge  of  both  languages. 
To  accomplish  this  in  respect  to  the  New  Testament,  a  man, 
besides  the  knowledge  of  his  vernacular  tongue,  must  have 
an  accurate  knowledge  of  both  Greek  and  Hebrew.  This  is 
necessary,  not  only  to  understand  the  original,  but  to  judge  of 
What  is  peculiar  to  each  language,  and  to  express  the  sense 
of  the  original  in  a  manner  adapted  to  the  genius  of  his  own 
language. 


ON  TRANSLATING  THE  SCRIPTURES.  109 

§  102.  Cases  where  we  must  adhere  to  the  mode  of  trans- 
lating ad  verhum.  But  various  causes  operate  to  prevent  a 
translator  from  strictly  following  the  rule  in  §  190.  For, 
'first,  when  \heform  and  manner  of  the  Greek  words  has  such 
a  connection  with  the  things  signified  and  the  method  of  argu- 
ing, that  those  things  cannot  be  well  understood  nor  the  argu- 
ment proceed  well  if  a  translation  ad  verhum  be  not  made, 
then  we  must  sacrifice  the  idiom  of  our  own  language  and 
adhere  to  that  of  the  Greek.  This  frequently  happens  in 
respect  to  the  epistles  of  Paul  ;  e,  g.  2  Cor.  in.  in  regard  to 
the  words  ygdfifiaiog  and  nvd'fiarog,  also  do^rjgf  add  Gal.  3: 
16  ;  and  in  respect  to  allegories,  John  x. 

^  193,  Continued.  Antithesis,  paronomasia,  and  the  like 
figures  of  speech,  also  require  a  modification  of  the  rule  in 
§  190.  For  the  grace  and  beauty  of  these  perish  when  the 
language  is  changed.  Paul  has  many  of  these  figures.  But 
they  cannot  always  be  preserved,  as  another  language  will 
not  always  admit  them.  E.  g.  in  Matt.  16:  18,  nirgog  and 
wfiT^a,  the  paronomasia  can  be  preserved  in  Latin  but  not  in 
English. 

"§  194.  Continued.  Another  class  of  words  which  must 
be  literally  rendered,  are  those  for  which  no  equivalent  ones 
can  be  found  in  the  language  of  the  translator,  so  as  fully  and 
unambi-guously  to  express  the  idea.  E.  g.  the  word  ^(a^ ;  and 
others  as  nlaiig,  fisrdvoia,  etc, 

§  195.  Continued.  In  very  difficult  and  doubtful  passages 
also  a  literal  translation  must  be  given,  because  a  version  ad 
sensum  would  be  assuming  that  one  definitely  understood  the 
real  meaning  of  the  passage.  This  might  do  in  a  commen- 
tary, but  not  in  a  translation.  With  propriety  says  Castalio 
on  1  Pet.  4:  6,  *'  This  I  do  not  understand,  therefore  I  trans- 
late it  ad  verbum,''^  -         ^ 

10 


no  MORIJS  ON  TRANSLAtlOl^. 

§  196.  In  translating,  we  ought  to  lean  towards  our  own 
vernacular  idiom.  A  good  acquaintance  with  these  maxims 
of  translation,  specially  a  practical  acquaintance,  will  enable 
any  one  to  judge  whether  a  version  has  preserved  the  right 
method  in  regard  to  purity  of  language,  or  introduced  too 
many  of  the  idioms  of  the  original.  As  versions  however  are 
not  made  for  the  learned  who  can  read  the  original,  but  for 
others  and  specially  for  the  common  people,  it  is  better  to  in- 
cline to  the  idiom  of  our  vernacular  tongue,  (even  in  cases 
where  you  might  with  some  propriety  adhere  to  the  original 
idiom),  for  the  sake  of  rendering  the  translation  more  intelli- 
gible. It  was  well  said  by  Jerome  to  Pammachius,  when 
speaking  of  the  best  mode  of  interpretation:  "  Let  others 
hunt  after  syllables  and  letters ;  do  you  seek  for  the  sense.^^ 


APPENDIX. 

MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

Extract  translated  from  a  dissertation  of  Dr.  Morus,]'late 
Professor  of  Theology  in  the  University  of  Leipsick,  entitled 

DE  DISCRIMINE  SENSUS  ET  SIGNIFICATIONIS  IN  INTERPRETANDOj 

and  contained  in  his  Dissertationes   Theol.  et  Philol.  Vol  I. 
No.  11 

[To  the  above  rules  of  Ernesti,  the  object  of  which  is  to  guide  the 
translator  in  making  a  version  of  the  original  Scriptures  into  his  own 
vernacular  language,  1  have  thought  it  would  be  acceptable  and  use- 
ful to  those  for  whom  this  little  volume  of  the  elements  of  Herrae- 
neutics  is  designed,  to  subjoin  an  extract  from  the  dissertation  of 
Morus  just  mentioned,  which  appears  to  be  very  judicious  and  in- 
structive. To  the  business  of  teaching  Hermeneutics,  Morus  was 
peculiarly  attached  and  devoted;  and  lew  men  have  understood  it 
better,  or  left  behind  them  more  useful  precepts  on  this  interesting 
subject.    Equally  removed  from  the  recent  latitudinarianism  of  many 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION.  Ill 

Qerman  interpreters,  and  from  the  mystic  and  technical  method  of 
the  older  interpreters,  he  formed  and  nurtured  a  school  which  has 
produced  great  and  lasting  influence  upon  the  science  of  interpreta- 
tion ;  and  the  principles  of  which,  for  the  most  part,  must  commend 
themselves  at  once,  when  well  understood,  to  every  intelligent  and 
unbiassed  mind. 

The  dissertation  in  question  commences,  with  pointing  out  the  im- 
possibility of  translating  ad  verbum  out  of  one  language  into  another, 
in  every  case  that  may  occur.  The  reason  of  this  is  grounded  in  the 
diflerent  modes  in  which  men  of  different  nations  view  the  same  ob- 
jects, and  express  themselves  in  respect  to  them.  The  age  in  which 
writers  live,  their  different  manners,  customs,  culture,  temper,  man- 
ner of  life,  knowledge,  etc.,  all  concur  in  producing  these  differences. 
In  consequence  of  the  operation  of  causes  so  diverse,  there  is  in  one 
language  much  of  rude  antiquity,  in  another  a  high  or  a  partial  state 
of  cultivation  ;  in  one  the  connections  and  transitions  are  circuitous, 
in  another,  short  and  easy  ;  in  one  ellipsis  abounds,  in  another  it  is 
unfrequent;  one  is  profuse  in  allegories  and  tropes,  another  dry  and 
jejune  in  expression  ;  one  abounds  with  equivocal  and  indefinite 
phraseology,  another  with  definite  and  certain  words ;  one  is  fitted 
for  expression  in  respect  to  the  arts  and  sciences,  another  destitute 
of  such  means  of  expression  ;  one  is  copious,  another  furnished  with 
a  scanty  stock  of  words. 

In  consequence  of  these  diversities,  and  the  differences  of  idiom 
which  spring  out  of  them,  it  becomes  impossible  always  to  translate 
ad  verbum  from  the  one  to  the  other.  In  such  cases,  Morus  justly 
contends  that  the  translator,  abandoning  a  literal  version,  should  aim 
at  exactly  communicating  the  sense.  E.  g.  the  literal  translation  of 
/caxoig  £/etv  is  to  have  badly  ;  but  what  idea  could  an  English  reader 
attach  to  this  translation  ?  Leaving  then  the  version  ad  verbum,  we 
must  translate  it  to  be  sick,  which  conveys  the  exact  sense  of  the 
Greek  piirase  in  an  intelligible  form.  And  this  instance  may  serve 
to  illustrate  what  Morus  means  by  the  phrase,  difference  between  the 
signification  and  the  sense  of  words.  The  former  is  the  literal  and 
primary  meaning  of  the  words  simply  considered;  the  sense  is  the 
idea  conveyed  by  the  words,  in  the  phrase  or  in  the  connection  where 
they  stand. 

What  is  said  of  words  may  also  be  applied  to  phrases  and  sen- 
tences, for  the  same  reasons  and  from  the  same  causes.  In  all  these 
cases,  where  the  sense  cannot  be  given  by  a  literal  translation,  we 
must  choose  other  words  which  will  designate  it;  and  where  particu- 
lar words  are  wanting  in  our  own  language  to  do  this,  we  must  have 
recourse  to  circumlocution. 

Having  discussed  these  principles  of  translating,  Morus  proceeds 
to  descant  upon  the  method  of  applying  them  to  practice.  As  this 
subject  is  a  matter  of  importance  to  all  who  are  to  expound  the  word 
of  God  in  their  own  vernacular  tongue,  1  shall  here  present  it  in  a 
translation  of  the  author's  words.     M.  S.] 

ft  is  proper  here  to  point  out  the  duty  of  the  interpreter,  in 
reference  to  the  above  principles.    In  regard  to  the  first  case, 


112  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

namely,  where  we  abandon  a  literal  version,  and  use  a  word 
which  will  convey  the  sense  of  the  original,  I  may  say,  in 
general,  that  the  word  substituted  should  approximate  as 
nearly  as  possible  in  its  signification  to  that  of  the  original 
word  which  it  represents.  On  accuracy  of  this  kind  depends, 
in  a  high  degree,  the  excellence  of  any  version. 

But  as  it  rarely  suffices  to  give  merely  general  directions, 
I  will  descend  to  particulars.  A  version  then  should  exhibit 
a  trope  where  the  original  does,  whether  it  be  used  for  the 
sake  of  ornament  or  variety  ;  an  energetic  word,  where  there 
is  one  in  the  original.  Let  the  translator  avoid  tropes,  where 
the  diction  of  the  original  is  not  figurative  ;  let  him  avoid 
technical  expressions,  where  those  of  common  life  should  be 
used.  E.  g.  TsXuov  should  not  be  rendered  perfection,  but 
"probity^  uprightness.  Let  him  not  commute  genus  for  spe- 
cies, nor  antecedent  for  consequent.  In  respect  to  words 
which  depend  on  an  excited  state  of  mind,  such  as  reproach- 
ful terms,  and  those  of  complaint,  lamentation,  and  indigna- 
tion, also  proverbs,  and  proverbial  phrases,  let  him  compare 
these  most  carefully  with  the  practice  of  common  life  ;  and 
what  men  are  wont  to  say  on  such  occasions  let  him  express 
in  his  version,  and  not  rest  satisfied  with  some  kind  of  gene- 
ral meaning,  nor  make  a  version  which  is  cramped  by  its  dic- 
tion. In  general,  let  him  take  care  to  form  a  right  estimate 
of  subjects  from  the  nature  of  the  predicates  attached  to 
them  ;  which  is  a  matter  of  great  importance,  where  there  is 
a  departure  from  a  literal  version.  It  will  also  afford  an  anti- 
dote against  negligence  and  error. 

It  is  sufficient  to  have  given  these  few  hints  ;  and  he  who 
wishes  for  more  accurate  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  transla- 
ting, must  inquire  into  the  grounds  or  reasons  of  these  laws. 
The  reasons  are,  the  desire  to  translate  closely  and  not  para- 
phrastically  ;  a  wish  to  give  an  exact  idea  of  the  thing  desig- 
nated by  the  original  words,  so  that  the  reader  may  under- 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION.  113 

Stand  it ;  the  necessity  of  exhibiting  the  external  beauty  of 
the  oricfinal  diction;  and  the  design  of  so  exhibiting  the 
writer's  thoughts  in  our  own  language,  as  to  make  it  appa- 
rent, that  if  the  writer  himself  had  used  our  language  he 
would  have  expressed  this  proverb,  that  exclamation,  that  for- 
mula of  speech,  just  as  the  translator  has  done. 

In  regard  to  the  second  case,  viz.  where  circumlocution  is 
to  be  employed,  one  rule  may  be  given  to  guide  the  transla- 
tor. Let  him  use  words,  if  possible,  which  do  not  express 
entirely  an  idea  that  is  composed  of  many  parts  in  the  origi- 
nal, and  some  of  which  are  not  designated  exactly  in  the  pas- 
sage which  is  translated  ;  but  let  him  choose  terms,  which 
are  as  exactly  equivalent  to  the  original  as  possible.  Where 
doubt  may  hang  over  the  expression,  he  may  explain  it  by 
notes  ;  but  he  should  not  be  blamed  for  not  expressing  deji- 
nilely  in  translation,  what  is  indefinite  in  the  original ;  and 
while  he  avoids  doing  this,  he  cannot  be  accused  of  obtruding 
his  own  views  upon  the  author  whom  he  translates. 

Thus  far  in  respect  to  translating  ad  sensum  rather  than  ad 
verhim,  when  single  words  are  to  be  explained  or  translated. 
Let  us  come  now  to  sentences  and  propositions  ;  in  regard  to 
which,  when  they  cannot  be  literally  translated  without  obscu- 
ring instead  of  illustrating  the  sense,  we  must,  in  like  manner 
as  before  described,  substitute  the  meaning  of  the  words  in- 
stead of  the  words  themselves.  In  merely  explaining  a  pas- 
sage, which  contains  the  sign  of  some  particular  thing,  the  in- 
terpreter may  substitute  the  thing  signified  for  the  sign  of  it. 
E.  g.  when  God  is  said  to  come  from  heaven,  an  interpreter  in 
merely  explaining  may  say,  this  means  God  as  performing 
some  illustrious  work,  or  doing  any  thing  in  general ;  or  God 
as  taking  cognizance  of  any  thing,  or  as  propitious  or  unpro- 
pitiov^,]us\.  as  the  contextjequires.  Or  when  Christ  is  pre- 
sented as  sitting  at  the  right  hand  of  God,  the  meaning  is, 
that  Christ  is  participating  in  divine  sovereignty.  So  when, 
10* 


114  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

in  the  oriental  writers,  the  sun  is  represented  as  darkened,  the 
moon  as  obscured,  and  the  stars  as  shaken,  these  are  images  of 
distressing  times ;  and  therefore  when  it  is  said  that  these 
things  will  happen,  the  simple  meaning  is  that  times  of  great 
distress  will  follow,  in  which  as  it  were  all  nature  seems  to 
threaten  ruin.  To  this  class  of  passages,  however,  belong  all 
those  in  which  God  as  future  judge  is  represented  as  visible  ; 
the  forms  of  speech  being  taken  from  the  customs  of  men. 
The  meaning  of  such  passages  is,  that  Gad  will  render  to 
every  one  according  to  Ms  deeds ;  as  is  plainly  expressed 
in  Matt.  16:  27. 

In  the  mere  explanation  of  these  formulas  of  language,  ev- 
ery one  sees  that  the  sense  is  to  be  given  ;  but  our  translator 
has  a  work  of  more  difficulty.  For  where  the  object  of  enu- 
merating many  signs  of  the  nature  described  above,  is  to  ren- 
der the  description  more  vivid  and  impressive,  (as  in  Matt. 
24:29,30,31.  Joel  3:  1.  Dan.  7:9),  everything  must  be 
closely  translated.  The  translator  would  mutilate  the  diction 
of  the  author,  if  he  should  abridge  the  description  and  give 
only  the  general  meaning ;  for  it  was  not  the  design  of  the 
writer  merely  to  present  to  the  mind  the  thing  summarily  and 
literally  declared,  but  as  it  were  to  place  it  before  the  eyes  in 
a  picture  or  painting  of  it.  For  if  the  version,  by  preserving 
these  special  traits,  is  not  liable  to  produce  an  erroneous  im- 
pression in  the  reader's  mind,  but  every  one  who  reads  will 
easily  understand  that  the  whole  is  to  be  considered  as  a  figura- 
tive expression,  (as  those  things  are  which  are  spoken  of  God 
av&QMJiona&ag)  then  there  is  no  good  reason  why  the  version 
should  be  changed  into  a  paraphrase  or  explanation.  Who 
would  doubt  or  be  at  a  loss  what  is  meant,  if  men  in  a  state 
of  suffering  and  wretchedness  should  be  described  as  approach- 
ing the  throne  of  God  for  the  purpose  of  supplication  ?  But  if 
a  translation,  as  it  stands  in  our  vernacular  tongue  to  be  read 
by  the  unlearned,  necessarily  leads  to  wrong  views  of  the 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION.  115 

sentiments  of  the  author  by  being  literal ;  or  communicates  a 
sentiment  opposite  to  his  ;  or  makes  no  sense  ;  I  see  no  rea- 
son why  we  should  fear  to  substitute  the  sense  instead  of  the 
literal  signification  of  the  words ;  specially  when  an  argument 
follows  which  does  not  depend  on  the  words  but  on  the  sense, 
and  which  no  one  can  understand  who  does  not  attend  to  ihe 
sense  rather  than  the  words.  Of  this  nature  are  such  expres- 
sions as  making  intercession  for  men ;  sitting  at  the  right 
hand  of  the  king ;  Christ  who  was  rich  becoming  poor  that 
men  might  be  made  rich ;  Christ  being  received  into  the  hea- 
I  venSy  etc. ;  which  last  phrase  clearly  means  to  be  mast  exalted, 
to  have  supreme  dominion.  Had  some  critics  understood 
this,  they  might  have  spared  themselves  the  trouble  of  inquir- 
ing whether  Christ  contains  the  heavens,  or  the  heavens  him ; 
nor  would  they  have  thought  of  the  majesty  of  Christ  as  suf- 
'  fering  degradation  by  being  included  in  a  place ;  nor  would 
Beza  have  written  such  a  note  as  he  has  on  this  subject.  The 
meaning — ihe'  meaning  only — is  to  be  sought  for;  and  not 
the  mere  literal  signification  of  the  words. 

In  other  cases,  what  the  sacred  writers  have  applied  only 
to  a  part  or  species,  interpreters  have  sometimes  applied  to 
the  whole  or  the  genus ;  and  vice  versa.  Contemplated  in 
the  light  where  they  have  placed  it,  the  thing  appears  obscure, 
or  difficult,  or  as  needing  to  be  softened  down ;  but  in  the 
other  light,  it  is  plain,  easy,  and  accurately  described.  What 
David  in  a  certain  place  imprecates  upon  his  enemies,  (and 
therefore  the  enemies  of  Christ),  viz.  that  their  habitation 
might  be  desolate  and  deserted,  Peter  applies  to  Judas  the  be- 
trayer of  Christ,  and  declares  that  it  happened  to  him  (Acts 
1:  20).  But  if  a  literal  application  of  it  is  to  be  made  to 
David's  enemies,  it  is  not  to  be  applied  in  the  same  sense  in 
which  it  is  to  Judas.  How  will  it  be  shewn  that  the  habita- 
tion of  Judas  became  desolate  and  deserted  ?  Surely  violence 
must  be  done  to  the  passage,  if  any  one  determines  to  under- 


116  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

Stand  it  literally.  We  may  therefore  see  whether  the  passage 
cannot  be  translated  ad  sensum.  E.  g.  if  in  uttering  an  im- 
precation against  one,  we  say :  '  Let  his  house  become  deso- 
late,' our  meaning  is,  in  general,  that  he  may  he  extirpated, 
that  he  may  utterly  perish.  Many  imprecations  are  of  such 
a  nature,  that  the  object  of  them  is  evil  in  general  by  which 
some  one  is  to  be  overwhelmed  or  crushed  ;  and  to  the  mere 
form  of  the  words  themselves  we  are  not  scrupulously  to  ad- 
here. For  the  language  of  imprecation  is  of  such  a  nature 
that  it  designates,  by  its  vehemence  or  moderation,  the  more 
vehement  or  moderate  affection  of  the  mind,  and  also  the 
weight  or  lightness,  the  abundance  or  fewness,  of  the  evils 
which  are  to  be  inflicted. 

Similar  to  the  imprecations  of  which  I  have  just  been  speak- 
ing, is  that  of  wishing  that  any  one  may  be  extirpated^  or,  to 
express  it  rhetorically,  that  his  house  may  he  deserted ;  which 
is  the  image  of  destruction  or  extirpation.  This  expression 
logically  considered  means  a  species  of  destruction,  and  in  the 
language  of  common  life  it  would  stand  for  an  exainple  of 
destruction.  If  now  the  words  above  applied  to  Judas  are 
considered  as  simply  designating  the  idea,  let  him  perish,  and 
are  urged  no  farther,  all  this  most  truly  happened  to  Judas ; 
and  this  entirely  agrees  with  the  sense  put  upon  the  words  in 
Peter's  discourse.  For,  as  Peter  argues,  if  Judas  has  perish- 
ed, there  is  need  of  a  successor  in  his  office.  But  if  the  pas- 
sage be  literally  understood,  the  conclusion  is  not  valid  ;  for 
it  would  not  follow  that  because  the  house  of  Judas  is  deserted, 
a  successor  to  his  office  is  needed.  We  may  conclude  there- 
fore that  Peter  cites  one  of  the  many  imprecations  contained 
in  a  long  poem,  not  because  this  imprecation  only  is  to  be  re- 
garded literatim  et  syllahatim,  but  merely  to  show  to  whom 
all  imprecntions  of  that  nature  attach,  and  to  whom  they  may 
be  referred. 

But  still  further  to  confirm  this  exegesis ;  does  Paul,  I 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION.  117 

would  ask,  when  he  cites  a  part  of  the  imprecations  in  the 
same  poem,  insist  upon  and  urge  the  literal  meaning  of  them  ? 
(Rom.  11:  9,  10.)  Does  he  apply  the  tropical  language  of  it  to 
some  particular  kind  of  suffering,  as  poverty  for  example,  or 
sickness  ?  Not  at  all ;  but  he  plainly  teaches  us  that  the 
language  of  the  Psalmist  means  generally  to  express  the  im- 
precation :    Let  the  enemies  of  God  be  wretched  ! 

But  still  in  translating  passages  of  this  nature,  it  is  not 
enough  to  give  the  sense  in  general.  We  must  present  the 
same  images  as  the  author  does,  and  of  course  express  his 
words.  If  we  neglect  to  do  this,  our  readers  may  indeed 
know  in  general  the  meaning  of  the  author  ;  but  they  will  re- 
main ignorant  of  what  language  he  employs,  and  how  much 
force  and  ornament  he  exhibits. 

I  come  next  to  allegory,  or  where  similitudes  are  employed 
for  the  sake  of  illustration.  The  use  which  we  should  make 
of  allegories  in  interpretation,  is  to  deduce  from  them  the 
general  sentiment,  in  which  is  summarily  and  properly  con- 
tained that  which  the  writer  wishes  to  illustrate  by  his  simili- 
tudes. In  explaining  allegories,  it  is  surely  proper  to  have 
respect  to  the  design  of  the  author  in  writing  them.  But  all 
men,  who  make  use  of  allegories,  expect  their  readers  to  re- 
gard the  general  sentiment  inculcated  by  them  rather  than 
the  similitude  themselves ;  or,  which  amounts  to  the  same 
thing,  not  to  dwell  upon  the  language  merely  but  to  consider 
the  design  of  it.  For  example  ;  when  Christ  was  asked  why 
he  did  not  enjoin  it  upon  his  disciples  oftener  to  fast,  according 
to  the  usual  custom,  he  answered  by  allegories,  using  these 
three  similitudes,  viz.  that  while  the  bridegroom  was  present 
it  was  not  proper  for  the  wedding  guests  to  be  sad  ;  that  a 
new  patch  should  not  be  sewed  upon  an  old  garment ;  and 
that  new  wine  should  not  be  put  into  old  bottles.  (Matt.  9:  14 
— 18.)  In  these  similitudes  is  doubtless  contained  one  gen- 
eral sentiment,  which  being  understood,  the  force  of  Jesus'a 


118  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

reply  is  manifest.  That  sentiment,  as  it  appears  to  me,  is 
this  ;  that  no  one  in  common  life  is  wont  to  do  those  things, 
which  are  incongruous  with  the  time,  place,  and  occasion. 
For  if  any  one  should  be  sad  at  a  wedding  feast,  or  put  new 
wine  into  old  bottles,  or  sew  a  new  patch  upon  an  old  gar- 
ment, would  he  not  act  foolishly,  and  be  regarded  as  one  des- 
titute of  a  sense  of  propriety  ?  It  is  as  much  as  to  say,  in 
common  life  such  things  are  incongruous.  Whether  there- 
fore we  advert  to  all  these  similitudes,  or  only  to  one  of  them, 
the  same  meaning  is  and  ought  to  be  deduced  from  the 
passage. 

The  amount  of  the  whole  is,  that  Christ  being  asked  why 
he  permitted  his  disciples  so  much  indulgence  in  regard  to 
fasting,  replied  by  making  use  of  similies  to  shew  that  no  one 
in  common  life  would  do  that  which  is  incongruous;  and 
therefore  he  would  not  compel  his  disciples  to  do  that,  which 
neither  the  time  nor  the  occasion  required.  For  certainly  it 
would  have  been  incongruous  for  the  disciples,  while  Christ 
was  with  them  as  their  guide  and  teacher,  to  spend  their  life 
in  sadness,  and  to  devote  themselves  to  rites  of  this  nature  ; 
especially  when  Christ  was  soon  to  be  taken  from  them,  ancl 
they  were  to  be  assailed  by  many  calamities  and  distresses. 
Now  if  Christ,  who  knew  this  would  be  their  lot,  had  forbidden 
them  their  present  enjoyments,  and  prematurely  loaded  them 
with  burdensome  rites  which  were  incongruous  with  their 
present  circumstances  and  with  the  indulgence  of  his  affection 
for  them,  he  would  have  done  that  which  would  be  like  being 
sad  at  a  wedding  feast,  or  sewing  a  new  patch  upon  an  old 
garment,  or  putting  new  wine  into  old  bottles,  i.  e.  he  would 
have  done  an  incongruous  unseemly  thing. 

But  he,  who,  overlooking  the  fact  that  so  many  words  are 
employed  in  the  designation  of  one  general  sentiment,  thinks 
this  mode  of  explanation  does  not  exhaust  the  whole  meaning 
of  the  sirailiesj  will,  after  the  manner  of  many  ancient  and 


MORtTS  ON  TRANSLATION*  ll9 

modern  expositors,  explain  every  part  by  itself ;  so  that  the 
bridegroom  is  made  the  husband  of  the  church,  the  toine  is  the 
gospel,  the  old  and  the  new  are  Pharisaical  and  Christian  doc- 
trine, etc.  For  myself,  I  am  wont  to  follow  the  usage  of 
common  life  in  explaining  similitudes  ;  for  this  is  the  voice  of 
nature,  and  can  easily  be  distinguished  from  the  usual  method 
of  allegory,  fable,  and  simile.  I  could  wish  that  the  language, 
opinions,  and  customs  of  common  life,  were  more  frequently 
regarded  in  the  interpretation  of  ancient  authors. 

If  it  be  true,  that  whatever  pertains  to  the  art  of  expression 
is  drawn  from  the  observation  of  nature  and  common  lifej 
how  shall  we  judge  that  we  have  learned^  not  the  mere  opin* 
ions  and  speculations  of  others  about  language,  but  the  real 
art  of  language  which  agrees  with  the  practice  of  common 
life,  unless  we  compare  what  we  have  learned  with  the  results 
of  common  and  every  day's  experience  ?  If  it  be  true  that 
any  book  is  simply  the  language  of  the  author  as  it  were  ad* 
dressed  to  us,  can  we  persuade  ourselves  that  we  have  attain- 
ed the  sense  of  it,  if  when  we  read  it  we  construe  every  thing 
in  a  different  manner  from  what  we  should  had  we  heard  it 
spoken  ;  if  we  understand  language  against  all  the  usages  of 
common  life ;  if  we  seek  in  the  very  syllables  of  a  writer 
mountains  of  sense  which  no  one  in  the  language  of  common 
life  looks  for  or  suspects  ?  Can  we  attain  the  right  sense,  if 
we  deny  to  an  author  the  right  of  being  reasonably  construed^ 
a  right  not  to  have  his  words  urged  beyond  their  proper 
bounds  ?  This  is  a  thing  we  always  concede  in  conversation ; 
and  it  is,  indeed,  a  fundamental  rule  of  explaining  language  that 
is  spoken.  Shall  we  suppose  an  author  to  have  written  mere* 
ly  to  afford  us  an  occasion  of  indulging  our  ingenuity,  and 
while  he  walks  upon  the  earth  shall  we  mount  ourselves  upon 
the  clouds  ?  Only  think  how  many  errors,  phantasies,  and 
difficulties  have  been  introduced  by  those,  for  example,  who 
have  commented  on  the  ancient  poets,  and  setting  nature  at 


120  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

defiance  as  exhibited  in  common  life,  have  undertaken  to  in- 
terpret from  their  own  fancy !  How  much  grave  wisdom  has 
been  obtruded  upon  Homer  against  his  will,  where  his  words 
breathed  simple  nature  and  common  life  !  Think  with  what 
anxiety  of  mind  many  have  handled  the  sacred  writings, 
while  they  seemed  to  forget,  that  although  the  authors  were 
inspired  yet  they  were  men  that  used  human  language,  and 
so  wrote  it  that  others  for  whom  it  was  designed  could  under- 
stand it  in  the  usual  way,  that  is  by  the  application  to  it  of 
their  knowledge  of  the  idiom  in  which  it  was  composed.  It 
may  happen,  indeed,  that  pursuing  this  plain  beaten  path  we 
may  seem  to  be  unlearned,  because  we  do  not  profess  to 
know  all  which  others  think  they  know  ;  but  we  shall  be  more 
than  compensated  by  the  abundant  satisfaction  of  having  every 
thing  around  us,  all  that  common  life  comprises,  testifying  in 
our  favour,  and  that  the  meaning  of  language  must  be  scan- 
ned by  the  rules  which  we  have  brought  to  view.  Some 
perhaps  may  think  too,  that  we  do  not  exhibit  much  modesty 
or  diffidence  in  regard  to  the  sacred  books,  and  that  we  are  . 
too  liberal  and  studious  of  neology.  Still  our  satisfaction  will 
be  very  great,  if  the  reasons  of  our  interpretation  depend  on 
precepts  drawn  from  common  life  and  usage,  which  carry 
along  with  them  a  convincing  weight  of  evidence  in  their 
favour,  and  are  not  repugnant  to  the  nature  and  genius  of  all 
languages.  Such  incongruous  principles  Turretine  has  very 
ably  refuted,  in  his  book  de  Sac.  Script.  Interpretatione.  I 
do  not  mean  to  say  that  acuteness  or  subtilty  in  philology  is 
to  be  neglected.  By  no  means ;  for  without  these  no  doc- 
trine can  be  well  understood.  He  who  heaps  together  much, 
is  not  therefore  a  learned  man  ;  but  he  who  arranges,  defines, 
fortifies  with  arguments.  Who  would  be  satisfied  with  being 
deprived  of  all  the  advantages  of  subtilty  or  nice  discrimina- 
tion, which  enables  us  more  certainly,  briefly,  clearly,  and 
orderly,  to  learn  any  thing  ?     But  when  we  have  so  learned  it, 


GENERAL  RULES  OF  CRITICISM.  121 

all  is  to  be  brought  to  the  test  of  common  life,  so  that  it  may 
appear  what  we  have  learned  for  ourselves,  what  for  others  ; 
what  for  the  schools,  and  what  for  every  day's  use. 

[As  related  to  the  general  subject  of  translating  ,  and  specially  of 
translating  the  New  Testament,  the  reader  will  not  fail  to  compare 
with  the  above  remarks,  Campbell's  excellent  observations  comprised 
in  the  Preliminary  Dissertations  to  his  Translation,  of  the  Gospels, 
Diss.  11.  Vlli.  X.]  M^j  TA)  v<i  hiino*f 


om'momt&i  x'Ml  ttoikf- 


fH3fjd.  .jit^cl^u  ->::<-.  PART  IV. 

il'  'I-:/  Ofto  Qii 

GENERAL    RULES    OF   CRITICISM   IN    RESPECT   TO   THE    NEW 
TESTAMENT. 

eitfinpg  p.i;  «n*  m  «i  ^.i  . >«■; 

[Translated  from  Beckii  IVtonogrammata  Hermeneutices  Librornm 
Nov.  Testamenti,  edit.  1803,  Lipsiae,  Sectio  111.  pp.  117,  etc.] 

§  1.  Criticism  is  divided  into  lower  and  higher,  terms  not 
altogether  adapted  to  express  a  proper  division  of  it ;  each  of 
which  is  again  subdivided  into  grammatico-historical  and  con- 
jectural. 

^  2.  The  authenticity  of  a  book,  the  genuineness  of  a  pas- 
sage, and  the  goodness  of  a  particular  reading,  are  establish- 
ed by  arguments  external  and  internal.  The  latter  kind  of 
arguments  is  deduced  from  the  nature  of  things  treated  of, 
the  sentiments,  and  the  language. 


§  3.  Lower  or  verbal  criticism  is  regulated  by  the  follow- 
ing general  principles ;  viz.  that  reading  is  preferable,  re- 
specting which  it  may  be  probably  shewn  that  it  bears  the 
stamp  of  the  author,  and  from  which  it  may  appear  that  all 
the  varieties  of  reading  have  proceeded.  Hence  all  the 
errors  of  copyists  should  be  noted  ;   as  they  often  furnish 

11 


122  GENERAL  RULES  OF  CRITICISM 

means  of  finding  out  the  true  reading  and  the  origin  of  various 
readings. 

§  4.  Common  laics  of  lower  criticism  ivhich  apply  to  hooks 
in  general  whether  sacred  or  profane. 

1.  That  reading  is  to  be  regarded  as  true,  which  is  sup- 
ported by  far  the  greater  number  of  copies  and  witnesses. 

But  still,  readings  supported  by  a  few  books  are  not  en- 
tirely to  be  disregarded  ;  [specially  when  they  harmonize 
with  the  usus  loquendi  of  the  author.] 

2.  That  reading  which  the  better  copies  exhibit,  unless 
special  reasons  prohibit  it,  is  to  be  prefered  to  the  one  which 
the  poorer  copies  exhibit,  although  most  numerous.  What 
copies  are  of  the  better  kind,  is  a  question  to  be  discussed  in 
another  place,  where  inquiry  is  made  respecting  the  genius 
of  the  Ni  Testament  writings.  Neither  the  antiquity  nor  pro- 
priety of  a  reading,  solely  considered,  always  proves  it  to  be 
a  true  one ;  [unless  the  antiquity  should  extend  back  to  the 
autograph,  or  the  propriety  should  be  shewn  to  be  exclusive.] 

3.  That  reading  which  is  more  harsh,  obscure,  difficult, 
unusual,  or  delicately  chosen,  if  supported  by  the  authority 
of  a  proper  witness,  is  preferable  to  one  which  is  plain,  easy, 
usual,  and  common.  Difficulty  sometimes  exists  in  respect 
to  a  whole  passage  and  its  connection  ;  sometimes  in  regard 
to  the  ambiguity  of  particular  words  and  phrases  ;  sometimes 
in  respect  to  the  grammatical  forms,  historical  and  doctrinal 
passages,  etc.     But, 

4.  That  reading  which  approaches  nearest  to  the  popular 
and  familiar  method  of  speaking,  if  it  be  supported  by  exter- 
nal testimonies,  is  preferable  to  one  more  artificial  and  subtile. 

5.  The  shorter  reading,  when  supported  by  testimony  of 
importance,  and  not  incongruous  with  the  style  and  design  of 
the  writer,  is  preferable  to  a  more  verbose  one.  Still  there 
are  cases  where  the  more  copious  reading  is  to  be  preferred. 


IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  123 

6.  That  reading  which  gives  the  best  sense  is  peculiarly 
preferable.  But  to  determine  this,  the  nature  of  the  whole 
passage,  the  genius  of  the  writer,  and  not  the  mere  opinions 
and  sentiments  of  particular  interpreters,  are  to  be  consulted. 

7.  The  reading  which  produces  a  worthless  or  an  incon- 
gruous sense  is  to  be  rejected.  Good  care  however  must  be 
taken  not  to  condemn  a  reading  as  worthless  or  incongruous, 
which  a  more  correct  grammatical  and  historical  investiga- 
tion would  prove  to  be  a  true  reading,  or  at  least  a  probable 
one. 

8.  A  reading  which  agrees  with  the  usus  loquendi  of  the 
writer,  is  preferable  to  that  which  disagrees  with  it.  It  must 
be  remembered  in  judging  here,  that  the  style  of  an  author 
sometimes  varies  with  increasing  age. 

9.  A  reading  is  to  be  rejected,  in  respect  to  which  plain 
evidence  is  found  that  has  undergone  a  designed  alteration. 
Such  alteration  may  have  taken  place,  (1)  From  doctrinal 
reasons.  (2)  From  moral  and  practical  reasons.  (3)  From 
historical  and  geographical  doubts ;  Malt.  8:  28,  comp.  Mark 
5:  1.  (4)  From  the  desire  of  reconciling  passages  apparently 
inconsistent  with  each  other.  (5)  From  desire  to  make  the 
discourse  more  intensive.  Hence  may  emphatic  readings 
have  originated.  (6)  From  the  comparison  of  many  manu- 
scripts the  readings  of  which  have  been  amalgamated.  (7) 
From  a  comparison  of  parallel  passages. 

Corrections  of  the  more  celebrated  manuscripts  have  been 
sometimes  detected. 

10.  Various  readings  are  to  be  rejected,  which  spring  from 
the  mere  negligence  of  copyists,  and  from  those  errors  which 
are  very  common  to  all  kinds  of  books.  To  these  belong, 
(1)  The  commutation  of  forms  in  the  Macedonico- Alexan- 
drine dialect,  and  also  other  unusual  forms,  for  those  of  the 
common  dialect.  The  Alexandrine  and  common  form,  how- 
ever, have  the  preference  over  others  in  the  New  Testament ; 


124  .,,    GENERAL  RULES  OF  CRITICISM 

and  the  Alexandrine  dialect  itself  also  admitted  some  Attic 
forms.  (2)  The  commutation  of  single  letters  and  syllables, 
by  an  error  of  either  the  eye  or  the  ear ;  the  former  resulting 
from  obscure  and  compendious  methods  of  writing,  [the  latter, 
from  copying  after  the  reading  of  one  who  was  misunder- 
stood or  who  read  erroneously].  (3)  The  commutation  of 
synonymes.  (4)  From  transferring  into  the  text  words  writ- 
ten in  the  margin  of  copies,  and  thus  uniting  both  readings, 
James  5:  2.  (5)  From  the  omission  of  a  word  or  a  verse, 
by  an  error  of  the  sight.  (6)  From  the  transposition  of 
words  and  passages  ;  whence  it  may  have  happened  that 
some  error  has  crept  into  most  of  our  books.  (7)  From 
words  which  ended  with  the  Hke  sound,  or  appeared  alike  ; 
and  from  proximate  words,  one  ending  and  the  other  begin- 
ning with  the  same  syllable.  (8)  From  incorrectly  unhing 
or  separating  words  ;  which  naturally  resulted,  in  some  cases, 
from  the  ancient  method  of  continuous  writing.  (9)  From 
an  erroneous  interpunction  and  distinction  of  passages. 

11.  A  reading  is  to  be  rejected  which  plainly  betrays  a 
gloss  or  interpretation.  This  may  be  a  word,  or  a  whole  pas- 
sage. Sometimes  these  glosses  are  united  to  the  true  text, 
and  sometimes  they  have  thrust  it  out.  Not  all  interpreta- 
tions however  are  spurious  glosses  ;  [for  authors  themselves 
sometimes  add  them,  in  order  to  explain  their  own  language.] 

12.  Readings  deduced  from  versions  or  the  commentaries 
of  interpreters  are  to  be  rejected.  In  judging  of  them,  how- 
ever, great  prudence  and  much  skill  is  necessary. 

[The  maxims  thus  far  are  comprised  within  the  province  of  lower 
criticism.  But  higher  criticism  may  be  and  ought  to  be  employed, 
in  order  to  assist  in  forming  a  judgment  of  the  genuineness  of  many 
passages.  Here  follows,  from  the  same  writer,  a  synopsis  of  the 
•principles  of  higher  criticism.] 

•  §  5.  Laws  of  higher  criticism  respecting  the  establishment 
-of  a  pure  text. 

1.  The  sentiment,  declaration,  passage,  book,  or  part  of  a 


IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  125 

book  of  any  author,  which  on  account  of  its  nature,  form, 
method,  subject,  or  arguments,  does  not  appear  to  have  origi- 
nated from  him,  is  either  spurious,  or  at  least  very  much  to 
be  suspected. 

Imitations  of  authors  made  with  design,  or  for  the  sake  of 
practice  in  writing,  or  from  other  reasons,  may  easily  be  as- 
cribed to  the  authors  themselves,  though  they  are  supposi-  ^ 
titious. 

2.  A  passage  which  manifestly  disagrees  with  the  nature 
and  connection  of  the  context,  and  interrupts  it,  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  spurious. 

3.  A  passage  which  belongs  in  another  place  either  in  the 
same  words  or  with  little  variation,  and  seems  to  be  more 
properly  and  commodiously  placed  there,  may  be  suspected 
of  having  been  transferred  to  the  place  where  it  stands  with 
less  propriety,  and  may  be  removed  from  thence. 

But  here  great  care  is  requisite  lest  we  judge  rashly  or 
form  our  opinion  rather  from  the  taste  and  style  of  the  present 
day  than  from  the  genius  of  the  author,  his  design  and  style, 
or  the  subject  and  argument  of  the  discourse.  As  an  exam- 
ple, one  might  appeal  to  the  disputations  about  the  Apocalypse, 
and  to  the  appendix  of  John's  Gospel  in  chap.  xxi. 

4.  Passages  which  are  manifestly  interpolated,  by  the  com- 
ments of  interpreters  or  from  any  other  cause,  are  to  be  re- 
jected from  the  text. 

But  great  caution  is  necessary  here  to  judge  rightly.  In 
general,  internal  arguments  alone  are  not  to  be  relied  on  as 
sufficient  evidence. 

5.  Parts  of  books  which  appear  incoherent,  and  yet  clearly 
exhibit  the  genius  and  style  of  the  author,  may  be  reduced  to 
better  order  by  separation,  and  making  a  different  arrange- 
ment.    [Great  caution  here  too  is  necessary.] 

6.  If  numerous  and  very  diverse  readings  of  a  book  are 
found  in  the  best  copies,  we  may  conclude,  either  that  the 

11* 


^iJiS  .  GENEKAL  RULES  OF  CRITICISM 

book  has  gradually  received  various  accessions,  or  has  been 
re-published  by  a  later  hand,  or  has  been  edited  a  second 
time  by  the  author  and  corrected,  so  as  to  give  occasion  for 
the  introduction  of  such  various  readings. 

§  6.  Laws  proper  to  guide  our  judgement  in  respect  to  the 
true  reading  of  passages  in  the  New  Testament,  spurious  ad- 
ditions, the  books  themselves,  or  the  authors  of  them,  may  be 
deduced  from  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  things  described,  and 
the  style  of  the  books.  They  may  also  be  deduced  from  the 
nature  of  the  sources  whence  the  various  readings  come,  and 
from  the  testimony  of  witnesses.     Such  are  the  following : 

1.  Passages  are  to  be  regarded  as  spurious,  at  least  are  to 
be  suspected  (if  any  such  there  are),  which  disagree  with  the 
nature  of  the  Christian  religion,  the  history  of  it,  or  the  mode 
of  teaching  and  deciding  appropriate  to  any  sacred  writer  ;  or 
if  they  appear  trifling,  inapt,  or  jejune,  when  compared  with 
the  force  of  the  doctrine  exhibited,  or  the  gravity  of  the  au- 
thor who  exhibits  it.  Specially  are  they  to  be  suspected,  if 
historical  reasons  concur  to  render  them  suspicious. 

The  importance  of  subjects,  the  force  of  precept  and  nar- 
rations, and  other  things  of  this  nature,  are  to  be  estimated  by 
the  manner,  judgment,  and  usage  of  those  times  in  which  the 
books  were  written.  In  judging  of  doctrines,  special  caution 
is  to  be  used. 

We  must  be  watchful  against  the  pious  frauds  (as  they  are 
called)  of  ancient  churches,  committed  in  the  interpolation  of 
books,  and  in  giving  new  forms  to  passages  of  them.  The 
special  causes  of  interpolations  were  tradition,  apocryphal 
writings,  the  desire  of  explaining,  augmenting,  correcting,  etc. 
On  the  other  hand,  some  passages  were  eje^cted  as  spurious, 
which  seemed  to  be  unworthy  of  the  authors  of  them.  E.  g. 
Luke  22:  43,  vide  Paulus's  Commentary,  p.  613. 

2.  In  general,  the  reading  which  savours  of    Hebraism 


IN  EESPECT  TO  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  127 

or  Syro-Chaidaism,  is  preferable  to  that  which  savours  of 
classical  Greek.     [CcBteris paribus,  it  is  always  preferable.] 

Some  of  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament,  however,  as 
Paul  and  Luke,  approach  nearer  to  the  Greek  style. 

The  conjecture  of  some  critics,  that  the  books  of  the 
New  Testament  were  originally  written,  for  the  most  part, 
in  Syro-Chaldaic,  and  afterwards  were  translated  into  Greek 
by  an  interpreter  who  has  committed  many  errors,  can  at  most 
be  extended  to  but  very  few  books.     [To  none,  as  I  believe.] 

3.  Since  the  New  Testament  was  commonly  used  both  in 
public  and  private,  and  certain  parts  of  it  were  selected  for 
ecclesiastical  use,  inquiry  must  be  made  whether  any  portion 
of  it  has  been  interpolated,  either  from  the  parallel  passages 
of  the  Old  Testament,  or  from  the  Church  Lectionaries. 

4.  As  many  copies,  versions,  and  fathers  of  the  ancient 
Churches,  are  found  nearly  always  to  have  followed  the  same 
text,  those  which  belong  to  the  same  class  are  not  to  be  sep- 
arately numbered,  but  rather  to  be  regarded  as  standing  in 
the  place  of  one  witness.  Still  less  are  we  to  trust  solely  to 
any  one  copy,  however  ancient,  critical^  or  carefully  written. 
Nor  is  any  copy,  which  may  be  erroneously  written,  or  recent, 
or  occasionally  interpolated,  to  be  rejected  as  altogether  use- 
less. 

5.  In  respect  to  any  reading,  the  first  inquiry  is  :  To  what 
recension  or  edition  does  it  belong  ? 

The  age  and  country  of  copies  and  readings  are  to  be  ex- 
amined by  careful  comparison. 

No  copy  extant  is  perfectly  free  from  error  in  all  the  books, 
or  uniformly  follows  any  one  uncorrupted  recension.  We 
must  judge,  therefore,  from  the  consent  of  many  things  of  the 
same  kind,  and  from  internal  evidence,  what  recension  is 
followed,  either  generally,  or  in  particular  passages.  Some 
copies  are  thought  to  follow  various  recensions  in  particular 
parts.    A  few  copies  of  the  most  ancient  classes  of  manu- 


128  GENERAL  RULES  OF  CRITICISM 

scripts  are  extant,  but  the  majority  of  copies  are  more  mod- 
ern. If  an  ancient  copy  has  been  propagated  through  many 
editions,  it  may  have  been  exposed  to  vary  from  the  ancient 
recension,  or  have  been  corrupted  by  new  errors  of  the  copy- 
ist, more  than  if  a  recent  copy  were  directly  taken  from  the 
ancient  one. 

6.  That  reading  in  which  all  the  recensions  of  the  best 
copies  agree,  is  the  most  correct,  certainly  the  most  ancient. 
Slight  deviations  are  unimportant. 

7.  Readings  supported  by  the  authority  of  the  most  ancient 
classes  of  manuscripts,  and  of  the  more  credible  witnesses, 
are  to  be  preferred  to  others.  But  a  regard  must  be  had  to 
the  internal  goodness  of  a  copy. 

8.  The  Alexandrine  class  of  manuscripts  is  sometimes  pre- 
ferable to  the  occidental,  and  sometimes  of  less  authority.  In 
the  conflicting  claims  of  various  classes,  special  regard  must 
be  had  to  historical  and  internal  means  which  enable  us  to 
judge  of  a  reading. 

9.  Manuscripts  are  of  the  highest  authority  ;  but  neither  the 
ancient  versions,  nor  the  exegetical  and  other  books  of  the 
fathers  are  to  be  neglected. 

10.  In  collecting  and  judging  of  the  ancient  versions,  (1) 
Regard  must  be  had  to  those  made  directly  from  the  Greek. 
Among  these,  the  Latin,  Syriac,  and  Gothic  deserve  special 
mention.  (2)  We  must  use  a  correct  text  of  these  Versions. 
(3)  We  must  inquire  whether  the  translator  has  rendered 
literally  or  ad  sefisum ;  whether  the  errors  in  the  version 
arise  from  the  fault  of  the  translator's  copy,  or  from  other 
causes ;  and  finally  whether  the  version  has  been  corrected 
or  not.  (4)  Those  versions,  which  from  comparison  are 
found  to  belong  to  the  same  family  of  manuscripts,  are  to  be 
regarded  as  standing  in  the  place  of  one  ancient  witness. 
(5)  No  reading  derived  merely  from  versions,  and  destitute 
of  other  support,  can  be  received ;  but  the  consent  of  all  the 


IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  129 

ancient  versions  and  fathers  in  a  particular  reading,  which 
^varies  from  that  of  manuscripts,  renders  the  latter  suspicious. 
',  11.  In  regard  to  the  readings  derived  from  the  writers  be- 
longing to  the  ancient  churches,  we  must  see,  (1)  That  they 
are  drawn  from  a  correct  and  not  a  corrupt  edition  of  the 
fathers.  (2)  We  must  diligently  consider  the  authors,  their 
descent,  age,  erudition,  subtilty  of  judging,  temerity  in  emen- 
dation, the  nature  of  the  copies  which  they  used,  and  the 
creed  of  the  churches  to  which  they  belonged.  (3)  We  must 
consider  in  what  kind  of  book  or  passage  of  ecclesiastical 
writers,  various  readings  are  found.  (4)  Inquiry  must  be 
made,  whether  the  variations  are  supported  by  real  and  direct 
testimony  of  the  fathers ;  or  whether  changes  were  occasion- 
ed in  the  text  by  lapse  of  memory,  or  a  designed  accommo- 
dation ;  or  whether  merely  opinions  or  conjectures  are  pro- 
posed. It  seems  to  be  very  unjust,  to  ascribe  all  the  variety 
found  in  the  ecclesiastical  fathers  either  to  error  of  the  mem- 
ory, or  to  temerity  in  accommodation,  or  a  fondness  for 
emendation.  (5)  The  omission  of  some  passage  in  the  com- 
mentaries of  the  fathers,  does  not  always  show  that  it  was 
wanting  in  the  copy  which  the  writer  had.  Silence  however 
concerning  an  important  passage,  renders  it  suspicious. 

12.  The  fragments  of  heretical  writings  are  not  to  be  over- 
looked, in  the  search  for  various  readings;  for  the  supposi- 
tion is  rash,  that  they  generally  corrupted  the  text  of  all  parts 
of  the  sacred  writings. 

13.  That  interpunction  and  distinction  of  verses  and  chap- 
ters, which  is  most  consonant  with  the  argument,  sentiments, 
connection  of  discourse,  and  usus  loquendi^  of  the  sacred  wri- 
ters, is  to  be  regarded  as  the  best. 

§  7.  In  the  criticism  of  all  ancient  books  it  is  well  under- 
stood, that  particular  readings  are  not  required  to  be  establish- 
ed by  most  certain  and  irrefragable  arguments,  but  only  that 


130  ON  THE  QUALIFICATIONS 

a  probability  be  shown  that  they  approximate,  at  least,  very 
near  to  the  original  readings  ;  and  the  judgment  is  to  be  made 
up,  in  view  of  what  appears  to  be  most  probable.  So  in  re- 
spect to  the  New  Testament ;  no  more  should  be  required 
than  can,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  performed.  Every 
thing  on  all  sides  should  be  considered,  before  the  judgment 
is  made  up.  And  if,  in  judging  of  the  text  of  profane  au- 
thors, gravity  and  modesty  are  rightly  commended  ;  surely 
in  judging  of  the  sacred  books,  we  ought  most  scrupulously 
to  abstain  from  all  rashness  and  levity,  as  well  as  from  all 
favoritism  and  superstition. 


PART  V. 
CHAPTER  I. 


ON  THE  QUALIFICATIONS  OF  AN  INTERPRETER. 

[The  following  chapter  is  extracted  from  Keil's  Elemcnta  Herme- 
neutices,  translated  from  the  original  German  into  Latin  by  C.  A.  (Jr. 
Emmeriing,  and  published  at  Leipsick  in  1811.  Although  it  con- 
tains several  things  that  seem  to  be  a  repetition  of  the  ideas  advanced 
in  various  places  by  Err.csti,  as  exhibited  in  the  foregoing  pages; 
yet  as  the  object  is  to  describe  the  qvalifications  of  the  interpreter  him- 
self in  respect  to  hwwledge,  and  as  it  is  a  very  brief  and  well  digested 
summary,  it  appears  desirable  that  the  student,  who  aspires  to  the 
place  of  an  interpreter,  should  liave  the  qualifications  of  one  definitely 
and  separately  described,  as  here,  in  order  that  he  may  direct  his 
special  attention  to  this  subject,  unembarrassed  by  other  considera- 
tions. 

1  take  it  for  granted  here,  that  the  student  of  the  sacred  books, 
who  designs  to  enter  upon  the  duties  of  the  ministry,  feels  himself 
attracted  to  this  work  by  motives  of  sincere  piety  and  benevolence. 
It  is  a  bondage  worse  than  Egyptian,  to  be  compelled  to  the  perform- 
ance of  pastoral  duties  by  a  mere  sense  of  official  obligation.  A 
man  of  this  cast  must  be  very  stupid  in  order  that  he  should  not  be 
very  miserable.  When  the  blind  lead  the  blind,  woe  to  both  !  The 
last  thing  that  I  could  commend  to  a  man  who  is  not  truly  pious, 
Would  be  the  work  of  the  ministry.     But  supposing  him  to  possess 


OF  AN  INTERPRETER.  131 

sincere  piety  and  good  common  sense,  then  the  precepts  which  fol- 
low may  aid  him  in  the  acquisition  of  useful  knowledge.] 

§  1.  He  who  desires  to  understand  and  interpret  the  books 
of  the  New  Testament,  must,  first  qfall,  acquire  some  histor- 
ic knowledge  of  the  author  of  each  book  ;  of  the  state  of  things 
existing  when  it  was  written  ;  of  the  body  or  collection  of  the 
New  Testament  books  ;  of  the  particular  history  of  its  ancient 
versions,  editions,  and  parts  in  which  it  was  written  ;  and 
other  things  of  this  nature.  To  this  must  be  added  a  know!-' 
edge  of  the  principles  of  criticism,  in  respect  to  the  text  of  the 
New  Testament. 

Books  to  be  read  for  information  on  these  topics  :  Marsh's  trans- 
lation of  Michaelis's  Introduction  to  the  N.  Test. ;  and  various  other    ^^ 
Introductions  more  recently  published.  '' 

<J  2.  Of  the  second  kind  of  knowledge,  preparatory  to  the 
understanding  and  interpretation  of  the  N.  Testament. 

(1)  The  interpreter  must  understand  the  language  in  which 
the  hooks  are  written.  As  the  diction  is  not  pure  classic 
Greek,  but  the  Hebrew  idiom  here  and  there  intermixed  with 
classic  Greek,  and  as  vestiges  of  the  Chaldee,  Syriac,  Eab- 
binic  and  Latin  languages  occur ;  it  follows,  of  course,  that 
the  interpreter  should  not  only  be  acquainted  with  pure  Greek, 
but  with  its  various  dialects,  specially  the  Alexandrine.  Above 
all,  he  ought  to  be  well  versed  in  the  Hebrew,  Chaldee^ 
Syriac,  Rabbinic,  and  Latin  idioms. 

Vorstius  de  Hebraismis  N.  Test,  cura  Fischeri,  1778.  Leusden  de 
Dialectis  N.  Test.  edit.  Fischeri,  1792.  Mattaire  de  Dialectis  Ling. 
Graecae.  Sturtzde  DialecitoMacedonica  et  Alexandrina,  1808.  Ffann- 
kuche  Ueber  die  Palaestinische  Landessprache  in  dem  Zeitalter 
Christi,  im  Eichhorn^s  allgemeine  Bibliothek  B.  viii.  s.  365,  seq., 
—translated  in  the  Bib.  Repositoryi    *   V^   <- 

■  ,i  (2)  The  interpreter  must  possess  a  knowledge  of  the  things 
Respecting  which  the  hooks  treat.  These  are  partly  histori- 
cal, and  partly  doctrinal.  The  explanation  of  them  must 
be  sought,  primarily,  from  the  books  themselves  ;  and  second* 


lld^  ON  THE  QUALIFICATIONS 

arily,  from  those  writings  of  more  recent  authors,  which  may 
be  subsidiary  to  the  attainment  of  this  knowledge. 

(^  3.  As  to  the  historic  matter  of  these  looks.  Ii  is  of  great 
importance  to  the  interpreter  to  be  well  versed  in  sacred  geo- 
graphy, chronology,  civil  history,  and  archaeology ;  i.  e.  to 
understand  those  things  which  respect  the  situation  and  cli- 
mate of  the  countries,  where  the  events  referred  to  happened  ; 
as  well  as  those  which  serve  to  define  the  times  when  they 
happened  ;  and  also  the  history  of  the  nation  among  whom 
they  took  place,  and  of  other  nations  mentioned  in  this  his- 
tory, with  their  condition,  manners,  and  customs. 

(1)  Geographical  knowledge.  The  geography  of  Pales- 
tine and  the  neighbouring  countries  should  be  well  understood 
(a),  as  also  their  natural  productions  {h).  To  this  must  be 
added  a  knowledge  of  many  countries  in  Asia,  and  of  some 
in  Europe  ;  also  the  Roman  empire,  as  it  then  existed,  di- 
vided into  provinces. 

(a)  Well's  Sacred  Geography.  Relandi  Palaestina.  Bachiene' 
h-istor.  und  geograph.  Beschreibung  von  Palaestina,  Tom.  vii.  8vo. 
1766.  Hamelsfeldt,  biblische  Geographie,  3  Theile.  1796.  Specially 
Bellerman's  biblical  Geography,  and  (later  and  better  still)  that  of  Ro- 
senmueller.  Specially  Robinson  and  Smith's  Travels,  just  published. 

{b)  Celsii  Hierobotanicon,  1745.  Bocharti  Hierozoicon,  edit.  Ros- 
enmueller,  1776.  Tom.  iii.  Supp.  to  Calmet's  Dictionary,  Vols,  iii — 
v.  Harmer's  Observations  edited  by  A.  Clarke.  Bush's  Conipend, 
Bratt.  Vt.  1836. 

(2)  Chronology.  The  interpreter  should  have  not  only  a 
knowledge  of  technical  chronology,  but  of  the  Roman  mode 
of  reckoning  ad  TJrhe  condita,  and  of  the  Greek  Olympiads, 
(on  which  subjects  he  may  study  authors  well  deserving  of 
credit) ;  but  in  respect  to  historical  chronology,  he  should 
know  in  what  order  of  time  the  events  related  in  the  Old  Tes- 
menl  happened ;  when  and  where  the  first  Roman  emperors, 
the  various  kings  and  princes  that  sprung  from  the  house  of 
Herod  the  Great,  the  Roman  Consuls  at  the  beginning  of  the 
empire  of  the  Caesars,  the  Jewish  high  priests  (and  the  num- 


OF  AN  INTERPRETER.  133 

ber  of  them)  in  our  Saviour's  time,  and  the  Roman  Magis- 
trates, specially  in  the  provinces  of  Syria  and  Judea,  succeed- 
ed each  other. 

Petavii  Opus  de  Doctrina,Temporum,  1703.  Scaliger  de  Emenda- 
tione  Teinporum,  1629.  Usherii  Annales  Vet.  et.  N.  Test.  Franckii 
Novum  Systema  Chronol.  fundamentalis,  1.  Goetting.  1778.  A  useful 
compend  is  Hegewisch's  Introduction  to  historical  chronology,  re- 
cently translated  from  the  German  by  Prof.  Marsh  of  Burlington  Uni- 
versity, and  published  in  this  country.  A  work  much  used  in  Ger- 
many, is  Gatterer's  Abriss  dt?r  Chronologie,  1777. 

(3)  History  civil  and  political.  In  regard  to  the  history 
of  events  among  the  nations  mentioned  in  the  sacred  books, 
and  also  their  forms  of  government,  it  is  important  for  the  in- 
terpreter to  make  himself  acquainted,  first,  with  the  ancient 
history  of  the  Jews.  In  studying  this,  he  is  not  to  confine 
himself  merely  to  the  Old  Testament ;  he  must  also  consult 
the  traditionary  accounts,  which  were  extant  in  the  time  of 
Christ  and  the  apostles  (a).  Secondly,  he  must  study  the  his- 
tory of  the  Jews  under  the  Herods,  and  that  of  these  princes. 
Thirdly,  the  condition  and  circumstances  of  the  Jews  in  Pal- 
estine, while  under  the  dominion  of  the  Romans  ;  and  also  of 
the  Jews  living  in  other  countries.  Finally,  the  history  of  the 
Roman  emperors  at  that  period,  and  of  the  Roman  prefects 
over  the  Asiatic  provinces. 

(a)  Shuckford's  Connection.  Prideaux's  Connection.  Krebsius, 
Decreta  Romanorum  pro  Judaeis  e  Josepho  collecta,  1  vol.  8vo. 
1763.  Wesselingii  Diatribe  de  Judaeorum  Archontibus,  1  vol.  8vo. 
1738.  Benson's  History  of  the  first  planting  of  the  Ciiristian  religion. 
Josephi  Opera,  edit.  Havercampii.  Jahn,  Geschichte  der  Juden  in 
Archaeologie  der  Hebraer,  Band  1.  Jahn's  Archaeology,  and  his  his- 
toryof  the  Hebrew  Commonwealth,  have  been  translated  by  Professors 
Upham  and  Stowe,  and  repeatedly  published  at  the  press  in  Andover. 
They  are  the  most  useful  books  that  we  have  on  these  subjects.  < 

(4)  Manners  and  customs.  In  regard  to  these,  (a)  A  know- 
ledge of  Antiquities  in  general  is  necessary.  (^)  A  consider- 
able knowledge  of  the  Greek  and  Roman  antiquities,  (c)  A 
knowledge  of  the  ecclesiastical  rites  and  customs  of  the  primitive 
churches  ;  both  those  which  they  received  from  the  Hebrews, 
and  others  which  were  introduced  by  Christians  themselves, 

12 


134  ON  THE  QUALIFICATIONS 

Opera  Philonia  Alex.,  et  Josephi.  Warnekros  Entwurf  der  HeK 
Alterthuerner,  1  vol.  8vo.  Jahn's  Archaeology  translated  by  the 
Rev.  Prof,  Upham  ;  a  work,  which  combines  brevity  with  perspicui- 
ty and  good  order,  and  comprizes  the  substance  of  preceding  publi- 
cations on  this  interesting  subject. 

Of  Roman  antiquities,  Adams's  work  is  a  very  useful  compend  ^ 
and  of  the  Greek,  Potter  remains  not  only  the  best,  but  almost  the 
only  respectable  one.  Of  eccles.  antiquities,  Bingham's  Orig.  Ecc. 
Also  Roessler,  Bibliothek  der  Kirchenvaetern ;  especially  a  more  re- 
cent work  by  Augusti,  entitled  DenkwUrdigkeiten,  etc.  Coleman's 
Abridgment  of  Augusti. 

§  4.  Doctrinal  contents  of  the  sacred  books.  That  part  of 
the  New  Testament,  which  is  directly  concerned  with  faith 
and  practice,  will  be  rightly  understood,  when  the  interpreter 
rightly  understands  what  each  particular  writer  has  inculca- 
ted. As  there  are  many  passages  which  relate  to  the  Jews ; 
and  as  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament  and  their  first  read* 
ers  were  of  Jewish  extraction,  it  will  be  important, 

(1)  To  know  the  sentiments  of  the  Jews  of  that  period  in 
regard  to  religion  ;  specially  of  those  who  used  the  Hebrew- 
Greek  dialect,  and  of  the  three  great  sects  among  which  the 
Jews  were  divided,  viz.  the  Pharisees,  Sadducees,and  Essenes* 

Josephi  et  Philonis  Scripta.  An  admirable  view  of  Philo's  senti- 
ments has  been  published  by  Schreiter,  in  Analekten  der  exeget. 
Theologie,  Band  i.  ii.  Fabricii  Codex  Pseudepigraphus  Vet.  Test,  et 
Codex  Apocryphus  Nov.  Test.  Grabii  Spicilegium  Sanctt.  Patrum, 
saec.  i.  ii.  iii.  2  vols.  8vo.  On  the  right  use  of  these  sources,  see 
Mori  Hermeneut.  Vol.  ii.  p.  172.,  etc.  Brettschneider,  systemat. 
Darstellung  der  Dogmat.  und  Moral  der  Apocryph.  Schriften  des 
A.  Test.  1805.  Staeudlin,  Theologiae  Moralis  Ebraeorum  ante 
Christum  Historia,  1794.  De  tribus  Judaeorum  Sectis,  delph.  1703, 
4to.  comprizing  the  works  of  Serrarius,  Drusius,  and  Scaliger,  on 
this  subject.     See  also  Jahn,  as  above. 

(2)  The  precepts  of  the  Christian  religion.  What  was 
adopted  from  the  Jewish  religion,  what  rejected,  and  what 
was  added  anew  to  Christianity,  must  be  understood  in  order 
to  explain  the  New  Testament  properly.  But  knowledge  of 
this  nature,  that  is  certain,  can  be  drawn  only  from  the  sacred 
writings  themselves. 

The  Biblical  Theology  o^  Storr,  Reinhard,  Doederlein,  Zachariae, 
Leun,  Muntinghe,  (and  for  some  purposes,  of  Ammon  and  Bauer j) 


OF  AN  INTEBPRETER.  135 

may  be  used  with  profit.  But  the  student  is  not  to  be  guided  by 
any  system,  except  so  far  as  the  author  shews  it  to  be  built  upon  a 
satisfactory  interpretation  of  the  word  of  God.  Flatt's  edition  of 
Storr,  translated  into  German,  and  accompanied  by  the  notes  of  the 
editor,  is  a  fundamental  book  in  the  study  of  Biblical  Theology.  It 
has  been  translated  into  English  and  published,  by  the  lle°v.  Dr. 
Schmucker  of  Gettysburg  Theol.  Seminary  in  Pennsylvania. 

(3)  The  doctrines  of  heretical  sects.  It  is  important  to 
know  the  opinions  of  early  heretics,  because,  it  is  probable, 
some  passages  of  the  New  Testament  have  a  special  refer- 
ence to  them. 

By  far  the.bestbook  is  Walch'sEntwurf  einer  vollstaend.  Geschich- 
te  der  Ketzereien,  etc.  11  vols.  8vo.  Vol.  i.  contains  an  account  of 
the  earliest  heresies  Tittmanni  de  vestigiis  Gnosticorum  in  Nov. 
Test,  frustra  quaesitis,  will  well  repay  the  labour  of  perusal ;  but 
Horn's  Biblische  Gnosis,  and  the  Essays  of  Neander,  and  others, 
are  also  to  be  compared.  In  the  religious  and  critical  Periodicals  of 
Germany,  many  deeply  interesting  essays  on  various  heresies  and 
heretics  of  ancient  times,  have  of  late  years  been  published. 

§  5.  In  enumerating  the  qualifications  of  an  interpreter,  we 
must  not  omit  a  knowledge  of  grammar,  rhetoric,  and  phi- 
losophy. 

(1)  Grammar.  Not  only  a  general  knowledge  of  its  prin- 
ciples is  necessary,  but  also  a  special  technical  knowledge  of 
both  etymology  and  syntax.  The  interpreter  must  be  ac- 
quainted with  the  various  forms  of  words,  and  understand 
how  the  significations  are  connected  with  the  forms ;  he  must 
understand  the  manner  in  which  words  are  connected  in  a 
sentence  ;  the  use  of  the  particles  ;  and  also  of  the  grammati- 
cal figures,  as  they  are  called,  such  as  ellipsis  and  pleonasm. 

Vigcrus  de  idiotismis  Ling.  Graecae,  edit.  Hermann,  1812.  Hoog- 
eveen  Doctrina  partic.  Graec.  edit.  Schutz,  1806.  Bos  Ellipses 
Graecae  edit.  Schaefer,  1808.  Weiskii  Pleonasmi  Graeci,  1807. 
Hartung,  on  the  Greek  Particles. 

(2)  Rhetoric.  A  knowledge  of  this  is  necessary,  not  so 
much  to  judge  of  rhetorical  figures  as  to  find  out  the  meaning 
of  them,  or  the  sentiment  which  they  are  designed  to  convey. 

(3)  A  knowledge  of  philosophy.  Not  that  of  some  partic- 
ular school  or  sect  merely,  but  that  which  pertains  to  the  culti- 


136  Henderson's  bioral  qualifications 

vation  of  the  mental  powers,  and  to  nice  psychological  discrim- 
ination. Such  a  knowledge  is  requisite,  in  order  to  form  clear 
conceptions  in  the  mind,  and  accurately  to  define  our  ideas ;  to 
discern  what  is  similar  in  different  things,  and  what  is  distinct ; 
to  judge  of  the  connection  of  thought  and  argument ;  and 
finally,  to  qualify  one  perspicuously  to  represent  the  opinions 
of  an  author  to  others.  Great  caution  however  is  necessary 
here,  lest  the  interpreter  intrude  upon  his  author  his  own  par- 
ticular philosophy. 

Ernesti,  Opuscula  Philol.  de  vanitate  Philosopliantium,  etc. 


PART  VI, 


DR.  E.  HENDERSON, 

ON    THE    MORAL     QUALIFICATIONS    OF    AN    INTERPRETER    OF 
THE  SCRIPTURES. 

[The  first  edition  of  this  work  was  reprinted  in  London,  in  1827, 
under  the  care  of  the  Rev.  E.  Henderson,  D.  D.,  now  Principal  of 
Highbury  College  in  the  precincts  of  London.  In  general,  the  Amer- 
ican edition  is  simply  followed  in  the  English  one,  tn  a  few  cases, 
however.  Dr.  H.  has  appended  some  notes  of  his  own.  In  particu- 
lar, he  has  added  a  whole  section  to  the  part,  in  the  Appendix  to  the 
American  edition,  which  is  taken  from  Keil,  and  has  respect  to  the 
literary  Qualifications  of  an  Interpreter.  Dr.  H.  felt,  and  with  good 
reason,  that  the  German  teachers  are  too  apt  to  neglect  the  moral 
qualifications  of  young  candidates  for  the  ministry,  when  th(\y  come 
to  the  study  of  the  holy  Scriptures.  He  has  therefore  added  a  sec- 
tion to  the  chapter  from  Keil  on  the  subject  above  mentioned,  and 
printed  it  near  the  beginning  of  the  book.  I  now  subjoin  his  remarks 
with  much  pleasure,  according,  in  my  own  views,  throughout  with  the 
spirit  of  them,  and  in  no  case  differing  enough  from  even  the  man- 
ner of  expression  to  deem  it  of  importance  to  make  notes  in  the  way 
of  what  might  be  named  correction.  The  American  reader  will 
doubtless  be  gratified,  to  have  the  views  of  this  excellent  man  and 
highly  respectable  and  learned  scholar  placed  before  him.     M.  S.] 

It  has  frequently  been  asserted,  that  in  the  interpretation  of 


OF  AN  INTERPRETER.  13*^ 

Scripture,  we  should  proceed  in  the  same  manner  that  we 
would  do  in  regard  to  any  other  book  of  antiquity.  To  a 
certain  extent,  this  position  may  be  regarded  as  just,  and  many 
of  the  observations  contained  in  the  pages  of  Ernesti  are 
founded  on  it :  but  as  the  Bible  contains  subjects,  which,  of 
all  others,  are  calculated  to  affect  the  heart,  and  it  is  gene- 
rally admitted,  that  in  proportion  as  the  heart  is  interested  in 
any  inquiry,  a  corresponding  degree  of  influence  will  be  ex- 
erted on  the  processes  of  investigation  ;  it  is  evident  that  re- 
spect must  be  had  to  the  moral  state  of  the  affections,  if  we 
would  arrive  at  just  and  accurate  views  of  divine  truth. 

The  high  and  exclusive  claims  of  Scripture,  too,  give  them 
an  elevation  of  character,  which  commands  peculiar  atten- 
tion and  respect.  Till  the  mind  be  satisfied  on  the  subject  of 
these  claims,  it  may  be  conceded  to  an  inquirer,  to  class  the 
sacred  writings  with  other  works,  pretending  to  a  heavenly 
origin,  though,  even  then,  he  could  not  be  justified  in  treating 
their  contents  with  levity  and  indifference  of  mind;  but  no 
sooner  are  their  inspiration  and  paramount  authority  admitted, 
than,  according  to  the  natural  constitution  of  the  human  mind, 
he  is  constrained  to  place  himself  under  ihe  influence  of  a 
principle  which  will  lead  him  to  bow  with  humble  submission 
to  their  holy  dictates,  and  to  seek  in  all  things  to  receive  and 
practice  whatever  is  presented  to  him,  as  the  will  of  the  great 
Author  of  revelation. 

If  he  be  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  the  Bible,  and  his  affec- 
tions be  in  unison  with  its  dictates,  nothing  will  be  more  nat- 
ural and  easy,  than  the  acquisition  of  correct  ideas  respecting 
its  contents  :  whereas,  if  his  views,  feelings,  and  inclinations 
ire  at  variance  with  its  requirements,  he  will  infallibly,  though 
perhaps  unwittingly,  endeavour  to  pervert  the  language  in 
which  these  requirements  are  recorded,  in  order  to  bring  them 
into  accordance  with  his  wishes,  or  the  standard  of  his  pre- 
conceived opinions. 

12* 


138  Henderson's  moral  QUALtFicATioNs 

§  1.  The  primary  moral  qualification,  therefore,  of  all  who 
would  successfully  interpret  the  Scriptures,  is  vital  and  prac- 
tical godliness — that  "  godliness,"  which  "  is  profitable  to 
all  things" — "the  fear  of  the  Lord,"  which  "  is  the  begin- 
ning of  wisdom."  While  it  is  the  righteous  determination  of 
heaven,  that  "  none  of  the  wicked  shall  understand  ;"  we  are 
taught  by  Him,  who  is  truth  itself,  that  all  who  conduct  their 
inquiries  under  the  influence  of  a  predisposition  to  conform  to 
the  will  of  God  shall  not  be  left  without  instruction  :  ^Edv  xt? 
■&slri  TO  -diXr^xa  aviov  noiuv,  yvuaEiat  usqI  t?]?  didaxi^g,  John 
7:17.  "What  man  is  he  that  feareth  the  Lord  .?  him  shall 
he  teach  in  the  way  that  he  shall  choose,"  Psalm  25:  12. 

§  2.  Unreserved  submission  to  the  authority  erf  divine  reve- 
lation. The  language  of  him  who  interprets  Scripture,  should 
ever  be  in  harmony  with  that  of  Samuel  :  "  Speak,  Lord,  for 
thy  servant  heareth."  All  favourite  ideas,  popular  hypothe- 
ses, hereditary  or  self-cogitated  systems  and  opinions,  must 
be  laid  prostrate  at  the  feet  of  the  Bible,  which  must  be 
"  received,  not  as  the  word  of  men,  but,  as  it  is  in  truth,  the 
word  of  God."^ — "To  the  law  and  the  testimony,"  all  our  de-' 
cisions  must  be  brought.  If  they  differ  from  them,  "  it  is  be- 
cause there  is  no  light  in  them."  A  divine  revelation  might 
naturally  be  expected  to  teach  truths  untaught  by  reason  ; 
and  it  is  equally  natural  to  expect,  that  our  limited  capacities 
should  not  be  able  to  comprehend  fully  the  modes,  circum- 
stances, and  relations  of  those  truths  which  reason  could  not 
teach,  and  which  are  known  only  by  revelation,  any  more 
than  of  many  physical  and  moral  truths  connected  with  our 
world,  known  without  revelation.* 

§  3.  An  humhle  and  teachaUe  disposition  of  Mind.  As 
few  things  are  more  hostile  to  the  pursuit  of  truth,  in  general, 

*  Storr's  Elements  of  liiblical  Theology,  Vol.  1.  p.  471. 


OF  AN  INTERPRETER.  139 

than  self-conceit  and  pride  of  intellect,  so  there  is  no  temper 
more  offensive  to  the  great  Author  of  religious  truth,  than  a 
proud  and  self-sufficient  disposition.  "  Though  the  Lord  be 
high,  yet  hath  he  respect  to  the  lowly  ;  but  the  proud  he 
knoweth  afar  off.  Every  one  that  is  proud  in  heart,  is  an 
abomination  to  the  Lord.  God  resisteih  the  proud,  but  giveth 
grace  to  the  humble.  The  meek  will  he  guide  in  judgment, 
and  the  meek  will  he  teach  his  way  ;"  Pslam  138:  6.  Prov. 
14:  5-  1  Peter  5:  5.  Psalm  25:  9.  Hence,  both  in  the  gen- 
eral defence  of  Christianity,  and  in  the  successful  interpreta- 
tion of  its  essential  doctrines,  none  have  more  signally  distin- 
guished themselves  than  they^  who,  to  a  grasp  of  intellect 
above  their  fellows,  have  united  the  profoundest  reverence 
and  humility  in  exploring  the  depths  of  heavenly  wisdom.* 

§4.-4  decided  aUachment  to  divine  truths  springing  from 
a  perception  of  its  intrinsic  beauty  and  excellence.  That 
spirit  of  indifference  which  some  would  recommend  as  favour- 
able to  the  discovery  of  truth,  is  perfectly  incompatible  with, 
all  just  ideas  of  the  nature  and  importance  of  divine  revela- 
tion. The  truths  it  discloses  are  so  transcendently  excellent, 
and  bear  so  directly  on  our  best  and  dearest  interests,  that 
whenever  discovered  in  their  native  light,  they  must  win  the 
heart,  and  decide  the  choice  Accordingly,  those  who  derive 
no  saving  benefit  from  the  Gospel,  are  said  to  receive  not  the 
LOVE  OF  THE  TRUTH.  2  Thess.  2:  10.  The  more  the  true 
glory  of  the  revealed  system  is  perceived,  the  more  will  the 
mind  be  imbued  with  its  spirit,  and  the  influence  which  this 
imbuement  will  exert  in  leading  to  full  and  consistent  views 
of  that  system,  cannot  fail  to  be  signally  beneficial. 

§  5.  Persevering  diligence  in  the  use  of  every  proper  means 
for  discovering  "  the  mind  of  the  spirit^     While  it  is  of 

*Van  Mildert's  Bampton  Lectures,  p.  52. 


140  Henderson's  moral  qualifications 

prime  importance  for  the  interpreter  of  Scripture  to  form  a 
just  estimate  of  his  natural  faculties,  and  never  to  attribute 
supremacy  to  his  own  understanding,  or  the  judgment  of  any- 
mere  man,  or  body  of  men,  it  is  obviously  his  duty  to  apply 
those  faculties  in  the  use  of  the  various  means  with  which  he 
is  furnished  for  understanding  the  Scriptures.  Subject  to 
those  restrictions,  which  a  sense  of  the  supreme  authority  of 
the  oracles  of  God,  and  the  natural  darkness  of  the  mind  can- 
not but  inspire,  human  reason  and  science  may,  without  hesi- 
tation, be  allowed  their  full  share  in  the  interpretation  of  those 
oracles.  Though  incompetent  in  themselves  to  the  discovery 
of  spiritual  knowledge,  yet,  when  discovered,  they  are  com- 
petent to  discern,  to  examine,  to  compare,  to  illustrate,  and  to 
confirm  it  by  means  similar  to  those  which,  in  every  other 
pursuit,  lead  most  certainly  to  improvement  and  perfection.* 
Not  only  must  the  interpreter  render  himself  familiar  with 
the  contents  of  the  sacred  volume,  by  a  constant  and  unre- 
mitted reading ;  but  he  must  spare  no  pains  in  finding  out, 
and  appropriating  to  his  use,  all  the  accessory  means  by 
which  his  acquaintance  with  it  may  be  facilitated  and  ad- 
vanced :  endeavouring  to  make  himself  master  of  every  sub- 
ject in  any  way  connected  with  the  work  in  which  he  is  en- 
gaged ;  and  guarding  against  every  temptation  to  precipita- 
tion and  rashness,  in  drawing  conclusions  respecting  subjects 
of  such  transcendent  importance. 

§  6.  Incessant  and  earnest  prayer  for  divine  illumination. 
While  it  is  freely  admitted,  that  no  such  extraordinary  teach- 
ing, as  was  enjoyed  in  the  age  of  inspiration,  can  warrantably 
be  expected  in  the  present  day,  it  is  nevertheless  undeniable, 
that  the  Scriptures  instruct  us  to  believe  in  the  enlightening 
influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  1  John  2:  20,  27.  This  aid 
consists  in  a  special,  internal,  and  efficient  operation  of  that 

*  Van  Mildert  ut  sup.  p.  126. 


OF  AN  INTERPRETER.  I4l 

divine  agent,  and  is  no  less  distinct  from  the  prophetic  and 
apostolic  impulse,  than  it  is  from  that  mere  natural  assistance 
by  which  we  discover  common  truths,  and  succeed  in  our 
ordinary  undertakings.  It  is  granted  in  answer  to  prayer, 
accompanied  by  the  exercise  of  humble  dependence  on  God, 
and  a  due  use  of  all  the  ordinary  means  of  improvement. 
"  If  any  man  lack  wisdom,  let  him  ask  of  God,  that  giveth  to 
all  men  liberally  and  upbraideth  not,  and  it  shall  be 
GIVEN  HIM."  James  1:  5. 

All  eminent  interpreters  of  Scripture  have  asserted  the 
necessity  and  utility  of  prayer.  One  of  the  qualifications 
which  Wickliff  considered  to  be  indispensably  requisite  in 
him  who  interprets  the  word  of  God,  he  expresses  in  the  fol- 
lowing striking  terms : — "  He  should  be  a  man  of  prayer. 
He  needs  the  internal  instruction  of  the  primary 
TEACHER."*  To  the  samo  effect  is  the  testimony  of  the  great 
Dr.  Owen : — "  For  a  man  solemnly  to  undertake  the  inter- 
pretation of  any  portion  of  Scripture  without  invocation  of 
God,  to  be  taught  and  instructed  by  his  Spirit,  is  a  high  prov- 
ocation of  him;  rior  shall  I  expect  the  discovery  of  truth 
from  any  one  who  thus  proudly  engages  in  a  work  so  much 
above  his  ability.  But  this  is  the  sheet  anchor  of  a  faith- 
ful expositor  in  all  difficulties :  nor  can  he  without  this  be 
satisfied  that  he  hath  attained  the  mind  of  the  Spirit  in  any 
divine  revelation.  When  all  other  helps  fail,  as  they  fre- 
quently do,  this  will  afford  him  the  best  relief.  The  labours 
of  former  expositors  are  of  excellent  use ;  but  they  are  far 
from  having  discovered  the  depths  of  this  vein  of  wisdom  ; 
nor  will  the  best  of  our  endeavours  prescribe  limits  to  our 
successors :  and  the  reason  why  the  generality  go  in  the 
same  track,  except  in  some  excursions  of  curiosity,  is  the  not 
giving  themselves  up  to  the  conduct  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the 


Milner's  Church  history,  Vol.  IV.  p.  134. 


142  HENDERSON^S  MORAL  QUALIFICATIONS,  ETC. 

diligent  performance  of  their  duty."*  And  Ernesli  himself, 
whom  none  will  accuse  of  fanaticism,  scruples  not  to  assert, 
"  that  men  truly  pious,  and  desirous  of  knowing  the  truth,  are 
assisted  hy  the  influence  of  the  Spirit  in  their  researches, 
specially  in  those  things  that  pertain  to  faith  and  practice." 
Part  I.  §  31. 

Had  the  subjects  treated  of  in  this  chapter  not  been  in  a 
great  measure  systematically  excluded  from  hermeneutical 
and  exegetical  studies,  and  in  many  instances  regarded  as 
detrimental  to  the  free  and  successful  prosecution  of  them, 
foreign  theological  literature  would  not  have  been  disgraced  as 
it  is  with  such  a  mass  of  puerile,  irreverent,  and  hazardous  inter- 
pretations, such  temerity  of  hypothesis,  and  such  an  immense 
accumulation  of  philological  speculations,  marshalled  in  infi- 
del array  against  the  fortress  of  divine  truth.  To  guard  the 
student  against  the  pernicious  consequences  of  attempting  to 
interpret  the  Bible,  except  in  the  spirit  of  the  Bible,  the  above 
observations  are  inserted  in  this  work. 


Pneumatology,  p.  332.  Lond,  1808.  &vo 


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